Archive for 11 August 2008

Rival Teams and Non-Rival Knowledge

| Dick Langlois |

A recent issue of the Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, an all-electronic Bepress journal, carried a piece provocatively titled “Quantifying NFL Coaching: A Proof of New Growth Theory” by Kevin P. Braig. The paper is a rambling mix of sports anecdotes and goofy math. My favorite of the latter is:

lim f(x) = 1 first down

x→10 

But the piece is amusing reading and does make some interesting points.

The title is more than a bit fatuous, of course. What the author has in mind is that one can increase output not only by increasing the inputs but by learning to reorganize the way those inputs are combined. This was the growth theory of Smith and Marshall, of Rosenberg and Mokyr. The only contribution of the New Growth Theory has been to cram a diminished and mechanized version of these ideas into the formalism of the production function — and, of course, to receive credit in the popular mind for the very notion that growth is about the search for new “recipes.” Braig is on firmer ground when he associates himself with Carliss Baldwin‘s notion of designs.

What has this got to do with sports? Consider baseball, which is probably the most modular of major (American) sports. In baseball, the only real way to be more successful is to improve the quality of the players, what Braig likes to call their human capital. This is because the way players interact is relatively hard-wired and invariant among teams. Small adjustments are possible — shifts, bunting strategy — but no one ever redefines how to turn a double play. The so-called moneyball approach has been to find better statistical measures of the effectiveness of player human capital — not to reorganize how the players interact. (In testimony to the almost mystical numerology of this article, Braig finds wonder in the fact that average on-base percentage has remained nearly constant over the live-ball era at about 0.331, exactly the ratio one gets by recognizing that “the hitters’ needs (4 bases) exceed their resources (2 outs) by a 2-to-1 margin.” But this presumes that human capital in batting should somehow exactly keep pace with human capital in pitching — even though there is arguably more room for innovation in pitching. I think a closer examination would find that baseball rulemakers have tweaked subtle rules like the size of the strike zone or the height of the mound to keep the ratio constant.) (more…)

11 August 2008 at 3:31 pm 3 comments

Organizational Structure and the Diversification Discount

| Peter Klein |

Do diversified conglomerates trade at a discount relative to more specialized firms? A huge literature in strategy and corporate finance emerged over the last couple of decades devoted to this question. Early studies claimed to find a substantial diversification discount, though more recent papers claim that the observed discount is due to measurement error, self-selection, and other characteristics, not a harmful effect of diversification per se. (For a good overview of this literature, now slightly dated, see this roundtable report edited by Belén Villalonga. Some of my own contributions are here and here.)

Seemingly lost in the search for a diversification discount, however, is a related question: What is being discounted? Potential benefits of diversification, according to the literature, include access to internal capital markets and more efficient redeployment of distressed assets; potential costs include inefficient rent-seeking, bargaining problems, and bureaucratic rigidity. But these benefits and costs have little to do with industry or geographic diversification per se — they apply to the management of any multi-unit organization, even if its activities do not span different industries or regions.

In a new paper, “Organizational Structure and the Diversification Discount: Evidence from Commercial Banking,” Marc Saidenberg and I try to distinguish the effects of diversification and organiztaional complexity by studying multi-unit firms within a single industry, commercial banking. (more…)

11 August 2008 at 2:04 am Leave a comment


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Nicolai J. Foss and Peter G. Klein, Organizing Entrepreneurial Judgment: A New Approach to the Firm (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
Peter G. Klein and Micheal E. Sykuta, eds., The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics (Edward Elgar, 2010).
Peter G. Klein, The Capitalist and the Entrepreneur: Essays on Organizations and Markets (Mises Institute, 2010).
Richard N. Langlois, The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (Routledge, 2007).
Nicolai J. Foss, Strategy, Economic Organization, and the Knowledge Economy: The Coordination of Firms and Resources (Oxford University Press, 2005).
Raghu Garud, Arun Kumaraswamy, and Richard N. Langlois, eds., Managing in the Modular Age: Architectures, Networks and Organizations (Blackwell, 2003).
Nicolai J. Foss and Peter G. Klein, eds., Entrepreneurship and the Firm: Austrian Perspectives on Economic Organization (Elgar, 2002).
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