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	<title>Comments on: Hagel on Institutional Innovation</title>
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	<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2007/10/11/hagel-on-institutional-innovation/</link>
	<description>Economics of organizations, strategy, entrepreneurship, innovation, and more</description>
	<pubDate>Sun, 27 Jul 2008 02:36:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: michael webster</title>
		<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2007/10/11/hagel-on-institutional-innovation/#comment-55504</link>
		<dc:creator>michael webster</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Oct 2007 21:03:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>It appears to me that the overwhelming amount of research is on the share issuing firm; very little academic research is about the franchise system.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It appears to me that the overwhelming amount of research is on the share issuing firm; very little academic research is about the franchise system.</p>
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		<title>By: spostrel</title>
		<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2007/10/11/hagel-on-institutional-innovation/#comment-54981</link>
		<dc:creator>spostrel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Oct 2007 00:35:26 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>One of the minor themes that comes up when I teach strategy is that new technologies, demand shifts, etc. often don't fit well with existing institutions, but that there is a lag in changing these for various reasons. Whoever can first figure out how to shift to more efficient forms can gain advantage, although once you break the ice imitation comes rapidly. 

The most obvious things that come up are "business model" institutions--who gets paid for what on what basis. Often there is a traditional basis for transactions that is no longer incentive compatible with maximizing joint surplus when technology or demand conditions shift. Yet people resist change, often because they fear that they cannot separate the distributional impact from the efficiency impact. 

A good example is TV producers fighting (and winning for a long time) against relaxing the FCC's financial/syndication rules that limited networks' ability to own TV shows. The incentives of the traditional system were truly screwy, with the networks' cancellation decisions hugely affecting the wealth of the producers (by determining whether they accumulated enough episodes to sell reruns in the syndication market), but the networks not seeing a dime of the syndication money. Hardly a recipe for efficient cancellation decisions, but the producers and studios were militant about retaining this structure (even getting former actor Ronald Reagan to overrule his own policy people to preserve the regs).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One of the minor themes that comes up when I teach strategy is that new technologies, demand shifts, etc. often don&#8217;t fit well with existing institutions, but that there is a lag in changing these for various reasons. Whoever can first figure out how to shift to more efficient forms can gain advantage, although once you break the ice imitation comes rapidly. </p>
<p>The most obvious things that come up are &#8220;business model&#8221; institutions&#8211;who gets paid for what on what basis. Often there is a traditional basis for transactions that is no longer incentive compatible with maximizing joint surplus when technology or demand conditions shift. Yet people resist change, often because they fear that they cannot separate the distributional impact from the efficiency impact. </p>
<p>A good example is TV producers fighting (and winning for a long time) against relaxing the FCC&#8217;s financial/syndication rules that limited networks&#8217; ability to own TV shows. The incentives of the traditional system were truly screwy, with the networks&#8217; cancellation decisions hugely affecting the wealth of the producers (by determining whether they accumulated enough episodes to sell reruns in the syndication market), but the networks not seeing a dime of the syndication money. Hardly a recipe for efficient cancellation decisions, but the producers and studios were militant about retaining this structure (even getting former actor Ronald Reagan to overrule his own policy people to preserve the regs).</p>
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		<title>By: Meh</title>
		<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2007/10/11/hagel-on-institutional-innovation/#comment-54953</link>
		<dc:creator>Meh</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Oct 2007 20:29:53 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>There is of course some volume of literature about diffusion of institutional forms...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is of course some volume of literature about diffusion of institutional forms&#8230;</p>
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