31 January 2011 at 3:46 pm Peter Klein 1 comment
| Peter Klein |
A visual reminder why real-world contracts are typically incomplete, giving rise to interesting problems of ex ante incentive alignment and ex post governance.
Entry filed under: - Klein -, New Institutional Economics, Theory of the Firm. Tags: .
Peter G. Klein and Micheal E. Sykuta, eds., The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics (Edward Elgar, 2010).
Peter G. Klein, The Capitalist and the Entrepreneur: Essays on Organizations and Markets (Mises Institute, 2010).
Richard N. Langlois, The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Schumpeter, Chandler, and the New Economy (Routledge, 2007).
Nicolai J. Foss, Strategy, Economic Organization, and the Knowledge Economy: The Coordination of Firms and Resources (Oxford University Press, 2005).
Raghu Garud, Arun Kumaraswamy, and Richard N. Langlois, eds., Managing in the Modular Age: Architectures, Networks and Organizations (Blackwell, 2003).
Nicolai J. Foss and Peter G. Klein, eds., Entrepreneurship and the Firm: Austrian Perspectives on Economic Organization (Elgar, 2002).
1. Links for February 7, 2011 « Marc F. Bellemare | 7 February 2011 at 8:53 am
[...] The transaction costs of trying abide by the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare. Bookmark on Delicious Digg this post Recommend on Facebook share via Reddit Share with Stumblers Tweet about it [...]