Archive for 5 October 2008

Amethyst and Public Choice

| Dick Langlois |

Many of you have heard of the Amethyst Initiative, a petition signed (at this writing) by 130 American college and university presidents in favor of lowering the drinking age from 21 back down to 18. As the website puts it, prohibition is not working. The college presidents are hoping that, by removing the black-market character of college drinking in the U.S., lowering the drinking age might be part of a solution to the problem of binge drinking on campus. (Although American 18-year-olds may not buy alcohol because such an activity is unsafe and unhealthy, it is quite alright for the same 18-year-olds to join the military and be posted to Iraq or Afghanistan.) Needless to say, this proposal has generated an enormous amount of controversy, and is vociferously opposed by politically powerful groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving. The authoritarian response, typified by this column in Slate, is to point to the many studies that show that a higher drinking age reduces driving fatalities, although the Slate article does come around at the very end to the point that economists would make: taxes are more efficient at regulating behavior than is prohibition. (This would also include binge drinking. A student of mine, recently returned from a semester abroad, reports that there is no binge drinking at the National University of Singapore despite a drinking age of 18 — not because of that government’s well-known authoritarianism but because alcohol is highly taxed.) Not, of course, that I would personally like to see higher taxes on my pinot grigio.

My point here is not to engage the debate but to raise a Public Choice point I haven’t seen raised elsewhere. A quick reading of the list of university presidents who have signed suggests that many of them are from private schools. Among the most prominent of these are Dartmouth, Duke, and Johns Hopkins. Public Choice theory might suggest that presidents of state universities are much less likely to sign, since they depend on politicians for funding, and are much less willing to take positions that groups like MADD would oppose. The president of my university is certainly not about to sign it. The six Connecticut schools that have signed are all private, including Trinity College but not including Connecticut College, Wesleyan, or Yale. (Of course, Rick Levin at Yale may be just as reluctant to take unpopular positions given the hungry eye the government has been casting at his endowment.) On the other hand, there are a number of public colleges among the signatories, notably Maryland, UMass, and Ohio State. Are the signatories really biased in favor of private schools? Or are people actually taking moral positions despite possible consequences? That would be interesting. Do we have enough data to tell? Might be an good project for someone talented in the relevant econometrics.

I hesitated at first to post this, since I didn’t see its relevance to the current financial crisis. On reflection, however, it occurred to me that there is an important connection, since the best possible response to the financial crisis might well be binge drinking.

5 October 2008 at 11:24 am 5 comments

Protesting Against and Sanctioning Bad Reviewers

| Nicolai Foss |

Keynes famously complained (whined) that Hayek, in his review of A Treatise of Money, hadn’t treated the book with the measure of relative goodwill that an author is entitled to expect from a reviewer. He also equally famously informed Hayek that he (Keynes) had changed his mind, so that Hayek’s two-part, article-length review was irrelevant anyway. Hayek later explained that this was the main reason why he had chosen not to review Keynes’ General Theory (the story is a bit more complex, see this paper).

While Keynes was no doubt whining — those who care can check Hayek’s very careful and balanced review — he does have a point: Aren’t authors entitled to a certain measure of goodwill in the sense that they can reasonably expect that the reviewer has tried to understand what the author is talking about, doesn’t misinterpret and misrepresent him too badly, doesn’t kill a paper because of very minor problems, etc. etc.? While I trust that most people would agree with this, we also know that we may occasionally get reviewers (whether anonymous or, in the case, of published reviews, usually non-anonymous) who are not at all inclined to show such goodwill. (more…)

5 October 2008 at 8:50 am 3 comments

Call for Papers: Org Economics and Org Capabilities

| Nicolai Foss |

The relation between organizational economics (agency theory, TCE, property rights theory, team theory) and the organizational capabilities view has often been debated on O&M. Perhaps not surprising, as at least three out of the four current O&M bloggers have frequently covered this theme in their research, Dick Langlois writing about the relation between these ideas at least as early as 1984 (here), my first publication on the subject appearing in 1993 (here), and Peter’s first paper on it appearing in 1996 (here). I think we hold different views on the nature of the relation between organizational economics and capabilities ideas. I increasingly think of ideas on transaction costs, property rights etc. as primary to, and more fundamental than, notions of capabilities (e.g., see this paper, forthcoming in Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal). Dick, on the other hand, seems to hold the opposite view.

Such differences are even more pronounced in the strategy and organization fields. Some scholars reject organizational economic altogether (Sid Winter seems close to that position). Others argue that organizational economics and the organizational economics view are complementary in an additive sense: They deal with different, yet complementary issues, so that, for example, the organizational capabilities view tells us which assets/resources we need, organizational economics providing insight in the actual organization of those assets/resources (this seems to be the current mainstream view). Some scholars go further, and argue that there is a real scope for integrating, for example, ideas on localized knowledge and learning from the capabilities view with transaction cost economics (e.g., this paper). In fact, overall there seems to have been some movement from the i initial polarized positions of 10-15 years to today’s more integrative stance. 

In order to report advances in research on the relation between organizational economics and the organizational capabilities view, Nick Argyres, Teppo Felin, Todd Zenger and I will edit a special issue of Organization Science on “Organizational Economics and Organizational Capabilities: From Opposition and Complementarity to Real Integration.” Papers which can be both theoretical (or, for the US audience, “conceptual”) and empirical, must be submitted between Oct. 1 and Oct. 30 2009. The Call for Papers is here (scroll down a bit). The Call contains a long list of possible themes for papers, but feel free to mail me at njf.smg@cbs.dk (or any of the other editors) if you are in doubt whether your paper may make a fit with the SI.

5 October 2008 at 8:26 am 1 comment


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Nicolai J. Foss and Peter G. Klein, Organizing Entrepreneurial Judgment: A New Approach to the Firm (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
Peter G. Klein and Micheal E. Sykuta, eds., The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics (Edward Elgar, 2010).
Peter G. Klein, The Capitalist and the Entrepreneur: Essays on Organizations and Markets (Mises Institute, 2010).
Richard N. Langlois, The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (Routledge, 2007).
Nicolai J. Foss, Strategy, Economic Organization, and the Knowledge Economy: The Coordination of Firms and Resources (Oxford University Press, 2005).
Raghu Garud, Arun Kumaraswamy, and Richard N. Langlois, eds., Managing in the Modular Age: Architectures, Networks and Organizations (Blackwell, 2003).
Nicolai J. Foss and Peter G. Klein, eds., Entrepreneurship and the Firm: Austrian Perspectives on Economic Organization (Elgar, 2002).
Nicolai J. Foss and Volker Mahnke, eds., Competence, Governance, and Entrepreneurship: Advances in Economic Strategy Research (Oxford, 2000).
Nicolai J. Foss and Paul L. Robertson, eds., Resources, Technology, and Strategy: Explorations in the Resource-based Perspective (Routledge, 2000).