Brainstorming appears in many strategy, entrepreneurship, and leadership texts, often mentioned in passing with the implication that it’s a great tool for group decision-making. But the research literature suggests a more circumspect attitude. Indeed, this week’s New Yorker features an interesting and informative essay on some of the latest results:

The underlying assumption of brainstorming is that if people are scared of saying the wrong thing, they’ll end up saying nothing at all. The appeal of this idea is obvious: it’s always nice to be saturated in positive feedback. Typically, participants leave a brainstorming session proud of their contribution. The whiteboard has been filled with free associations. Brainstorming seems like an ideal technique, a feel-good way to boost productivity. But there is a problem with brainstorming. It doesn’t work.

Writer Jonah Lehrer goes on to quote Keith Sawyer: “Decades of research have consistently shown that brainstorming groups think of far fewer ideas than the same number of people who work alone and later pool their ideas.” Lots more at the source.

O&M co-founder Nicolai Foss will give the 2012 Sherlock Hibbs Distinguished Lecture in Business and Economics Tuesday, 6 March 2012, 10:00-11:30am, in 205 Cornell Hall on the University of Missouri campus. The title is “Open Entrepreneurship: The Role of External Knowledge Sources for the Entrepreneurial Value Chain.” The lecture is sponsored by the Hibbs Professors of the University of Missouri’s Trulaske College of Business and the University of Missouri’s McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership (which I direct).

The full announcement (with Nicolai’s impressive bio) is below the fold. The lecture is free and open to the public, so all are welcome!

The Hibbs Professors of the University of Missouri’s Trulaske College of Business and the University of Missouri’s McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership invite you to the 2012 Sherlock Hibbs Distinguished Lecture in Business and Economics:

Open Entrepreneurship: The Role of External Knowledge Sources for the Entrepreneurial Value Chain

Nicolai J. Foss
Copenhagen Business School and Norwegian School of Economics and Business

Tuesday, March 6, 2012
205 Cornell Hall
10:00 – 11:30am

Sponsored by the Hibbs Professors of the University of Missouri’s Trulaske College of Business and the University of Missouri’s McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership, the lecture is free and open to the public.

Nicolai J. Foss is a Professor of Strategy and Organization at the Copenhagen Business School, a part-time Professor of Knowledge-based Value Creation at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, and the Head of Department of the Department of Strategic Management and Globalization at CBS. He also holds part-time and visiting professorships at the Lund University, Luiss Guido Carli-Roma, and Agder University. He founded the Center (now Department) of Strategic Management and Globalization at the Copenhagen Business School in 2005, building it from a center with 5 faculty members to a full department with 17 faculty members along with postdocs and PhD students.

He is author or editor of 22 books, 136 journal articles, and 81 book chapters. His work has appeared in the Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management Journal, Organization Science, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Management Studies, Strategic Organization, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, Industrial and Corporate Change, Organization Studies, and other leading academic journals. His articles and books have been translated into Chinese, Russian, and Spanish. His newest book, Organizing Entrepreneurial Judgment: A New Approach to the Firm (with Peter G. Klein), is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press.

Foss was a founder of the Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics and a co-founder of the industry-funded Center for Policy Studies, the most influential privately funded Danish think tank. Since 2000 he has raised over €2 million in external funding as research leader and has participated in many additional funded research projects. He is a panel member of the European Research Council and serves as a member of the three-person management group of the Norwegian Center for Service Innovation at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, which is supported by a €20 million, 8-year grant.

Educated as an economist from the Copenhagen University (1989), Foss his received his PhD from the Copenhagen Business School in 1993, where he has been Assistant, Associate and Full Professor.

I wrote earlier about Doug Allen’s The Institutional Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Here’s a new EH.Net review by Mark Koyama.

Institutions in Allen’s view minimize transaction costs, where transaction costs include the costs associated with opportunistic behavior. Transaction costs precluded “first-best” institutions from developing in the pre-industrial world. Instead, apparently inefficient institutions such as tax farming, the sale of offices, and the aristocratic dominance of politics persisted for centuries. Allen argues that these apparently inefficient institutions were, in fact, efficient given the existing configuration of transaction costs. This insight, which builds on the ideas of Yoram Barzel, provides a powerful hypothesis for studying institutional change. Allen places particular emphasis on the importance of measurement. In the high variance pre-modern world, measurement was costly or impossible and consequently bureaucrats, soldiers, sailors, and policemen could not be paid on the basis of observable inputs. Alternative institutions had to emerge to deter opportunism and reward effort. These institutions were often elaborate, and sometimes strange; they involved making the bureaucrats, soldiers, or tax collectors residual claimants of some sort. The story of how these institutions disappeared and were replaced by modern institutions is The Institutional Revolution.

The institutional revolution Allen proposes is linked to the industrial revolution because technological change drove institutional change by reducing measurement costs. Standardization reduced variance. This reduction in variance lessened the possibilities for opportunistic behavior and enabled institutions based around the idea of rewarding individuals for their marginal contribution to emerge.

Nature News (via Bronwyn Hall):

One in five academics in a variety of social science and business fields say they have been asked to pad their papers with superfluous references in order to get published. The figures, from a survey published today in Science, also suggest that journal editors strategically target junior faculty, who in turn were more willing to acquiesce.

I think reference bloat is a problem, particularly in management journals (not so much in economics journals). Too many papers include tedious lists of references supporting even trivial or obvious points. It’s a bit like blog entries that ritually link every technical term or proper noun to its corresponding wikipedia entry. “Firms seek to position themselves and acquire resources to achieve competitive advantage (Porter, 1980; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986).” Unless the reference is non-obvious, narrowly linked to a specific argument, etc., why include it? Readers can do their Google Scholar searches if needed.

In management this strikes me as a cultural issue, not necessarily the result of editors or reviewers wanting to build up their own citation counts. But I’d be curious to hear about reader’s experiences, either as authors or (confession time!) editors or reviewers.

Over at The Conglomerate, Gordon Smith asks:

Law professors teach and write about topics like public choice, agency capture, rent seeking, etc., but I don’t often hear law professors talking systematically about the use of law for strategic purposes. . . . In simplest terms, the study of law and strategy views the world from the perspective of a business and asks: how can we use law to gain a competitive advantage? This question ought to be of interest to lawyers, but does any law school teach a class on law and strategy?

The context is Richard Shell’s book Make the Rules or Your Rivals Will, which sounds interesting and important. Perhaps the O&M readership can help? The emerging field of non-market strategy (1, 2), led by people like David Baron, Vit Henisz, and the de Figueiredo brothers, studies how firms use not only law but also the regulatory system, bureaucracies, and other non-market features to achieve competitive advantage. The older economics literatures on public choice and rent-seeking of course deal with these issues as well, but typically from “society’s” point of view, rather than the firm’s. As for teaching, I see from a little Googling that John de Figueiredo is teaching law and strategy at Duke, and I suspect other members of the non-market strategy crowd housed at law schools do so as well. Suggestions for Gordon?

Along with Don Siegel, Nick Wilson, and Mike Wright, I am guest editing a special issue of Managerial and Decision Economics on the “Effects of Alternative Investments on Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Growth.” Proposals are due 15 June 2011. A special issue conference for developing the papers is planned for 29 October 2011 at the SUNY Global Center in Manhattan. The conference is jointly sponsored by the SUNY-Albany School of Business, the Centre for Private Equity Research at Imperial College Business School, and the McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership. Further details and submission guidelines are below the fold.

Call for Papers: 
Special Issue of Managerial and Decision Economics

EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS
ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND GROWTH

Submission Due Date: June 15, 2012
Special Issue Conference: October 29, 2012

Guest Editors:
Peter Klein, University of Missouri
Donald Siegel, University at Albany, SUNY
Nick Wilson, Leeds University Business School
Mike Wright, Imperial College Business School

Special Issue Conference sponsored by
School of Business, University at Albany, SUNY
Centre for Private Equity Research, Imperial College Business School
McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership, University of Missouri

Introduction

The past decade has brought rapid growth in a variety of specialist alternative investment vehicles, including venture capital, business angel funds, later-stage private equity, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, infrastructure funds, and real estate funds. The importance of venture capital and angel investment for new firms, particularly in high-growth, high-technology sectors, is well known. But alternative investments span a wide range of company types, from small, early-stage ventures with high growth rates but little cash flow to large firms in mature industries that generate substantial cash flow.

Alternative investment vehicles introduce new forms of financing with different objectives and diverse forms of involvement by investors in portfolio firms. Alternative investors differ widely in skills, goals, experience, and investment time horizons. They often invest across a variety of institutional environments, transferring standard investment approaches from one sector or country to another. Because these alternative equity stakes are generally less liquid than shares in publicly traded enterprises, their growth raises a host of important issues for the organization and governance of portfolio companies, for the structure of industries heavily dependent on alternative investment pools, and for entrepreneurship, innovation, and economic growth more generally.

This special issue of Managerial and Decision Economics focuses on the effects of alternative investments on entrepreneurship, innovation, and economic growth. These issues are especially timely given current debates about the role of alternative investments in stimulating economic outcomes and the need for diverse sources of capital to stimulate economic growth in conditions of severe recession. We welcome theoretical papers, large scale quantitative analyses, and focused case studies.

Research Questions

Research questions that contributors to the special issue might address include:

• How does the nature of deals vary by different types of alternative investor? What factors are influential in determining these differences?
• What are the relationships between financial structuring of deals and the nature and extent of entrepreneurship and innovation in portfolio firms?
• How does financial structure affect entrepreneurial alertness, judgment, and innovation not only in new firms, but in established organizations as well?
• To what extent do alternative investors engage in funding both restructuring and innovative activities? What are the effects of alternative investments on growth at the level of the firm, sector, region, and economy?
• How do buyout firms attempt to increase innovation within public companies that are taken private?
• How have the roles of alternative investment vehicles changed over time, as in the changing roles of venture capital firms and business angels in Silicon Valley?
• How do venture capital and angel investors organize themselves into networks? How do these affect venture performance?
• What is the nature of the contractual relationships between alternative investors and founders or operators of startup companies?
• What explains the clustering of alternative investments across industries? Across time and place?
• To what extent can alternative investors, as “active” participants in their portfolio companies, themselves be modeled as entrepreneurs?

Papers on related issues not explicitly listed above are also welcome.

Submission and Review Process

Submissions must be made on or before June 15, 2012. All papers will be externally reviewed according to standard policies of Managerial and Decision Economics.

Conference Details and Time Line

To aid in the development of papers, a special issue conference will be held at the SUNY Global Center in Midtown Manhattan October 29, 2012.

Accommodation and meals will be provided for all authors and discussants attending the conference. Financial support is provided by the School of Business and the Center for Institutional Investment Management at the University at Albany, SUNY, the Centre for Private Equity Research at Nottingham University Business School, and the McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership at the University of Missouri.

Key dates:
June 15, 2012: Deadline for electronic submission of papers to the conference and special issues
August 15, 2012: Notification to authors regarding acceptance for conference
October 29, 2012 : Special Issue Conference at the SUNY Global Center

More Information

For additional information, please contact see http://mcquinn.missouri.edu/cfp2012June15.htm or contact the special issue editors:
Peter Klein, University of Missouri, pklein@missouri.edu
Donald Siegel, University at Albany, SUNY, dsiegel@uamail.albany.edu
Mike Wright, Imperial College, London, mike.wright@imperial.ac.uk
Nick Wilson, Leeds University Business School, nw@lubs.leeds.ac.uk

Raghu Rajan’s AFA presidential address is now online as an NBER working paper:

The nature of the firm and its financing are closely interlinked. To produce significant net present value, an entrepreneur has to transform her enterprise into one that is differentiated from the ordinary. To achieve the control that will allow her to execute this strategy, she needs to have substantial ownership, and thus financing. But it is hard to raise finance against differentiated assets. So an entrepreneur has to commit to undertake a second transformation, standardization, that will make the human capital in the firm, including her own, replaceable, so that outside financiers obtain rights over going-concern surplus. I argue that the availability of a vibrant stock market helps the entrepreneur commit to these two transformations in a way that a debt market would not. This helps explain why the nature of firms and the extent of innovation differ so much in different financing environments.

You’ve all heard the story of the Manhattan socialite who expressed shock at Nixon’s landslide 1972 victory because “nobody I know voted for him.” (Attributed variously to Pauline Kael, Katharine Graham, Susan Sontag, and others, and probably apocryphal, but who cares; it’s a great quote.) I was reminded of this by a line in Larry Summers’s confidential 2008 economic policy memo now making the rounds, courtesy of the New Yorker: “Greg Mankiw is the only economist we have consulted with [about the optimal stimulus package] who refused to name a number and was generally skeptical about stimulus.” How can a huge stimulus package be wrong — everybody I know favors it!

(For the record, the economists consulted — supposedly representing the full spectrum of legitimate opinion — were Robert Reich (recommended stimulus: $1.2 trillion over 2 years), Joe Siglitz ($1 trillion over two years), Paul Krugman ($600 billion in one year), Jamie Galbraith ($900 billion in one year), Dean Baker and colleagues ($900 billion), Marty Feldstein ($400 billion in one year), Larry Lindsey ($800 billion to $1 trillion), Ken Rogoff ($1 trillion over two years), Mark Zandi ($600 billion in one year), an unnamed group of Fed officials (over $600 billion), Adam Posen ($500-700 billion in one year), and an unnamed group at Goldman Sachs(!) ($600 billion). So, we’ve got left-wing Keynesians, right-wing Keynesians, moderate Keynesians, Robert Reich who wouldn’t know a Keynesian from a Kenyan, and Goldman Sachs. How’s that for diversity of opinion?)

Update: Mankiw agrees: “Of course, the fact that I was ‘the only economist’ expressing skepticism reflects the range of economists that Team Obama chose to consult.”

Did you know 2012 is the centenary of Charles Dickens’s birth? Dickens is often lumped with Carlyle, Shaw, Ruskin, etc. as a Romantic, Victorian, literary anti-capitalist. (Carlyle indeed disliked capitalism, but not for the usual reasons.) But Dickens, as I originally learned from Paul Cantor, was a wildly successful capitalist and entrepreneur, a driving force behind the great nineteenth-century innovation of the serialized, commercial novel. Consider the following from one Dickens scholar:

Stephen Marcus has called Dickens “the first capitalist of literature” in the sense that he worked within apparently adverse conditions to take advantage of new technologies and markets, creating, in effect, an entirely new role for fiction. In Charles Dickens and His Publishers, Robert Patten quotes Oscar Dystel (president and chief executive of Bantam Paperbacks) on the three “key factors” in his development of a successful paperback line: availability of new material, introduction of the rubber plate rotary press, and development of magazine wholesalers as a distribution arm. As Patten points out, parallel factors operated in the Victorian era: a plethora of writers, new technologies, and expanded distribution. And as methods of papermaking, printing, and platemaking increased in efficiency, so did means of transportation. By 1836, a crucial network of wholesale book outlets in the Strand, peddlers, provincial shops, and the royal mailmade possible by the development of paved roads, fast coaches, and eventually the national railway systemhad been consolidated. The final task facing early publishers was, then, to develop the newly accessible market for their commodity. By lowering prices, emphasizing illustrations and sensational elements, and increasing variety of both form and content, publishers created readers within the largest demographic groups: the rising middle and working classes, where readers had essentially not existed before. . . .

Concurrently with these marketing advances, Dickens transformed the narrative from a standard series of bumbling sportsmen’s sketches into a picaresque based in London but depicting urban infiltration of the country. The fifth number introduced a working-class character, Sam Weller, and his father. Audiences responded well to Dickens’s humorous but sympathetic textual representation of these urban characters. Sales soared after Sam appeared on the scene, and readers apparently wrote Dickens to ”counsel him to develop the character largelyto the utmost.” And Dickens, already showing the true responsiveness to his audience that contrasts so markedly with the simulated responsiveness of Chapman and Hall, answered by making Sam central to the Pickwick adventures.

The author’s and publishers’ narrative, advertising, and distribution techniques, innovative from an entrepreneurial standpoint, proved overwhelmingly successful. By number 5, Pickwick’s circulation had increased to forty thousand per number, where it stayed throughout the run. As Norman N. Feltes is careful to stress in his Modes of Production of Victorian Novels, this success is generally attributed to literary genius, lucky accident, and marketing ability, combining to explode upon the literary world. But, Feltes argues, the historical processes that shaped and determined the material production of Pickwick Papers are as important as “genius, luck, and the shrewdness of Chapman and Hall.” The series’ success certainly depended on a combination of perfect timing, insight into the potential of advertising, Dickens’s great comic skill and ability to reflect his audience, and fine-tuning of the narrative to respond to audience desire. But all these factors could not have arisen simultaneously without the particular nexus of economic, technological, and ideological conditions existent in the 1830s.

The source is Jennifer Hayward’s Consuming Pleasures: Active Audiences and Serial Fictions from Dickens to Soap Opera.

I recently read Planet of the Apes, the 1963 novel by Pierre Boulle that inspired the movie franchise. Not surprisingly, the book is far more interesting and intelligent than the films. In the novel (spoiler alert!), the ape planet isn’t a future Earth, but a distant world much like Earth in which apes gradually assimilated and displaced a former human civilization simply by imitating their masters. The discovery of this older civilization (confirmed by the remains a talking human doll, as in the 1968 movie) explains the mystery of why ape culture stagnated at the level of its former human model. The apes could imitate, but not innovate.

The human protagonist convinces himself that imitation could produce a reasonable quality of science and art, then turns to more mundane activities.

It seemed absolutely clear that industry did not require the presence of a rational being to maintain itself. Basically, industry consisted of manual laborers, always performing the selfsame tasks, who could easily be replaced by apes; and, at a higher level, of executives whose function was to draft certain reports and pronounce ceratin words under given circumstances. All this was a question of conditioned reflexes. At the still higher level of administration, it seemed even easier to concede the quality of aping. To continue our system, the gorillas would merely have to imitate certain attitudes and deliver a few harangues, all based on the same model.

Not a flattering portrait of management, but keep in mind that the protagonist (like the book’s author) is French.