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	<title>Comments on: Demsetz, Coase, Postrel, and Williamson</title>
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	<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2007/11/05/demsetz-coase-postrel-and-williamson/</link>
	<description>Economics of organizations, strategy, entrepreneurship, innovation, and more</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jan 2009 20:49:10 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Steve Phelan</title>
		<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2007/11/05/demsetz-coase-postrel-and-williamson/#comment-57379</link>
		<dc:creator>Steve Phelan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Nov 2007 22:07:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>That is also my reading of it.

Nicolai's "what can't be achieved with a group under a big roof" resonates with me on this topic. 

Here is an attempt at an answer, following Selznick's Leadership in Administration, which makes the distinction between organizations and institutions.

If identifying with a firm for non-pecuniary reasons (loyalty, clanship, tribalism) leads to lower cooperation costs then establishing a institution  is more efficient than using the market.

The lower cooperation costs can come from reducing the level of self-interest to the "greater good" of the firm. Institutions can also lower coordination costs by establishing a common language but this could also occur under the big roof (or big tent as I like to call it).

Thoughts?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That is also my reading of it.</p>
<p>Nicolai&#8217;s &#8220;what can&#8217;t be achieved with a group under a big roof&#8221; resonates with me on this topic. </p>
<p>Here is an attempt at an answer, following Selznick&#8217;s Leadership in Administration, which makes the distinction between organizations and institutions.</p>
<p>If identifying with a firm for non-pecuniary reasons (loyalty, clanship, tribalism) leads to lower cooperation costs then establishing a institution  is more efficient than using the market.</p>
<p>The lower cooperation costs can come from reducing the level of self-interest to the &#8220;greater good&#8221; of the firm. Institutions can also lower coordination costs by establishing a common language but this could also occur under the big roof (or big tent as I like to call it).</p>
<p>Thoughts?</p>
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		<title>By: Joe Mahoney</title>
		<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2007/11/05/demsetz-coase-postrel-and-williamson/#comment-57288</link>
		<dc:creator>Joe Mahoney</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Nov 2007 04:55:30 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Postrel (2003) believes that without opportunism the firm is unnecessary.

I believe that is the position also of:

Williamson (1985) Institutions of Capitalism
Foss (1996) Organization Science
Mahoney (2001) Journal of Management</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Postrel (2003) believes that without opportunism the firm is unnecessary.</p>
<p>I believe that is the position also of:</p>
<p>Williamson (1985) Institutions of Capitalism<br />
Foss (1996) Organization Science<br />
Mahoney (2001) Journal of Management</p>
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