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	<title>Comments on: Amethyst and Public Choice</title>
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	<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2008/10/05/amethyst-and-public-choice/</link>
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		<title>By: Dick Langlois</title>
		<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2008/10/05/amethyst-and-public-choice/#comment-71748</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dick Langlois]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Oct 2008 17:17:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://organizationsandmarkets.wordpress.com/2008/10/05/amethyst-and-public-choice/#comment-71748</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As it happens, an article called &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.bepress.com/jdpa/vol1/iss1/art2/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;”Free Lunch” by Philip Cook&lt;/a&gt; at Duke came across my screen not long before your comment appeared.  Cook, who is apparently one of the world&#039;s experts on alcohol taxation, argues that an across-the-board tax on alcohol (A) doesn&#039;t have to be large to have effects and (B) is automatically targeted toward those who generate the most externalities (including the externality of ill-health in a socialized health-care system).  This latter is so because 80% of the alcohol gets consumed by only 20% of the drinkers (13% of the population).

Cook also claims -- and this is the free lunch part -- that the moderate drinkers are actually made better off by the tax, since the revenue the tax generates could be used to lower other taxes or provide additional valuable government services that the moderate drinkers would value.  Of course, readers of this blog are well aware that, empirically, the former never happens (hasn&#039;t Peter blogged about this?), and increased  taxes always lead to increased spending, arguably on less-than-obviously beneficial things.  Cook also seem to believe that most of us are &quot;under the influence [sic] of false lessons from national Prohibition.&quot;  By this he means that Public Health types believe that Prohibition did reduce alcohol consumption and related health and safety internalities and externalities, and thus was a good thing.  In fact, of course, we believers in the &quot;conventional wisdom&quot; are well aware that Prohibition reduced overall alcohol consumption; it’s just that we also believe that the externalities Prohibition created (cf. every period gangster movie ever made) far outweighed any benefits, even as calculated in narrow Public Health terms.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As it happens, an article called <a href="http://www.bepress.com/jdpa/vol1/iss1/art2/" rel="nofollow">”Free Lunch” by Philip Cook</a> at Duke came across my screen not long before your comment appeared.  Cook, who is apparently one of the world&#8217;s experts on alcohol taxation, argues that an across-the-board tax on alcohol (A) doesn&#8217;t have to be large to have effects and (B) is automatically targeted toward those who generate the most externalities (including the externality of ill-health in a socialized health-care system).  This latter is so because 80% of the alcohol gets consumed by only 20% of the drinkers (13% of the population).</p>
<p>Cook also claims &#8212; and this is the free lunch part &#8212; that the moderate drinkers are actually made better off by the tax, since the revenue the tax generates could be used to lower other taxes or provide additional valuable government services that the moderate drinkers would value.  Of course, readers of this blog are well aware that, empirically, the former never happens (hasn&#8217;t Peter blogged about this?), and increased  taxes always lead to increased spending, arguably on less-than-obviously beneficial things.  Cook also seem to believe that most of us are &#8220;under the influence [sic] of false lessons from national Prohibition.&#8221;  By this he means that Public Health types believe that Prohibition did reduce alcohol consumption and related health and safety internalities and externalities, and thus was a good thing.  In fact, of course, we believers in the &#8220;conventional wisdom&#8221; are well aware that Prohibition reduced overall alcohol consumption; it’s just that we also believe that the externalities Prohibition created (cf. every period gangster movie ever made) far outweighed any benefits, even as calculated in narrow Public Health terms.</p>
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		<title>By: Bertil</title>
		<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2008/10/05/amethyst-and-public-choice/#comment-71747</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bertil]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Oct 2008 16:30:04 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[A solution might be to have a tax scheme that isn&#039;t too bad on your Pinot Grigio, and significant for cheap Vodka. Sweden has rather expensive alcohol, but when you compare great wine, it&#039;s actually surprisingly affordable — not that the results are geat (everyone p*ssed-drunk on Friday nights).

An alcoholic content tax, with increasing rate by alcoholic ratio might do that, say: 
- ¢20/g for a light beer (0-5%) would make a small can (.33L, 3%, 1g) 20 cents more expensive;
- ¢30/g for wine (5-18%) would make a bottle (.75L, 12%, 9g) $2.7 more expensive;
- ¢50/g for liquor (18%-45%) would make a whisky bottle (1L, 40%, 40g) $20 more expensive.

But maybe this will encourage students to get drunk with beer, gulping gallons at once and inducing kidney failure. . . MADD won&#039;t like that either.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A solution might be to have a tax scheme that isn&#8217;t too bad on your Pinot Grigio, and significant for cheap Vodka. Sweden has rather expensive alcohol, but when you compare great wine, it&#8217;s actually surprisingly affordable — not that the results are geat (everyone p*ssed-drunk on Friday nights).</p>
<p>An alcoholic content tax, with increasing rate by alcoholic ratio might do that, say:<br />
- ¢20/g for a light beer (0-5%) would make a small can (.33L, 3%, 1g) 20 cents more expensive;<br />
- ¢30/g for wine (5-18%) would make a bottle (.75L, 12%, 9g) $2.7 more expensive;<br />
- ¢50/g for liquor (18%-45%) would make a whisky bottle (1L, 40%, 40g) $20 more expensive.</p>
<p>But maybe this will encourage students to get drunk with beer, gulping gallons at once and inducing kidney failure. . . MADD won&#8217;t like that either.</p>
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		<title>By: Rafe Champion</title>
		<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2008/10/05/amethyst-and-public-choice/#comment-71629</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafe Champion]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Oct 2008 23:25:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Lowering the legal age of drinking will only legalize something that is happening all the time and the parallel step is to point out that accepting personal responsibiliy for our behaviour and its consequences beats both legal restrictions and taxation in generating good outcomes. The  history of MADD is interesting, the original founder bailed out because it was taken over by zealots.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Lowering the legal age of drinking will only legalize something that is happening all the time and the parallel step is to point out that accepting personal responsibiliy for our behaviour and its consequences beats both legal restrictions and taxation in generating good outcomes. The  history of MADD is interesting, the original founder bailed out because it was taken over by zealots.</p>
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		<title>By: Um problema de Escolha Pública &#171; De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum</title>
		<link>http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2008/10/05/amethyst-and-public-choice/#comment-71628</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Um problema de Escolha Pública &#171; De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Oct 2008 22:25:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://organizationsandmarkets.wordpress.com/2008/10/05/amethyst-and-public-choice/#comment-71628</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] by claudio in Uncategorized.  Tags: escolha pública, lei seca, public choice trackback  Eis uma interessante reflexão. Para quem gosta de políticas públicas e álcool, este é um bom tema para se [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] by claudio in Uncategorized.  Tags: escolha pública, lei seca, public choice trackback  Eis uma interessante reflexão. Para quem gosta de políticas públicas e álcool, este é um bom tema para se [...]</p>
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