Organizations and Markets

 | Peter Klein |

Masahiko Aoki’s contribution to a forthcoming North symposium, “Understanding Douglss North in Game-Theoretic Language,” is available on SSRN. North’s 1990 book Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, writes Aoki,

laid the foundation for New Institutional Economics by conceptualizing institutions as the rules of the game, pointing out the vital importance of effective enforcement and arguing for the crucial roles they play in determining economic performance. Thus it became a seminal book. But if the rules of the game are so crucial, then why doesn’t a lagging economy emulates the rules that prevail in more advanced economies? Why cannot the rules of the game be changed and enforced by emulation? It seemed that in his [1990] book North regarded it as the essential role of polity to change and enforce the (formal) rules of the (economic) game. But in his view, political markets are imperfect and inefficient so that better rules cannot be emulated/devised or enforced as desired. Thus a further question is raised regarding how rules of political games are determined. This problem of potential infinite regression needs to be answered by going back in historical time to the past. Thus history matters to our understanding of institutions and thus the performance of an economy. . . .

In [Understanding the Process of Economic Change, 2005], particularly in Part I, he has made critical progress toward understanding to the nature of this process. He is now more explicit and vocal about the evolutionary nature of institutional change. . . . He innovatively focuses on the evolution of belief systems that human agents hold, arguing that we perceive the “human landscape,” interpret it, discover problems within it and intend to solve them. In this way, we collectively and incrementally change the societal rules of the game. In other words, we may say that there is a coevolution of belief systems and institutions.

See also reviews of the newer book by Alex Field, Stefan Voigt and Stanley Engerman.

| Steve Phelan |

Greg Mankiw reports that Myron Scholes has a novel idea to fix the credit crisis - rather than simply guaranteeing to underwrite asset losses (as they have with the JP Morgan/Bear Stearns ) Scholes proposes that the Fed takes senior equity and debt positions in a distressed bank thereby improving the capital adequacy ratio, and thus preventing a credit freeze which would damage the real economy. I like it - what do YOU think?

| Peter Klein |

June is an exciting month for O&Mers looking for research conferences. First up is ACAC 2008, 12-14 June in Atlanta. ACAC, which has received high marks on this blog, is an annual workshop organized by Rich Makadok emphasizing the “big issues” in strategic management. Next is the DRUID 25th Anniversary Conference, 17-20 June in Copenhagen, with the theme of “Entrepreneurship and Innovation.” The distinguished participant list includes Rajshree Agarwal, Carliss Baldwin, Bo Carlsson, Kathy Eisenhardt, Maryann Feldman, Bronwyn Hall, Steve Klepper, Anita McGahan, Joanne Oxley, Olav Sorenson, Scott Stern, Sid Winter, and some Foss guy. Immediately afterward is ISNIE’s 12th annual meeting, 20-21 June, in Toronto. I am on the program committee, working with president-elect Scott Masten, and we got a bunch of great submissions this year. Barry Weingast and Robert Ellickson are keynoters. The preliminary program should be up on the ISNIE website soon.

Also, for graduate students in economics, history, philosophy, political science, business administration, and related disciplines there’s the Rothbard Graduate Seminar, 13-18 June in Auburn, Alabama. The RGS is an intensive workshop and research seminar on Austrian economics that uses Murray Rothbard’s Man, Economy, and State as its core text. I am one of the discussion leaders.

If I could teleport I’d attend all four!

| Peter Klein |

Almost every recent paper on networks, clusters, agglomeration economies, and the like mentions Alfred Marshall’s concept of the “industrial district” and gives the obligatory cite to Book IV of Marshall’s Principles (Marshall’s term was the more colorful “thickly peopled industrial district”). But what exactly were Marshall’s views on industrial districts, and on industrial economics more generally? Attend this workshop to find out:

International Workshop: “Marshall and the Marshallians on Industrial
Economics”

March 15-16th 2008, Mercury Tower, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo (more…)

| Peter Klein |

My colleague Thom Lambert has a nice piece on Britney Spears over at Truth on the Market. Yes, really. Thom asks whether Britney’s popularity, which seems unrelated to intrinsic merit, is due to network effects — people are interested in her because other people are interested in her, and so on — leading us down an irreversible path toward Britneymania. Paul David, call your office! Britney, Thom suggests, may be like the QWERTY keyboard — grossly inefficient but hard to replace.

I like Thom’s analysis but think he should go further in exploring the welfare implications. Paul David’s fable of the inefficient typewriter keyboard has been pretty well demolished by Liebowitz and Margolis, among others; perhaps with Britney we finally have an example of market failure due to network effects! Then again, it’s hard to predict, ex ante, which promising young artists will achieve long-term success; given imperfect knowledge, there is always room for  ex post regret, which doesn’t necessarily imply inefficiency. Moreover, if Britneymania isn’t remediable, to use Oliver Williamson’s term, then it’s not inefficient. Finally, what’s the alternative? Do we want a trade association or, even worse, a Ministry of Culture choosing the next pop diva? We might get the next Oleg Gazmanov.

| Peter Klein |

Most theories of organizational form are framed in comparative-static, equilibrium terms. What organizational forms — degree of vertical integration, use of incentive pay, assignment of decision rights, and the like — are “optimal” in given circumstances (transactional attributes, industry conditions, legal or political environments)? There are lots of theoretical and empirical studies on these questions. And yet, we know relatively little about how new organizational forms emerge and how existing organizations change. Is change explained best in a comparative-statics framework — some underlying condition changed, leading firms to jump from the previously optimal, equilibrium form to a new, equilibrium form? Or is some kind of experimental, evolutionary, or institutional model required?

A new paper by Lisa Lynch, “The Adoption and Diffusion of Organizational Innovation: Evidence for the U.S. Economy,” addresses these questions empirically:

Using a unique longitudinal representative survey of both manufacturing and non-manufacturing businesses in the United States during the 1990’s, I examine the incidence and intensity of organizational innovation and the factors associated with investments in organizational innovation. Past profits tend to be positively associated with organizational innovation. Employers with a more external focus and broader networks to learn about best practices (as proxied by exports, benchmarking, and being part of a multi-establishment firm) are more likely to invest in organizational innovation. Investments in human capital, information technology, R&D, and physical capital appear to be complementary with investments in organizational innovation. In addition, non-unionized manufacturing plants are more likely to have invested more broadly and intensely in organizational innovation.

See also this paper on the evolution of contractual practices in US agriculture.

| Steve Phelan |

 I just had lunch with the general counsel of an internet retailer, which is headquartered here in Las Vegas. He was bemoaning the fact that the biggest headache in his job is patent infringments… (more…)

| Peter Klein |

I meant to blog on the newest LLSV paper (actually LLS, in this case) but never got around to it. LLSV, you’ll recall, inaugurated a stream of empirical research on the financial and economic effects of legal systems (focusing on the differences between common- and civil-law countries). The newest paper clarifies the argument and reflects on ten years of research, discussion, and debate on the role of legal origins.

Fortunately, Daniel Sokol has written some comments on the Conglomerate blog (one of my regular reads, by the way — keep up the good work, guys!). Daniel notes, wisely:

I believe that LLSV makes certain assumptions about history and political economy in legal origins that are not exactly supported by the underlying historical record. A number of scholars have attacked LLSV on these grounds. Nevertheless, I still find myself strangely attracted to LLSV. In many ways, the results are what you would intuitively expect if you were on your own to attempt to rank countries based on investor protection or other similar features. More importantly, a number of the variables that LLSV uses are a bit squishy but we have yet to come up with better cross country measurements. Indeed, as a result of the critiques, LLSV have gotten better as to how they measure shareholder protection. From a policy perspective, the key to change to various bottlenecks requires not merely a top down approach in the change of the legal system but a bottom up approach by the users of these legal systems to overcome various bottlenecks that are regulatory. This makes me believe that over time the common law/civil law distinction will be seen as a rather false one where instead you will find countries lumped into categories based on their ability to respond to local and changing conditions (even the United States, which in recent years may have created increased regulatory bottlenecks such as SOX). This evolutionary approach is what I believe holds the key to understanding how to think about law and institutions.

| Peter Klein |

Some interesting papers from the ASSA Meeting in New Orleans, where I’ll be spending the next couple of days. (I don’t have links, so you’ll have to do your own Googling to find the texts.)

ROBERT GIBBONS and REBECCA HENDERSON, Massachusetts Institute of Technology — What Do Managers Do? Suggestive Evidence and Potential Theories about Building and Managing Relational Contracts

CLAUDE MENARD, ATOM - University of Paris Pantheon-Sorbonne — The Governance of Interfirm Agreements: A Relational Contract Perspective

RICARD GIL, University California-Santa Cruz, and JEAN-MICHEL OUDOT, ATOM - University Paris Pantheon-Sorbonne — Contractual Completeness and Ex-post Efficiency: Trade-Offs between Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Costs in Contract Design

LUIS GARICANO and PAUL HEATON, University of Chicago — Information Technology, Organization, and Productivity in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Departments

DANIEL SPULBER, Northwestern University — Entrepreneurs in the Theory of the Firm (more…)

| Steve Phelan | 

Brad De Long’s analysis of the current financial crisis published in the Taipei Times on 01/01/08 received some attention in the blogosphere yesterday. For a crisis resulting in a sustained fall in asset values, he recommends either 1) nationalizing the debt or 2) inflating the price of nominal assets. As I was reading the article (and another on the fact that an 3 million excess housing units were created in the boom above long term trends) it occurred to me that a third path might be available — increased immigration. (more…)

| Peter Klein |

Open-source software is often cited as an example of what Hayek termed spontaneous order, the organic, bottom-up, decentralized form of organization that characterizes the market system. Giampaolo Garzarelli, in an explicitly Hayekian analyis, says open-source projects are defined by “no hierarchy, self-organization, self-regulation, and no ownership structure.” Is this an accurate characterization?

Commercial law, manifest in the medieval law merchant or lex mercatoria, is another important example of spontaneous order in the literature (see Harold Berman and Bruce Benson). Fabrizio Marrella and Christopher Yoo use the law merchant as a benchmark, asking “Is Open Source Software the New Lex Mercatoria?”They think not, arguing that focal firms, individuals, and groups play a more important role in guiding the evolution of open-source projects than is usually recognized. As a result, “[o]pen source has not achieved the type of universality or uniformity of principles envisioned by proponents of the lex mercatoria.” (more…)

| Peter Klein |

Austrian economists have mixed views on Adam Smith and classical economics. Mises and Hayek admired Smith as a social theorist and system builder while rejecting much of his technical apparatus, especially the labor theory of value. Menger taught Smithian political economy to his most famous pupil, Crown Prince Rudolf. Rothbard considered Smith grossly overrated. More generally, Austrian economists have tended to distance themselves as much from the classical system as from its neoclassical descendant. (Kirzner’s review of George Reisman’s Capitalism, which tries to synthesize Austrian and Ricardian economics, is worth reading in this regard.)

A new paper by Michael Bradley argues that the distinction between classical and Austrian analysis is overdrawn, at least with regard to competition theory. (more…)

| Peter Klein |

It’s hosted by Spain’s Urrutia Elejalde Foundation and takes place in San Sebastián, 14-17 July 2008. (Basque Country, not Spain, if you prefer.) The impressive speaker list includes Jon Elster, Diego Gambetta, Herb Gintis, Russell Hardin, and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, among others. Details here.

| Steve Phelan |

One of my hobbies is to perform counterfactual exercises in organization design (yes, sad, I know). Here is my current challenge. Ratings agencies like Moody’s are paid by the issuers of securities rather than the purchasers of the securities. This creates an agency problem because the rater has an incentive to give high ratings to stay in the good graces of the issuer — who will presumably “shop around” to get the best ratings.

Assuming this arrangement is efficient then what are the counterbalancing factors that offset the agency costs? How much would agency costs have to increase to trigger an adjustment in design? Was the the subprime fiasco such a trigger? What would the new design look like?

I know that economists are reluctant to second-guess how the market will work out its problems — but strategists are in the business of being proactive about these things :-)

| Steve Phelan | 

Brad DeLong recently posted an interesting set of questions on his blog about corporate nationality: (more…)

| Peter Klein |

Former O&M guest blogger Dick Langlois reviews Thomas McCraw’s Schumpeter biography, Prophet of Innovation, for EH.Net.

McCraw is at his best in conveying Schumpeter the man, providing an engaging and beautifully written portrait of this larger-than-life and often tragic figure. McCraw also works hard at weaving Schumpeter’s economics into the life story and at making the ideas supply their share of the drama. The result deepens our understanding of a fascinating and complex man and of the difficult times in which he lived, even if it does not necessarily sharpen our understanding of his economics or add much that is new to his biography.

See also our previous comments on McCraw and Schumpeter more generally.

| David Hoopes |

Since the O&Mers have been so quiet about the N prize I guess I’ll ramble a bit. In a comment on one of Peter’s posts I mentioned Demsetz and Alchian. For some reason I had it in my head that A.A. had already won. That’s what I get for staying at UCLA for so long (Alchian had just quit teaching when I got there).

I don’t know why I thought Alchian had won it. “Production, Information costs and Economic Organization” (with Harold Demsetz), American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777-95 is a pretty amazing paper. And “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process” (with Robert Crawford and Bejamin Klein), Journal of Law and Economics (1978) has been very influential. Though I think people think of Ben Klein for that paper. As noted above, Alchian is very well known for (and thought of because of ) “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory,” Journal of Political Economy 58 (1950): 211-21.

Having said all that, I think srp is correct in that Alchian’s best chance is going in with Nelson and Winter for evolutionary economics or Demsetz and Williamson or Oliver Hart for theory of the firm. It’s hard to imagine that evolutionary economics is that appreciated. I think Sid Winter is grossly underrated. His body of work in economics and strategy is pretty amazing.

As readers of my posts might guess, I am a pretty big fan of Demsetz. I don’t know that Harold is as productive or quantitative as most award givers might like. Stilger and Coase were pretty big fans. But, Hart and Williamson seem more likely award winners.

Over at orgtheory.net they’ve been discussing sociologists and management people who (in some alternate universe) might win. There are not too many Herb Simons out there.

| Peter Klein |

Here is John Hagel with a nice post on institutional innovation. Product, process, and management innovation are important, he notes, but institutional innovation — that which “redefines roles and relationships across independent entities to accelerate and amplify learning and reduce risks” — is the key to long-term value creation. Hagel names diversity, relationships, modularity, federated decision-making, reputation mechanisms, feedback loops, and incentive structures as the design principles underlying institutional innovation.

Hagel is clearly right to emphasize institutional innovation as a key driver of long-term firm, industry, and overall economic performance. He names the creation of the joint-stock company as a primary example. We could perhaps add the M-form structure, the franchise arrangement, relational contracting, the loosely organized network, and the venture-funded startup to this list.

And yet, there is a lot we don’t know about institutional innovation.  (more…)

| David Hoopes |

I am often surprised when I present or submit papers because audience members and reviewers find my construct definitions problematic. Often, people find my definitions are too narrow. Also, sometimes others don’t find the scholars whose work I would like to develop merit the attention I give them. This attention sometimes comes in the form of using their definition.  Case in point: Sid Winter and capabilities. In a couple of papers I’m working on my co-authors and I have based our definition of capabilities on one Sid Winter has used in an SMJ paper and a book he edited. Tammy Madsen and I have stuck with Sid’s definition. Steve Postrel and I have taken Sid’s definition and made it more specific to our work. Some readers and listeners have had a hard time with this (and given me a hard time). Now, there’s one “school,” that generally does not like definitions or theoretical constructs to be very narrow. Thus, “can’t X, Y, or Z also be a capability?” “Well, it could be. Just not in this paper.” ”Aren’t capabilities just resources?” “Sure. So and So big shot thinks so. We just think of resource and capabilities as being two different things.” Another “school” doesn’t understand why we should care about Sid’s opinion. “Shouldn’t you use Other Big Shot’s definition?” “Well, I don’t really understand her definition. Sid has been doing this capability thing for a while.” ”Isn’t it the same as Selznick?” “I don’t think so. Sid doesn’t think so” (see Intro to edited volume with Dosi).

I don’t mind that people prefer other definitions. Yet, I am surprised by how agitated people get. I get agitated by definitions when 1) There aren’t any; 2) I don’t understand what the author/presenter is saying; 3) The definition includes everything and the kitchen sink (presumably because that’s the way life is, “complex”).

So, I stumble along with my narrow definitions and hope not to get yelled at too much.

| Peter Klein |

Some version of the survivor principle, or “economic Darwinism,” underlies much economics and strategy research. While the term “survivor principle” was coined by Stigler (1968), the idea is usually attributed to Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953). Alchian argued that even though theories about rational decision makers making “optimal” choices are clearly unrealistic, the predictions of such theories need not be. The quest for profit, combined with competitive selection forces, ensures that the average firm will tend to behave like those described by theories of rational behavior (Alchian, 1950). Friedman (1953: 22), defending the profit-maximization hypothesis, puts it this way:

[U]nless the behavior of businessmen in some way or other approximated behavior consistent with the maximization of returns, it seems unlikely that they would remain in business for long. Let the apparent immediate determinant of business behavior be anything at all — habitual reaction, random choice, or whatnot. Whenever this determinant happens to lead to behavior consistent with rational and informed maximization of returns, the business will prosper and acquire resources with which to expand; whenever it does not, the business will tend to lose resources and can be kept in existence only by the addition of resources from outside. The process of “natural selection” thus helps to validate the [maximization] hypothesis or, rather, given natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis can be based largely on the judgment that it summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival.

The problem with Friedman’s strong version of the survivor principle is that we know little about how such competitive selection processes actually work. (more…)

| Peter Klein |

Some suggestions for Nicolai’s list:

John G .Matsusaka, “Corporate Diversification, Value Maximization, and Organizational Capabilities,” Journal of Business 74 (July 2001): 409-31. Offers a novel and provocative “match-seeking” theory of diversification in which firms do not know their own capabilities but must discover them by experimenting with various combinations of business units. A diversified firm may be valued at a discount relative to more specialized firms because its current lines of business include some not consistent with its capabilities, but such conglomeration is necessary, and value-creating in the long run, if the firm is to discover where it should eventually refocus. 85 hits on Google Scholar. Possibly neglected because it appeared in the Journal of Business near the end of its run.

Robert C. Ellickson, “A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 83-97. A nice example of the emergence of private law, focusing on the rules governing property rights in whales prior to the twentieth century. Without a central authority the whaling community — a small, close-knit group with shared characteristics and frequent interaction — developed a complex set of norms enforced by community sanction and the threat of ostracism. Just 25 Google Scholar hits. (more…)

| Peter Klein |

Recent work by Robert Putnam, Douglass North, Ed Glaeser, and others has highlighted the role of social capital — membership in organizations, participation in civic activities, social trust — plays in economic development. Empirically, social capital has typically been measured with survey data, making historical comparisons difficult. It is important to know, however, how social capital changes over time. If social capital is largely path dependent, then there is little that can be done to improve the stock or productivity of social capital at a particular time.

A new paper by Marta Felis Rota, “Is Social Capital Persistent? Comparative Measurement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” exploits Adelman and Morris’s (1965) database of socio-economic indicators for 23 countries from 1850 to 1914 to construct social capital indicators for the late nineteenth century, which can be compared to similar indicators for the twentieth century. Evidence for path dependence is weak; all countries enjoy long-run increases in social capital but rates of change vary widely. Check it out.

| Peter Klein |

By Arnold Kling, here and here.

I usually recommend to my students North’s 1991 Journal of Economic Perspectives paper, “Institutions,” for an overview of his general approach to institutions and economic change.

| Nicolai Foss |

Today is the second day of the annual conference of the Danish Research Unit for Industrial Economics.  In order to stimulate controversy, and entertain conference delegates between less interesting paper sessions, DRUID organizes debates on motions. 

I participated along with Sid Winter of the Wharton School, Peter Abell of the London School of Economics, and Thorbjørn Knudsen of Southern Denmark University in today’s “DRUID Debate on Methodological Individualism versus Scientific Progress” (sic!!!!!) which involved the following motion:

Let it be resolved that this conference believes that the lack of methodological individualism applied in strategy research seriously limits scientific progress in the field.

Speaking for the motion were Peter and I, speaking against were Sid and Thorbjorn. A vote was taken before the debate.  There were about as many pro as contra votes.  After the debate, which had its rather heated moments, another vote was taken.  And again there about as many pro as contra votes.  Apparently, the debate had — perhaps not surprisingly — not managed to change any beliefs.  The debate was streamed, and should be available on the DRUID site within a couple of weeks.

| Peter Klein |

A fundamental distinction between organizations and markets is teleological: organizations are established by specific individuals to achieve specific purposes, while markets emerge, organically, from the bottom up. Carl Menger used the terms “organizations” and “orders” to distinguish these two categories of institutions; Hayek preferred the obscure Greek terms taxis and cosmos. Invoking this distinction does not deny, of course, that there are “organic” elements within firms, or that markets are infused with institutions that are at least partly “designed” (civil law codes, for instance).

What, then, is meant by “market design,” as in designing markets for cadaveric organs, education vouchers, or tradeable emissions permits? Do attempts to do so constitute what Hayek called “constructivist rationalism” or “constructivism,” the belief that we can remake social institutions that have emerged incrementally, over long periods of time, to suit our current whims?

Lynne Kiesling and Mike Giberson have been wrestling with this question over at Knowledge Problem (here and here). How, asks a reader, “does one invoke Hayek in one breath and then speak of ‘designing’ a market in the next while keeping a straight face?” Lynne and Mike offer several responses: (more…)

| Peter Klein |

Luís Bettencourt, José Lobo, Dirk Helbing, Christian Kühnert, and Geoffrey West’s paper “Growth, Innovation, Scaling, and the Pace of Life in Cities” (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 17, April 24, 2007) is getting a lot of attention, garnering plugs in Scientific American and Nature. They use data on innovation, employment, wages, GDP, consumption, crime, disease, housing, and infrastructure from US, European, and Chinese cities to estimate a “power law scaling function” linking demographic, socioeconomic, and behavioral indicators to city size. Such indicators, are related to population according to

Findings:

Many diverse properties of cities from patent production and personal income to electrical cable length are shown to be power law functions of population size with scaling exponents, that fall into distinct universality classes. Quantities reflecting wealth creation and innovation have (increasing returns), whereas those accounting for infrastructure display (economies of scale). We predict that the pace of social life in the city increases with population size, in quantitative agreement with data, and we discuss how cities are similar to, and differ from, biological organisms, for which Finally, we explore possible consequences of these scaling relations by deriving growth equations, which quantify the dramatic difference between growth fueled by innovation versus that driven by economies of scale. This difference suggests that, as population grows, major innovation cycles must be generated at a continually accelerating rate to sustain growth and avoid stagnation or collapse.

For more on cities see these posts on Jane Jacobs and this one on clusters. Here is Ed Glaeser’s influential 1992 paper (with Hedi Kallal, Jose Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer) on growth in cities. Other important Glaeser papers on cities include this one with Jesse Shapiro, this one with Albert Saiz, and this one with Christopher Berry. Here is Glaeser’s review of Richard Florida’s Creative Class and here is Florida’s blog. And here is an interesting special issue of the Review of Austrian Economics on the new urbanism.

Update: Here is Florida’s take on the paper.

| Nicolai Foss |

As I have recounted on an earlier occasion (here), my interest in economics was, after about 1.5 years of a somewhat unsuccessful economics study, finally stimulated by discovering what may broadly be called “process approaches” to economics, particularly the work of Axel Leijonhufvud, and Austrian and evolutionary approaches. I was captivated by the claims inherent in these approaches of studying “real” market “processes” in “time,” taking account of “genuine uncertainty,” “surprises,” “ignorance,” etc. — all in contrast to the (I then thought) mindless neoclassical obsession with equilibrium states.

Clearly, the Austrian marketing effort seemed much superior to the mainstream one, much less dull and much more concerned with reality. (more…)

| Peter Klein |

Haim Ofek reviews Paul Seabright’s The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life (Princeton, 2004) for EH.Net. Some friends have highly recommended the book to me as a grand synthesis of market theory, institutional analysis, economic history, and evolutionary biology. I started reading it last year but my interest waned after a couple of chapters. (I guess I don’t have a taste for evolutionary biology; a lot of it reads like Just So Stories to me.)

Here is a 2005 interview with Seabright in Reason Magazine.

| Peter Klein |

Nobel Laureate Michael Spence writes about sustained high growth in today’s (gated) WSJ. Focusing on Botswana, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, Spence notes:

While each instance of sustained high growth is to some extent idiosyncratic, they share certain features. In all cases, there is a functioning market economy with its price signals, incentives, decentralization and enough definition of private property ownership to enable investment. All attempts to circumvent this necessary condition through central planning have met with major misallocations of resources and failure.

Isn’t it wonderful that the Austrian and public-choice critiques of central planning are so well-known that invoking them seems almost, well, trite?

A key feature of sustained high growth, Spence adds, is resource mobility:

Contrary to the image that sometimes comes from a macroeconomic overview, productivity growth at these rates is not achieved by having everyone do what they were doing before, but a little bit more efficiently. The portfolio mix of economic activity changes very rapidly. This is what Schumpeter called “creative destruction” and Paul Romer calls “churn.” . . . This movement of people geographically and across sectors is not an ancillary side effect of the growth process, but rather the essence of it.

Incidentally, Schumpeterian competition is not always easily discernible at a microeconomic level. Paul Vaaler and Gerry McNamara find mixed evidence for increasingly “dynamic competition” in the US technology sector. (See also the essays in Paul’s book with Lee W. McKnight and Raul L. Katz.)

| Peter Klein |

I’m not a great fan of Joan Robinson but believe she has admirers among the O&M clientèle. So here’s a pointer to a new book on Robinson’s work and significance, Joan Robinson’s Economics: A Centennial Celebration (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005). The volume, edited by Bill Gibson, stems from a 2003 conference on the centenary of Robinson’s birth. This passage from Michael Lawlor’s review in EH.Net may spark some interest:

One thing she particularly saw as useful in Marshall was his awareness of the difficulty of treating time by equilibrium constructs. Thus, rather than the highly artificial dynamic equilibria of modern theories of growth (of any stripe), she wanted dynamic economics to be “open” to uncertain expectations, technological change, habits, and the possible irreversibility that came with the “choice of technique.” In other words, she insisted that a theory of economic growth should be alive to the kinds of issues that, economic history teaches, have been real aspects of capitalist economies of the past. . . . She did not want to construct models that would reach the same “equilibrium” from radically different starting points, but ones that depended crucially on where a system began to determine part of where it ends up. In short, she wished for a dynamic economics in which a particular set of institutions and a particular history ought to be given its due as a factor that could influence the time path of an economy.

But as Donald Harris particularly emphasizes, this is no easy task. In fact one could say that her long struggle with a variety of complex approaches to such questions in the theory of economic growth (her most mature statements on this topic are to be found in Robinson, 1956 and 1962b) ended in her rejecting “equilibrium” altogether as a way to capture the manifold influences of “history” (Robinson, 1985).