Posts filed under 'Classical Liberalism'
Why “Doing Business” Leads to Bad Policy
| Benito Arruñada |
In a post at the PSD blog, David Kaplan sees little difference between the “Doing Business” position and my own. He writes:
Part of Professor Arruñada’s argument is that the Doing Business indicators do not capture all the relevant components of the business environment. The writers of the Doing Business 2009 report agree. . . .
I believe that the debate is not mainly about what Doing Business measures. Really, the debate is about how these measures are used in shaping public policy. Critics of Doing Business are concerned that countries will ignore the above warnings and only reform in areas that are measured in Doing Business.
I doubt that one can separate what DB measures and how it does it from how DB measures are used in the field. My main complaint, however, is different, namely that the DB method has often led to bad policy. (more…)
2 comments 26 June 2009
Does Capitalism Suffer Cycles of Statism?
| Benito Arruñada |
Does the current expansion of the State reverse a previous reduction, to be reduced once again in the future? Or, alternatively, is there a sort of ratchet effect, with a trend towards greater statism disguised by cycles along such increasing trend?
I am inclined to think that cycling has not taken place around a stationary average but around an increasing tendency (see the figures). But perhaps a better way of facing these questions would be to disaggregate in different dimensions. For instance, in several papers with Veneta Andonova I argue that freedom
of contract has been in decline for more than a century in Western Law, both in civil- and common-law countries. Something similar could probably be said about trade, but in the opposite direction. However, in both freedom of contract and trade, it might be the case that exchange opportunities have expanded mainly as a result of technological change (e.g., cheaper transportation and communications), whatever the legal constraints. In terms of research, how could these trends be measured?
These thoughts were triggered by a timely and extremely suggestive paper by Witold J. Henisz presented at the Workshop on “Manufacturing Markets” organized last week in Villa Finaly, Florence, by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant. My next few blogs will address other aspects of Henisz’s views on the broader challenges facing capitalism.
2 comments 18 June 2009
Mises and Hayek in Progress in Human Geography
| Nicolai Foss |
It is surprising, even bizarre, to see Mises and Hayek, as well as other luminaries of 20th-century classical liberalism, being extensively cited, quoted, and discussed in one of the leading geography journals, Progress in Human Geography (here is the wiki on the field of “human geography”), specifically in the form of the printed version of an invited lecture by Jamie Peck. (more…)
1 comment 10 June 2009
You Go, Gordon Gekko!
| Peter Klein |
Several folks in my part of the blogosphere have noted John Hasnas’s terrific op-ed in yesterday’s WSJ, “The ‘Unseen’ Deserve Empathy, Too.” Hasnas invokes the great Bastiat to counter President Obama’s call for judges who have compassion, empathy, and understanding of “people’s hopes and struggles.” As Hasnas points out, judges should consider the effects of legal rulings not only on the parties before the bar, but also on the “unseen” whose lives will be affected:
One can have compassion for workers who lose their jobs when a plant closes. They can be seen. One cannot have compassion for unknown persons in other industries who do not receive job offers when a compassionate government subsidizes an unprofitable plant. The potential employees not hired are unseen. . . .
The law consists of abstract rules because we know that, as human beings, judges are unable to foresee all of the long-term consequences of their decisions and may be unduly influenced by the immediate, visible effects of these decisions. The rules of law are designed in part to strike the proper balance between the interests of those who are seen and those who are not seen. The purpose of the rules is to enable judges to resist the emotionally engaging temptation to relieve the plight of those they can see and empathize with, even when doing so would be unfair to those they cannot see.
This was on my mind when, channel surfing last night, I came across Oliver Stone’s 1987 classic “Wall Street,” which I haven’t seen in its entirety in years. To my surprise (perhaps not yours), I found myself rooting for Michael Douglas’s Gordon Gekko, the corporate raider who serves as the movie’s arch-villain. The main sub-plot revolves around Gekko’s attempted buyout of Blue Star Airlines. Bud thinks the buyout can save the struggling airline, where his father still works, and helps convince the pilots’ and flight attendants’ unions to Gekko’s move. Later, Bud discovers Gekko is really planning to break up the company and sell off the pieces and Bud feels betrayed, leading to a climactic confrontation. (The film feels remarkably fresh, despite the glowing green CRT screens and brick-sized cellular phones, and Douglas’s performance is dazzling.) (more…)
8 comments 30 May 2009
Deregulation and the Financial Crisis
| Peter Klein |
Niall Ferguson joins Charles Calomiris, Jerry O’Driscoll, Arnold Kling, and many others in questioning the supposed link between “deregulation” and the financial crisis. As Ferguson emphasizes, the timing is all wrong; there is no time-series correlation between specific patterns of regulation and deregulation and particular financial or economic outcomes. The relaxation of Glass-Steagall restrictions on universal banking is an oft-cited example, but, as these writers point out, no one has offered any specific mechanism by which universal banking contributed to the problem (indeed, the opposite is likely to be true). The “laissez-faire caused the crisis” meme may be pithy, but is there any systematic theoretical or empirical evidence for it?
Ferguson has the best line (suggested by Luke): “It is indeed impressive how rapidly the economists who failed to predict this crisis . . . have been able to produce such a satisfying story about its origins.”
3 comments 22 May 2009
More on Adam Smith’s Metaphor
| Peter Klein |
If you enjoyed our earlier discussion of social science’s most famous metaphor — come on, guys, is “iron cage” even in the same ballpark? — see the current issue of EconJournalWatch, which features essays on the invisible hand by Gavin Kennedy and Dan Klein.
Add comment 19 May 2009
Cheer Up With the Depression Bundle
| Peter Klein |
Sorry, couldn’t resist the headline. But check it out: Murray Rothbard’s America’s Great Depression, Bob Murphy’s Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal, Dave Beito’s Taxpayers in Revolt, and John T. Flynn’s Roosevelt Myth, all for $49! That’s quite an uplifting deal.
More great news: Contra Keynes and Cambridge, vol. 9 of Hayek’s Collected Works, is now out in paperback from Liberty Fund, and just $14.50.
4 comments 1 May 2009
Macroeconomic Policy Quote of the Day
| Peter Klein |
Mike Rozeff makes the Hayekian point that is probably obvious to the O&M community, but virtually absent from public debate:
Bernanke is just a man. He is fallible. We learned this week that he pressured Bank of America into absorbing Merrill Lynch. In doing this, he pressured the leader of Bank of America into withholding critical information from his shareholders about Merrill Lynch losses. Technically, he can be charged with conspiracy to defraud. The loans he had the FED make to AIG look far from wise. A number of his other actions are highly questionable in making various kinds of loans to questionable borrowers.
I am saying that Bernanke doesn’t actually know what he’s doing. But I am using him only as an example. He’s not special. The more important point is that no one knows how to do fiscal and monetary policy, and they never have and never will. No one. For that reason alone, which is a narrowly practical one, no one should have those powers.
2 comments 30 April 2009
One Part of the Financial Sector Is Still Growing
3 comments 25 April 2009
Keynesian Economics in a Nutshell
| Peter Klein |
An earlier post on Keynesian economics in four paragraphs has proven extremely popular. Here’s Keynesian economics in just one-and-a-half paragraphs, courtesy of Mario Rizzo:
Clearly, DeLong is a rigid aggregate demand theorist. He talks about output and employment as if it were some homogeneous thing. In his mind, macroeconomics is just about spending to increase the production of stuff. Yes, there is lip service to the idea that the stuff should have economic value. But that is easy when you assume that the only alternative is value-less idleness. . . .
The sectoral problems generated, not only by exogenous shocks but by the low interest rate policy of the Fed, are of critical importance. The aggregate demanders are blind to this.
Here at O&M we take the opposite perspective, namely that heterogeneity matters. Actually, as Mario has pointed out in a series of posts (1, 2, 3), Keynes himself was much better than his latter-day followers. Keynes may have been wrong — deeply, deeply wrong, in my view — but he was no fool. As for today’s Keynesians. . . .
Update (14 April): See also Mario’s fine essay in the April Freeman, “A Microeconomist’s Protest.”
Add comment 10 April 2009
Adam Smith’s Famous Metaphor
| Peter Klein |
The indefatigable Gavin Kennedy explains, for the umpteenth time, that Adam Smith was ambivalent about market capitalism and that the famous metaphor of the “invisible hand” was not meant as a generalized defense of the market. As Gavin points out, Smith’s detailed analysis of the market economy appears in Books I and II of the Wealth of Nations, while the invisible hand metaphor appears only once, in Book IV, where Smith defends British merchants who, despite mercantilist export subsidies, preferred to keep their capital invested at home, to the benefit of the British economy. Notes Gavin:
So inconsequential was [Smith's] use of The Metaphor that neither he, nor anybody else until the late 19th century, commented upon it. . . .
Moreover, it was only in Chicago in the 1930s that The Metaphor was generalised into Smith’s so-called “law” of markets. Paul Samuelson (1948, 1st edition), in his famous textbook, Economics (16 editions), publicised this invention with the inevitable affect on modern economics, as tens of thousands of his readers took it on trust as true.
To be sure, the relevant passage in Smith also includes the famous lines, “By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good,” and the remark that “What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom.” But Smith’s statements need to be understood in context; he is discussing the specific problem of trade monopoly, arguing against trade and industrial policies that subsidize particular markets or industries.
4 comments 31 March 2009
New Friedman Book
| Nicolai Foss |
K. Puttaswamaiah has edited Milton Friedman, Nobel Monetary Economist: A Review of his Theories and Policies (Isle Publishing Co., 2009). I only know the names of a few of the contributors, but I do recognize a certain Samuelson, who recently ”remembered” Friedrich Hayek in a scandalously superficial and misleading note published in the pages of the Journal of Economic Organization and Behavior. Ones hopes that Friedman isn’t up for a similar treatment, but perhaps he is: One of the chapters in the volume is titled, “Milton Friedman: A Late and Overestimated Master of Sophistry.”
Add comment 26 March 2009
Why They Heart Keynes
| Peter Klein |
Luigi Zingales rides the Straight Talk Express (via Casey Mulligan):
Keynesianism has conquered the hearts and minds of politicians and ordinary people alike because it provides a theoretical justification for irresponsible behavior. Medical science has established that one or two glasses of wine per day are good for your long-term health, but no doctor would recommend a recovering alcoholic to follow this prescription. Unfortunately, Keynesian economists do exactly this. They tell politicians, who are addicted to spending our money, that government expenditures are good. And they tell consumers, who are affected by severe spending problems, that consuming is good, while saving is bad. In medicine, such behaviour would get you expelled from the medical profession; in economics, it gives you a job in Washington.
Three comments: First, the “hangover” metaphor, while not exactly accurate, is an effective way to communicate the basics of the Mises-Hayek malinvestment theory of the business cycle. Use it! Second, Zingales’s description applies equally well to the 1930s and 1940s, when the Keynesian consensus emerged. It’s important to remember that massive deficit spending to “cure” the Depression began with Hoover and Roosevelt in the early 1930s, long before the General Theory appeared. Keynes’s book did not propose a new direction for economic policy; it provided an allegedly scientific rationale for policies already in place, policies government officials were eager to defend and protect. (The use of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy to increase output had long been derided by serious economists as nonsense, as the domain of “monetary cranks” and other snake-oil salesmen).
Third, the Keynesian delusion afflicts not only policymakers, but professional economists as well. I’ve long suspected that the appeal of Keynes to people like Krugman and DeLong is ultimately based on aesthetic, not scientific, grounds. Deep in their hearts, they just don’t like private property, markets, and individual choice. They don’t think ordinary people are capable of making wise decisions and think they, the elites, should be in charge. They resent the fact that most people don’t want their lives controlled by liberal intellectuals. Technical arguments about the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy, the relationship between aggregate demand and output, the experience of the 1930s, and the like are really beside the point. For Keynesian economists, the belief that markets are naturally unstable in the absence of government planning is a matter of faith.
9 comments 11 March 2009
Ah, Democracy!
| Peter Klein |
I learned this week from Doug French that Dissident Books has published a new edition of H. L. Mencken’s classic and extremely politically incorrect Notes on Democracy. Who but Mencken could write that the common man “is not actually happy when free; he is uncomfortable, a bit alarmed, and intolerably lonely. He longs for the warm, reassuring smell of the herd, and is willing to take the herdsman with it.” As for democratically elected politicians, Mencken reminds us how quickly all those sappy paeans to the people’s will evaporate when a “crisis,” real or imagined, is on the horizon. “All the great tribunes of democracy, on such occasions, convert themselves, by a process as simple as taking a deep breath, into despots of an almost fabulous ferocity. Lincoln, Roosevelt and Wilson come instantly to mind.”
This was on my mind when I read (via Kathryn Muratore) about a new study appearing in Science finding that children looking at pictures of political candidates correctly pick the eventual winner 64% of the time. Apparently we are hard-wired to prefer pretty faces, even when supposedly choosing based on policy views, ideology, “the issues,” etc . So much for the rational voter.
1 comment 7 March 2009
What Does a Trillion Dollars Look Like?
| Peter Klein |
As they say, trillion is the new billion, where bailouts and government debt are concerned (1, 2). Just how much is a trillion dollars anyway? Here it is in pictures (via MGK).
Add comment 6 March 2009
Viral Marketing
| Peter Klein |
My friend Tom Woods has written a new book, Meltdown, that explains the economic crisis from an “Austrian” perspective. Tom is a historian by training but has an excellent grasp of economic theory and policy (disclaimer: I consulted on the book). The book is aimed at the intelligent lay reader and was produced very quickly (Tom writes faster than I read) to take advantage of today’s unique educational moment. The book went on sale today.
Tom is promoting the book via the usual means (scholarly and popular websites and blogs, email lists, some TV and radio appearances) and some of his admirers have launched a viral marketing campaign, based at GetTomonTV.com. Can viral marketing work to promote a quasi-academic book? Will policy wonks, economic journalists, and concerned citizens blog, text, and twitter like Blair Witch groupies or Christian Bale fans? How does one promote books (and, for that matter, journal articles) in the Web 2.0 world? Most important, how do I use this knowledge to promote myself?
3 comments 9 February 2009
Hayek on the Austrians
Those of you longing for a copy of my favorite volume in Hayek’s Collected Works, but unwilling to pay the hefty University of Chicago Press or Routledge price, can now get a handsome paperback edition for only $12, thanks to Liberty Press. The brilliant introduction and copious editor’s footnotes alone are worth the price!
2 comments 2 February 2009
Stimulus Haiku
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| Peter Klein |
From the great Bob Higgs:
Billions come bursting
From huge hydrants of money
I am stimulatedCredit freeze thaws now
Fed heats pipes until they steam
Winter is lovelyConsumers feel fine
Ready to mortgage their souls
John Maynard Keynes smilesSaving’s so passe
Capital stock may be assumed
Let K be capitalGiant debt you bet
Chinese will serve fine dinner
Children cannot voteLike rose in springtime
Welfare state blossoms anew
Laughter heard in hell
Feel free to try your hand in the comments section below. See also Bob’s reflections on the Inauguration.
Update: See also Morgan Reynolds’s bailout version of “I Fought the Law.”
3 comments 30 January 2009
New Leoni Collection: Law, Liberty, and the Competitive Market
| Peter Klein |
Transaction Publishers and the Instituto Bruno Leoni have just published a new collection of essays by Bruno Leoni, Law, Liberty, and the Competitive Market, edited by Carlo Lottieri. The essays elaborate on Leoni’s distinction between law and legislation, and the analogy between the latter and centralized economic planning, themes introduced in his best-known book, Freedom and the Law. Richard Epstein provides an informative introduction.
Add comment 28 January 2009
Disaster Socialism
| Peter Klein |
As I noted elsewhere yesterday, the “stimulus” bill making its way through Congress is a fine illustration of the Higgs effect, the tendency of government to expand massively in response to “crises,” real or imagined. Naomi Klein’s “Disaster Capitalism” thesis is exactly backward: “disasters” are inevitably followed by huge increases in the public sector at the expense of the private. Anyway, if you have any doubt that the current legislation has precious little to do with economic stimulus, consider the details of the House’s proposed $825 billion package, which includes:
- $1 billion for Amtrak
- $2 billion for child-care subsidies
- $50 million for the National Endowment for the Arts
- $400 million for global-warming research
- $2.4 billion for carbon-capture demonstration projects
- $650 million for digital TV conversion coupons
- $8 billion for renewable energy funding
- $6 billion for mass transit
- $600 million for the federal government to buy new cars
- $7 billion for modernizing federal buildings and facilities (including $150 million for the Smithsonian)
- $252 billion is for income-transfer payments ($81 billion for Medicaid, $36 billion for expanded unemployment benefits, $20 billion for food stamps, and $83 billion for the earned income credit for people who don’t pay income tax)
- $66 billion for education
Now I should state, for the record, that unlike other critics of this particular stimulus package, I don’t favor government “stimulus” packages of any kind. I’m not a Keynesian, after all.
1 comment 28 January 2009
Keynesian Economics in Four Paragraphs
Courtesy of Robert Barro:
[A]ssume that the multiplier was 1.0. In this case, an increase by one unit in government purchases and, thereby, in the aggregate demand for goods would lead to an increase by one unit in real gross domestic product (GDP). Thus, the added public goods are essentially free to society. If the government buys another airplane or bridge, the economy’s total output expands by enough to create the airplane or bridge without requiring a cut in anyone’s consumption or investment.
The explanation for this magic is that idle resources — unemployed labor and capital — are put to work to produce the added goods and services.
If the multiplier is greater than 1.0, as is apparently assumed by Team Obama, the process is even more wonderful. In this case, real GDP rises by more than the increase in government purchases. Thus, in addition to the free airplane or bridge, we also have more goods and services left over to raise private consumption or investment. In this scenario, the added government spending is a good idea even if the bridge goes to nowhere, or if public employees are just filling useless holes. Of course, if this mechanism is genuine, one might ask why the government should stop with only $1 trillion of added purchases.
What’s the flaw? The theory (a simple Keynesian macroeconomic model) implicitly assumes that the government is better than the private market at marshaling idle resources to produce useful stuff. Unemployed labor and capital can be utilized at essentially zero social cost, but the private market is somehow unable to figure any of this out. In other words, there is something wrong with the price system.
Barro thinks a multipler of zero is a more plausible baseline assumption. Of course, if GDP is adjusted for quality, the multipler is most likely negative, as resource allocation is directed by government officials, not consumer demands. In prior work Barro has estimated wartime multiplers of 0.8, but this seems high based on Robert Higgs’s important work [1, 2]. More important, there the Austrian point that resources are heterogeneous, and the additional goods and services financed by government spending will tend to be in the “wrong” place in the economy’s intertemporal structure of production. Keynes rejected the idea of capital heterogeneity, so this problem was lost on him.
3 comments 22 January 2009
Robert Burns and Adam Smith
I’m sure you’re all busy this week preparing your Burns Supper. I’ll be celebrating on Sunday, of course, the 250th anniversary of Burns’s birth (this Burns, not this one). To honor the occasion Gavin Kennedy has written about the influence on Burns of Adam Smith, whose Theory of Moral Sentiments Burns knew well. Reflecting on the famous lines from Burns’s “Poem About a Louse” — O wad some Pow’r the giftie gie us / To see oursels as ithers see us! — Gavin notes that
Burns’s poem is a way into Smith’s “impartial spectator.” Both men would have agreed that “to see oursels as ithers see us” expresses their different perspectives; Burns, pessimistically, reminding us of human frailty and its consequences, and Smith, optimistically, mapping how humans develop and maintain their moral senses. Smith, contrary to the poet’s assertion, says we do have the power “to see oursels as ithers see us” and he explains how. We have this power, if we wish to use it, from what we may crudely describe as akin to a conscience (though it was much more) in a weak resistance to self-deceit.
Smith is explicit and his stance inspired Burns’s verse:
. . . self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the disorders of human life. If we saw ourselves in the light in which others see us, or in which they would see us if they knew all, a reformation would generally be unavoidable. We could not otherwise endure the sight. (TMS III.4.6)
2 comments 20 January 2009
Philosophy Bites
| Peter Klein |
Philosophy Bites is a philosophy podcast site run by David Edmunds (co-author of Wittgenstein’s Poker) and Nigel Warburton. The political philosophy section is quite good (and features our friend Chandran Kukathas a couple of times). Via 3quarks.
1 comment 9 January 2009
The Failure of the Journalists, Part II
| Peter Klein |
Another aspect of journalists’ remarkably credulous and fatuous attitude towards policymakers is their view that rhetoric, not substance, is what matters. Hence the constant references to the Bush Administration’s “dedication to free-market principles,” its “aversion to regulation,” its “belief in letting markets work by themselves.” This is of course sheer balderdash and piffle, virtually the reverse of the truth. Bush and Paulson and Greenspan and their clique are “free marketeers” in the same way (to borrow from A. J. Jacobs) that Olive Garden is an Italian restaurant. They adopt the language, and some of the form, of market advocacy without any of the content. The Bush Administration was already, before the “financial crisis,” the most economically interventionist since LBJ; it now ranks with Hoover and FDR as the most aggressively anti-market in US history. Greenspan and Bernanke expanded the money supply like none before; Bush and Cheney borrowed and spent trillions to finance overseas adventures; the Federal Register added pages at a record-setting pace; now the banking and automobile industries have become GSEs. Lassiez-faire, indeed! (BTW can anyone name a specific act of “deregulation” that contributed to the financial crisis? Gramm-Leach-Bliley? No way. And GLB was under Clinton, as was the infamous WGFM. What specific regulations, e.g. on hedge funds or mortgage-backed securities or executive compensation, did the Bush Administration oppose?)
And yet, there was Juan Williams on yesterday’s Diane Rehm show explaining, matter-of-factly, how Bush and Paulson had allowed their “free-market ideology” and “resistance to regulation” to “commitment to the idea that the market works itself” to lead the nation into ruin. Williams may be a good news reporter, but he has the political-economy understanding of a fifth-grader. Does it ever occur to these “watchdogs” to investigate what government officials actually do, rather than simply repeat what they say?
7 comments 20 December 2008
Government and the Corporation
| Peter Klein |
What is the net effect of government intervention on firm size, scope, complexity, and ownership? Roderick Long thinks government intervention makes firms larger and more hierarchical than they would otherwise be, and that a pure market economy would be dominated by small firms like worker-owned cooperatives. I think the net effect of government intervention on firm characteristics is ambiguous, because there are so many interventions affecting different types of firms. Here’s some back-and-forth between Roderick and me: his original essay on Cato Unbound, my comment on Mises.org, his reply, and my rejoinder.
Update: See also Caplan.
1 comment 1 December 2008
Group Blog of the NYU Austrian Economics Colloquium
| Peter Klein |
It’s ThinkMarkets, written by the members of the NYU Austrian colloquium (formerly currently known as the Colloquium on Market Institutions and Economic Processes). The group includes Mario Rizzo, Bill Butos, Gene Callahan, Young Back Choi, Sandy Ikeda, Roger Koppl, Chidem Kurdas, and Joe Salerno. The colloquium was established in the 1980s by Israel Kirzner, who is still an occasional participant.
2 comments 14 November 2008
A Silver Lining
| Peter Klein |
As I mentioned in a recent talk, one good thing to come out of the bailout disaster is the diminished reputation of St. Alan the Wise. It was fun watching the same Congressional clowns who months earlier praised the “Maestro” as the greatest Fed chair in history slap him down for failing to prevent the housing bubble. Of course, Greenspan, like these clowns, ignored the issue of credit expansion, expressing regret only that he had put “too much trust” in market forces. Ha!
Now Paulson, never too popular in the first place, is suffering a similar fate, as he abandons the Troubled Asset Relief Program — the rationale for the bailout itself — and praises Congress for giving him the broad authority to do, well, whatever the hell he wants. Oh, please, let Bernanke be next!
BTW, Bob Higgs continues to offer some of the best commentary on the disaster — the political, journalistic, and educational disaster, I mean, not the supposed economic disaster. I hope his term, “Bailout of Abominations,” catches on.
Update: The Economist puts it this way: “One of the most humbling features of the financial crisis is its ability to humiliate policymakers who, thinking that they have a bazooka in their closet, soon discover that it is a mere popgun.”
3 comments 14 November 2008
New Blogs of Interest
| Peter Klein |
- Campus Entrepreneurship by David J. Miller
- Evolution and Complexity in the Social Sciences by Eliana Santanatoglia
- Anything Peaceful by the staff at FEE
1 comment 12 November 2008
Tooth-Fairy Economics
| Peter Klein |
Art Laffer offers this succinct summary of Bernankeconomics:
No one likes to see people lose their homes when housing prices fall and they can’t afford to pay their mortgages; nor does any one of us enjoy watching banks go belly-up for making subprime loans without enough equity. But the taxpayers had nothing to do with either side of the mortgage transaction. If the house’s value had appreciated, believe you me the overleveraged homeowner and the overly aggressive bank would never have shared their gain with taxpayers. Housing price declines and their consequences are signals to the market to stop building so many houses, pure and simple.
But here’s the rub. Now enter the government and the prospects of a kinder and gentler economy. To alleviate the obvious hardships to both homeowners and banks, the government commits to buy mortgages and inject capital into banks, which on the face of it seems like a very nice thing to do. But unfortunately in this world there is no tooth fairy. And the government doesn’t create anything; it just redistributes. Whenever the government bails someone out of trouble, they always put someone into trouble, plus of course a toll for the troll. Every $100 billion in bailout requires at least $130 billion in taxes, where the $30 billion extra is the cost of getting government involved.
If you don’t believe me, just watch how Congress and Barney Frank run the banks. If you thought they did a bad job running the post office, Amtrak, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the military, just wait till you see what they’ll do with Wall Street.
2 comments 28 October 2008
Philosophy: Who Needs It?
| Peter Klein |
When Greenspan was appointed Fed chair in 1987 the New York Times Magazine ran a lengthy profile noting, among Greenspan’s other eccentricities, that he was a follower of Ayn Rand, generally regarded as a strong advocate of laissez faire. But Greenspan is doctrinaire only “at a high philosophical level,” wrote Leonard Silk, reassuringly. Murray Rothbard, who knew Greenspan in the 1950s, when both were friends with Rand, got a kick out of that line:
There is one thing, however, that makes Greenspan unique, and that sets him off from his Establishment buddies. And that is that he is a follower of Ayn Rand, and therefore “philosophically” believes in laissez-faire and even the gold standard. But as the New York Times and other important media hastened to assure us, Alan only believes in laissez-faire “on the high philosophical level.” In practice, in the policies he advocates, he is a centrist like everyone else because he is a “pragmatist.” . . .
Thus, Greenspan is only in favor of the gold standard if all conditions are right: if the budget is balanced, trade is free, inflation is licked, everyone has the right philosophy, etc. In the same way, he might say he only favors free trade if all conditions are right: if the budget is balanced, unions are weak, we have a gold standard, the right philosophy, etc. In short, never are one’s “high philosophical principles” applied to one’s actions. It becomes almost piquant for the Establishment to have this man in its camp.
Today Tyler Cowen, writing on Anna Schwartz’s very good interview with the WSJ, calls Bernanke a person “with libertarian sympathies,” which I find puzzling, since I can’t recall any evidence of this sympathy in Bernanke’s writings or policy actions. Perhaps he is a sympathetic libertarian “at a high philosophical level.”
2 comments 20 October 2008


