Management Theory « Organizations and Markets

Posts filed under 'Management Theory'

O&M in Lund

| Peter Klein |

Nicolai and I, along with Jay Barney and John Matthews, are headlining the 2010 Holger Crafoord Memorial Symposium on “Strategy and Entrepreneurship,” 7 September 2010 at the Lund School of Economics and Management. The symposium is free but registration is required; details at the link above. Lund is a lovely university town, a short train ride (via the Øresund Bridge) from Copenhagen and hence easy to reach. A good time will be had by all.

1 comment 16 August 2010

Lachmann on Capital Heterogeneity

| Peter Klein |

We have written often on the role of capital heterogeneity in an entrepreneurial theory of the firm. “We are living in a world of unexpected change,” wrote Ludwig Lachmann in 1956; “hence capital combinations . . . will be ever changing, will be dissolved and reformed. In this activity, we find the real function of the entrepreneur.” Of course, the concept of heterogeneous resources is fundamental to transaction cost and resource-based views of the firm. It is mostly ignored by mainstream economists, however — macroeconomists in particular, as evidenced by the Old School Keynesianism that drives bailout and stimulus policy.

Here is Richard Ebeling with a fine overview of Lachmann’s capital theory, in contrast to Keynes’s superficial treatment:

A crucial element in Lachmann’s view of capital . . . is that the relationships between and among capital goods are those of substitutes and complements.

The Keynesian fallacy, Lachmann implies, is that Keynes tended to view and consider the capital stock has a more or less homogeneous aggregate under which all capital goods might be considered as interchangeable substitutes. Thus, any increase in capital investment lowers the “marginal efficiency of capital” (Keynes’ term) of every other unit of capital, since every unit of capital is a substitute with all other capital. . . .

Thus, if monetary manipulation brings about an increase in money and credit, and a resulting distortion of the rates of interest, and if this generates a tendency for misguided capital and related investments, and as a consequences capital goods and various types of labor are drawn into particular sectors of the economy and “stages” of the time structure of production, then . . .

You know the rest. And the coda too:

Government interventions and “stimulus” gimmicks merely serve to delay the adjustments and further distort an already distorted market. It is an attempt to maintain capital and labor complementary production and investment structures that are unsustainable in many of the patterns generated during the boom phase of the business cycle.

Add comment 15 August 2010

Academy of Management Conference Open Thread

| Peter Klein |

Much of the O&M extended family is heading home from Montréal, site of the Academy of Management Annual Meeting. I presented one paper, discussed several more, facilitated a research roundtable, and spoke at a doctoral student consortium. Then there are business meetings, editorial board pow-wows, and planning sessions. Plus the really important stuff: socializing, networking, exchanging gossip, and enjoying good food and drink. It was great to see so many O&M bloggers, former guest bloggers, regular and occasional commentators, lurkers, and secret admirers.

Several sessions dealt with pedagogy, data sharing, research collaboration, and other issues being transformed by the web/wiki/blog/tweet/Facebook revolution. There was even a session on academic blogging featuring some of our friends from That Other Site. Clearly the O&M community is on the cutting edge of organizational research, teaching, and policy.

What did you think of the conference? What were your favorite sessions, papers, discussions, and activities? What could be done to improve future conferences? (Believe it or not, many high-ranking AoM muckety-mucks are regular O&M readers, so now’s your chance to be heard!)

3 comments 11 August 2010

Does Knowledge Management Improve Performance?

| Peter Klein |

Yes, says Peter Cappelli:

The extensive literature on knowledge management spans several fields, but there are remarkably few studies that address the basic question as to whether knowledge management practices improve organizational performance. I examine that question using a national probability sample of establishments, clear measures of IT-driven knowledge management practices, and an experimental design that offers a unique approach for addressing concerns about endogeneity and omitted variables. The results indicate that the use of company intranets, data warehousing practices, performance support systems, and employee competency databases have significant and meaningful effects on a range of relevant business outcomes.

Cappelli relies on a national (US), establishment-level survey of knowledge-management practices to construct a panel in which (according to the practioner literature) none of the knowledge-management practices under consideration existed at the start of the sample period. Check it out.

1 comment 9 August 2010

Historical Foundations of Entrepreneurship Research

| Peter Klein |

Look for this new collection later this Fall. Hans Landström and Franz Lohrke have put together an excellent set of essays on the intellectual origins and historical development of entrepreneurship research. Nicolai and I have a chapter on “Entrepreneurial Alertness.” Other topics include entrepreneurial orientation, the liability of newness, entrepreneurial groups, governance, social networks, social enterprise, culture, and psychology. Check it out!

Add comment 1 August 2010

Overconfidence

| Peter Klein |

Busenitz and Barney (1997) famously argued that entrepreneurs (founders) are particularly susceptible to overconfidence and representativeness biases. Compared to professional managers, entrepreneurs systematically overestimate the probability that a new venture will succeed and tend to draw unwarranted generalizations about the future from small samples. Overconfidence is now one of the major themes in the contemporary entrepreneurship literature (Bernardo and Welch, 2001; Forbes, 2005; Koellinger, Minniti, and Schade, 2007).

A new NBER paper by Itzhak Ben-David, John Graham, and Campbell Harvey finds evidence for a particular kind of overconfidence, “miscalibration,” among corporate executives. Miscalibration occurs when the agent’s forecast probability distribution is too narrow, meaning that the likelihood of extremely positive or negative events is unrealistically discounted. The idea is that agents with miscalibrated expectations are overconfident, not in the success of their activities (what the authors label “optimism”), but in their ability to predict the success of their activities. Survey evidence from a sample of CFOs reveals a number of interesting regularities about the relationship between miscalibration and past financial performance, corporate investment, and other observables. Here’s the abstract:

Miscalibration is a form of overconfidence examined in both psychology and economics. Although it is often analyzed in lab experiments, there is scant evidence about the effects of miscalibration in practice. We test whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and study the determinants of their miscalibration. We study a unique panel of over 11,600 probability distributions provided by top financial executives and spanning nearly a decade of stock market expectations. Our results show that financial executives are severely miscalibrated: realized market returns are within the executives’ 80% confidence intervals only 33% of the time. We show that miscalibration improves following poor market performance periods because forecasters extrapolate past returns when forming their lower forecast bound (“worst case scenario”), while they do not update the upper bound (“best case scenario”) as much. Finally, we link stock market miscalibration to miscalibration about own-firm project forecasts and increased corporate investment.

I’m not aware of any entrepreneurship studies that distinguish miscalibration from optimism, in the sense those terms are used here. Am I missing something?

4 comments 26 July 2010

Performance Evaluation Links

| Peter Klein |

Performance evaluation is a favorite topic here at O&M; readers may enjoy these miscellaneous items on measurement:

“Is Impact Measurement a Dead End?” by Alanna Shaikh, guest blogging at AidWatch.
Moneyball’s Michael Lewis on basketball player statistics (HT: PB).
The Urban Institute’s Outcome Indicators Project for nonprofits.
Relevant Demotivators: Flattery, Ineptitude, and Mediocrity.

Add comment 22 July 2010

The Organizational Economics of the BP Oil Spill

| Peter Klein |

Now that passions are cooling regarding the BP disaster, it’s time to bring organizational issues into the discussion.

1. Everyone knows about the liability caps and the role they may have played in encouraging moral hazard. Just as bank deposits are guaranteed by government deposit insurance, and large banks themselves are probably Too Big to Fail, liability for property damage from oil spills off US waters is limited to $75 million (plus cleanup costs), based on a 1990 law passed after the Exxon Valdiz spill. This presumably mitigates drillers’ incentives to manage environmental risk. Indeed, oil companies enjoy a very cozy relationship with their ostensible guardians; as the NY Times noted, “[d]ecades of law and custom have joined government and the oil industry in the pursuit of petroleum and profit.” The federal agency that oversees drilling, the Minerals Management Service, rakes $13 billion a year in fees in what amounts to a public-private partnership. And does anyone really think the British government would “stand idly by” if BP’s status as an ongoing concern were threatened by criminal or civil penalties?

2. As Bill Shughart points out, BP did not own the Deepwater Horizon platform, but leased it from a company called Transocean. To Bill this suggests “a classic principal-agent problem in which the duties and responsibilities of lessor and lessee undoubtedly were not spelled out fully, especially with respect to maintenance and testing of the rig’s blowout preventer as well as to the advisability of installing a second ‘blind sheer ram,’ which may have been able to plug the well after the first (and only one then in service) failed to do so.” Would BP have paid more attention to safety if it owned, rather than leased, the platform? (more…)

7 comments 20 July 2010

Miscellaneous Organizational Links

| Peter Klein |

The much-anticipated KKR IPO turned out to be a snoozer. But what the heck is a publicly traded private-equity firm anyway?
Is the flattening hierarchy an illusion, driven by job-title inflation?
How call centers use behavioral economics.
Belén Villalonga’s new paper on ownership concentration and internal-capital-market efficiency — highly recommended.

3 comments 16 July 2010

Accounting Conference on Creativity

| Peter Klein |

Hold your accountant jokes, everybody, because the journal Accounting, Organizations, and Society, along with IESE Business School and Sda Bocconi School of Management, is sponsoring a workshop on creativity and it looks really interesting. The workshop, “Debating the Link Between Creativity and Control,” takes place 4–5 April 2011 in Barcelona. Here’s the blurb:

Creativity is more important today than ever before. In fact, in current hypercompetitive environments, where the comparative advantage is easily eroded by technological evolution and by imitative or innovative action of competitors, firms can only react by means of creative processes aimed at renewing market strategies and product lines. Different streams of research on creativity have been developed over time, evolving from different sources, focusing on somewhat different aspects and suggesting a rich set of managerial results.

The aim of the workshop is to start an interdisciplinary debate on creativity, calling together contributors from psychology, sociology, management, and accounting domains. The discussion will explore the link between creativity and control, seen as a promising stream of research not only because of its infancy but most important because of its relevance to the world of management. The event will contribute to unveiling how the dialog between different disciplinary perspectives may lead to a deeper understanding on how to control creativity processes, thanks to the potential synergies deriving from the study of this phenomenon from different theoretical angles.

Further details and submission info below the fold. (more…)

10 comments 30 June 2010

Amsterdam Workshop on Entrepreneurial Capabilities

| Peter Klein |

The Amsterdam Center for Entrepreneurship (ACE) is sponsoring a two-day workshop starting tomorrow, 28 June, on “The Development of Entrepreneurial Capabilities.” Participants include Benson Honig, Gary Dushnitsky, Zoltan Acs, David Audretsch, Thomas Astebro, ACE Director Mirjam van Praag, and former O&M guest blogger Chihmao Hsieh. For more information see the conference program. Good stuff!

1 comment 27 June 2010

Management Journal Impact Factors 2009

| Nicolai Foss |

Eugene Garfield may not exactly be defunct, but it is entirely true that practical men, such as university presidents, deans, and department heads, are slaves of the Science Citation Index he created. In fact, so are the rest of us who have eagerly been waiting for the publication of the impact factors for 2009. They have just arrived and it is fascinating stuff. Here are a few immediate observations on the management IFs:

Abstracting from MIS Quarterly, the Strategic Management Journal is #3.
Journal of Management is, at #5 (and #4 if MIS Q is left out) cementing its position as a top journal.
Strategic Organization is up on #8! Way to go, Joel and colleagues! But can you sustain that position?
Journal of International Business Studies has dropped a few positions but is still in the top-10.
Journal of Management Studies (#14) has emerged as a close competitior in terms of ranking to Organization Science (#12). It is the undisputed #1 Euro management journal (it has also just entered the Financial Times ranking).
Resarch Policy, which was among the top 10 only two years back, is now #22.
Management Science is now down to #24. There are management departmetns where this journal is considered A+.

Of course, we all know the many reasons why all this should be taken with more than the proverbial grain of salt. For example, as Ram Mudambi points out (personal conversation), more and more journals play the impact factor game and force authors to cite recent papers in the journals, and reference lists grow longer and longer. Perhaps Article Influence Scores represent the superior alternative.

1 comment 20 June 2010

In the Pink

| Dick Langlois |

A propos Peter’s recent post about behavioral economics, I discovered this interesting video illustrating Daniel Pink’s book Drive (thanks, Steve). I don’t think there is anything about it that is particularly inconsistent with what we know about the economics of organization, but others may disagree.

I once heard Pink speak, at the 2002 Business History Conference meeting, just after his book Free Agent Nation (about the rise of self-employment) appeared. He was one third of a panel on the New Economy, the rest of which consisted of two extremely far-left twits. It was amusing to hear Pink, a former speechwriter for Al Gore, gamely hold up a sensible position, though I remember thinking what greater fun it would have been if they had invited Virginia Postrel.

Add comment 13 June 2010

Economics of Creativity

| Peter Klein |

David Galenson has written a series of papers on the creative arts, including songwriting, architecture, filmmaking, photography, and many kinds of visual art. A new paper, “Understanding Creativity,” summarizes and synthesizes much of this work. A central theme is the distinction between “experimental” and “conceptual” innovators. Experimental innovators focus on perception, proceed incrementally, and tend to make their most important contributions late in their careers. Conceptual innovators emphasize emotions, proceed in bold strokes, and tend to peak early. (A cinematic example: John Ford and Alfred Hitchcock fall in the former category, Orson Welles and Jean-Luc Godard in the latter.)

There are obvious parallels with the study of technological innovation, management, and entrepreneurship. Think of incremental versus systemic innovation, sustaining versus disruptive change, low-key management versus charismatic leadership, Kirznerian coordination versus Schumpeterian innovation. The analogies are inexact, but nonetheless intriguing (particularly the life-cycle aspects). What connections do you see?

The abstract of “Understanding Creativity” is below the fold. (The paper itself is gated, unfortunately). (more…)

Add comment 28 May 2010

Study this Summer with Klein

| Peter Klein |

I’m participating in a distance-learning experiment this summer — no, not Bootsy Collins’s Funk University, but the Mises Academy, a new Mises Institute service offering short, non-degree courses to university students, management professionals, and the general public. Everything’s online — lectures, readings, discussions, assignments. I’m teaching “Entrepreneurship in the Capitalist Economy,” a course based on my favorite book (as Mankiw would put it). The course runs for 9 weeks from 7 June to 7 August and costs a mere $255 — that’s less than one or two of Nicolai’s books!

The course is pitched at the undergraduate/MBA level, with no formal prerequisites except intellectual curiosity, a good work ethic, and a sense of humor. Perhaps I’ll offer special extra-credit assignments for O&M readers. . . .

Drop me a line if you have any questions. I’d love to have you join me on this journey!

3 comments 26 May 2010

Does Behavioral Economics Offer Anything New and True?

| Peter Klein |

One of my frustrations with behavioral economics is that it often seems to restate common, obvious, well-known ideas as if they are really novel insights (e.g., that preferences aren’t stable and predictable over time). More novel propositions are questionable at best (e.g, the paradox of choice).

Dan Ariely’s column in this month’s HBR is particularly frustrating. He claims as a unique insight of behavioral economics that when people are evaluated according to quantitative measures of performance, they tend to focus on the measures, not the underlying behavior being measured. Well, duh. This is pretty much a staple of introductory lectures on agency theory (and features prominently in Steve Kerr’s classic 1975 article). Ariely goes on to suggest that CEOs should be rewarded not on the basis of a single measure of performance, but multiple measures. Double-duh. Holmström (1979) called this the “informativeness principle” and it’s in all the standard textbooks on contract design and compensation structure (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, Brickley et al., etc.) (Of course, agency theory also recognizes that gathering information is costly, and that additional metrics are valuable, on the margin, only if the benefits exceed the costs, a point unmentioned by Ariely.)

Ariely says firms should not evaluate CEO’s on stock price, but on a variety of measures. What, for example? Here the story gets a bit murky:

Ideally, they’d vary by industry, situation, and mission, but here are a few obvious choices: How many new jobs have been created at your firm? How strong is your pipeline of new patents? How satisfied are your customers? Your employees? What’s the level of trust in your company and brand? How much carbon dioxide do you emit?

Ariely seems unaware that stock price is the most frequently used measure of firm performance precisely because it is a composite measure that captures all of those things. Stock price reflects the best available information about current and expected future performance — products, jobs, customer satisfaction, etc. Is it a perfect measure? Hardly. But it isn’t obvious how owners or Boards can create their own quantitative, composite measure by by picking their favorite elements, proxies, weighting schemes, and so on, in a way that provides better overall assessments of performance than market valuations. Boards, after all, may be predictably irrational too.

15 comments 21 May 2010

Intro to The Capitalist and the Entrepreneur

| Peter Klein |

Here’s a nicely formatted HTML version of the introduction to The Capitalist and the Entrepreneur. I’d apologize for the self-promotion but, well, isn’t that the whole point of blogging?

(PS: Those of you who like to run your transactions through Amazon can get the book here. Not sure about a Kindle edition but I’m told an epub version will be available soon.)

1 comment 17 May 2010

The Capitalist and The Entrepreneur: Available Now!

| Peter Klein |

My new book, The Capitalist and the Entrepreneur: Essays on Organizations and Markets (Mises Institute, 2010), is now available. For a limited time, you can get it for just $15 — a bargain at half the price! Actually, the resource-constrained among you can read the Full Monty here, free of charge. A PDF version is also available. A promotional essay appears today on Mises.org.

The editorial and production staff did a terrific job, and I’m thrilled with the volume’s look and feel. The contents aren’t bad either!

Order two or more and I will personally send you a set of Ginsu knives.

8 comments 13 May 2010

Personnel Economics Survey

| Peter Klein |

Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer provide a helpful overview:

Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives
Paul Oyer, Scott Schaefer
NBER Working Paper No. 15977

We survey the Personnel Economics literature, focusing on how firms establish, maintain, and end employment relationships and on how firms provide incentives to employees. This literature has been very successful in generating models and empirical work about incentive systems. Some of the unanswered questions in this area — for example, the empirical relevance of the risk/incentive tradeoff and the question of whether CEO pay arrangements reflect competitive markets and efficient contracting — are likely to be very difficult to answer due to measurement problems. The literature has been less successful at explaining how firms can find the right employees in the first place. Economists understand the broad economic forces — matching with costly search and bilateral asymmetric information — that firms face in trying to hire. But the main models in this area treat firms as simple black-box production functions. Less work has been done to understand how different firms approach the hiring problem, what determines the firm-level heterogeneity in hiring strategies, and whether these patterns conform to theory. We survey some literature in this area and suggest areas for further research.

Add comment 12 May 2010

Lazear on Leadership

| Peter Klein |

Ed Lazear tries his hand at the leadership literature in “Leadership: A Personnel Economics Approach.” The paper fits closely with his earlier work on entrepreneurship (here and here). Intuition:

The view presented [here] is that leaders are individuals who confront new situations often and choose the right direction in a high proportion of cases. Leaders also have the ability to identify situations where their skills will be needed and to do this frequently in a public setting. As a result of their success in choosing direction, and because the success is observable to others, leaders acquire followers who turn to the leaders for guidance in new and ambiguous situations. Individuals follow those who make correct decisions for a variety of reasons, the most direct of which is that they will boost their own probabilities of being correct by mimicking the decisions of the leaders. Thus, a leader is someone who has both vision and wisdom and who attracts a coterie of followers because of displayed superiority of decision making.

Because leaders are confronted with a wide variety of choices and because these choices span many fields, leaders tend to be generalists rather than specialists. Further, the broader the organization that an individual leads, the more general are the skills. . . .

An additional key ingredient is that leaders also possess the skills necessary to convince others that they have leadership ability. Consequently, communication skills are likely to be an important component in the leadership mix.

A formal model generates some testable propositions: “1. Ability and visibility, manifested in number of contacts per period, are complements. The most able seek to be the most visible in decision making settings. 2. The most able leaders are in the highest variance industries. 3. Leaders are generalists.” Survey data from Stanford MBAs are consistent with #2 and #3. Overall, a useful contribution to the small economics-of-leadership literature pioneered by Ben Hermalin.

Update: I neglected to mention this very important paper on leadership.

3 comments 27 April 2010

Business Ethics Symposium in Reason Papers

| Peter Klein |

From Reason Papers 31 (Fall 2009):

Articles: Business Ethics Symposium

Rival Paradigms in Business Ethics —Nicholas Capaldi

The Need for Realism in Business Ethics —Elaine Sternberg

The Virtue of Prudence as the Moral Basis of Commerce —Tibor R. Machan

Hume and Smith on the Moral Psychology of Market Relations, Practical Wisdom, and the Liberal Political Order —Jonathan Jacobs

Ethics without Profits —Douglas Den Uyl

Is a Market for Values a Value in Markets? —Alexei Marcoux

The Sloppiness of Business Ethics —Marianne Jennings

The Business Ethics of Incarceration: The Moral Implications of Treating Prisons Like Businesses —Daniel D’Amico & Joseph Butt

3 comments 26 April 2010

C. K. Prahalad (1941-2010)

| Peter Klein |

C. K. Prahalad died Friday at the age of 68. He’s best known for his “guru” work with Gary Hamel, but had turned his attention more recently to economic development , particularly the “bottom-of-the-pyramid” approach to poverty reduction. Here are thoughts and reminiscences from the WSJ, HBR, Ross Emmett, and the Ross School. HBR has already set up a Prahalad page. Here are previous O&M mentions. I last saw him at the 2009 SMS conference in Washington, D.C. where he spoke with Yves Doz on “The Future of Strategy.”

2 comments 19 April 2010

A Real Hostage Model

| Peter Klein |

Forget Williamson (1983). Check out Randall Morck and Fan Yang’s analysis of the 19th-century banks Shanxi, China. These banks featured a dual-class equity structure and, to mitigate agency problems created by entrenched insiders, not only gave insiders few voting rights, but also allowed outsiders to enslave insiders’ wives and children and hold their relatives as hostages. As Morck and Yang observe, with dry humor: “Modern civil libertarians might question some of these governance innovations, but others provide lessons to modern corporations, regulators, and lawmakers.”

Add comment 13 April 2010

Lachmannian Entrepreneurship

| Dick Langlois |

The new issue of Organization Studies carries an article by John Mathews called “Lachmannian Insights into Strategic Entrepreneurship: Resources, Activities, and Routines in a Disequilibrium World.” Here’s the abstract.

Recent contributions to the organizational literature see the radical subjectivist and disequilibrium framework of Ludwig Lachmann as providing a suitable foundation for strategic entrepreneurial studies, in that his approach seeks independence from conventional equilibrium-based reasoning. In a Lachmannian spirit, this article suggests that strategizing can fruitfully be viewed as choices made by the entrepreneur in terms of the organization’s constituent resources, activities and routines together with their recombinations and complexifications. Cast in a general, disequilibrium setting, the strategic goals that guide the organizational entrepreneur’s strategizing can be formulated in terms of the construction and capture of resource complementarities, the pursuit of increasing returns through activities reconfiguration, and the generation of learning and dynamic capabilities through reconfiguration of routines. Once formulated in this way, the strategizing issues may be seen to make sense not just in the comparative static and imperfect equilibrium frameworks within which they have hitherto been posed, but in a more general dynamic and disequilibrium setting that corresponds to the real conditions in which firms are required to make entrepreneurial decisions. The simplified framework offers some hope for overcoming the balkanization of management scholarship that is so widely deplored.

Add comment 7 April 2010

Behavioral Corporate Strategy

| Peter Klein |

I’m not a huge fan of behavioral economics, though I obviously recognize its substantial and growing influence in economics, finance, entrepreneurship, and potentially, strategy. Many academics and commentators see the financial crisis as a vindication for behavioral economics research. Behavioral reasoning underlies the New Paternalism. I see the importance and implications of behavioral economics as overstated — the literature typically focuses on straw-man versions of “rationality” and largely ignores the effect of biases and heuristics on political decision-making — but it raises interesting issues in applied psychology.

My old friend Dan Lovallo has a nice piece (with Olivier Sibony) in the new McKinsey Quarterly making “The Case for Behavioral Strategy.” (It’s gated, but registration is free.) They make good arguments for applying behavioral insights into corporate decision making. The basic claim is that “we need new norms for activities such as managing meetings . . . , gathering data, discussing analogies, and stimulating debate that together can diminish the impact of cognitive biases on critical decisions. To support those new norms, we also need a simple language for recognizing and discussing biases, one that is grounded in the reality of corporate life, as opposed to the sometimes-arcane language of academia.” I agree, and urge you to check it out.

1 comment 7 April 2010

Posner on Institutions and Organizations, Round Two

| Peter Klein |

Remember the infamous Posner-Coase-Williamson exchange from JITE, 1993? Posner dismissed the New Institutional Economics as a derivative form of Posnerian law and economics, prompting unhappy replies from Coase and Williamson. Here’s Coase:

Posner [1993, 79] says that the first part of his paper describes “the conception of the field [the new institutional economics] held by Ronald Coase.” Reading this part of his paper recalled to my mind Horace Walpole’s opening remarks in his book on King Richard the Third: “So incompetent has the generality of historians been for the province that they have undertaken, that it is almost a question, whether, if the dead of past ages could revive, they would be able to reconnoitre the events of their own times, as transmitted to us by ignorance and misrepresentation” (Walpole [1768, 1]). I have only one foot through the door but should the final yank come before this piece is published, Horace Walpole’s words would apply exactly to Posner’s highly inaccurate account of my views.

Adds Williamson, wryly: “Richard Posner is a prolific writer and distinguished jurist. He is frequently asked to speak with wisdom and authority on many issues. Whether he hits the mark or misses varies with his depth of knowledge and understanding of those issues. . . . I content that Posner’s [1993] commentary mainly misses.”

Now Geoff Hodgson has produced a reboot: a long essay by Posner in the Journal of Institutional Economics titled “From the New Institutional Economics to Organization Economics: with Applications to Corporate Governance, Government Agencies, and Legal Institutions,” with replies from Jürgen Backhaus, Bruno Frey, Lin Ostrom, John Roberts, Tom Ulen, and several others (but not Coase or Williamson!). Posner focuses almost exclusively on the principal-agent problem, perhaps unaware that information, delegation, coordination, and adaptation are also important issues in organizational economics. His main conclusion seems to be that both private firms and public agencies are equally inefficient. Interesting reading, to be sure (and much better than Posner’s solipsistic essay on his conversion to Keynesianism, inexplicably published by the New Republic).

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Add comment 25 March 2010

A New Organizational Chart

| Peter Klein |

Fodder for dozens of future PhD dissertations, no doubt! (Click to enlarge.)

7 comments 23 March 2010

Shareholder-Stakeholder Smackdown: Jensen, Freeman, Mintzberg, Khurana

| Peter Klein |

This looks like a fun event. Watch the Big Guys debate the future of the firm, management, and management education. It’s Fordham University’s W. Edwards Deming Memorial Conference, 11 May 2010 in New York City. Kudos to Mike Jensen for his willingness to walk into what will be, presumably, a line of fire. And remember, management theory is not to blame.

Add comment 11 March 2010

Williamson Tribute in California Management Review

| Peter Klein |

Six new essays on Oliver Williamson by Haas School colleagues appear in the new issue of the California Management Review. They’re behind a subscription firewall, but just $6 a pop. Check ‘em out:

Institutions, Politics, and Non-Market Strategy
de Figueiredo, Jr., Rui J.P.

Holdup: Implications for Investment and Organization
Hermalin, Benjamin E.

Antitrust Economics
Shapiro, Carl

Regulation: A Transaction Cost Perspective
Spiller, Pablo T.

Williamson’s Contribution and Its Relevance to 21st Century Society
Tadelis, Steven

Williamson’s Impact on the Theory and Practice of Management
Teece, David J.

Thanks to Mike Cook for the tip.

Add comment 15 February 2010

The Capitalist Kibbutz

| Peter Klein|

That’s how the Financial Times headlines this fascinating story about the transformation of many Israeli kibbutzim into partially privatized, profit-seeking, professionally managed entities that act in capital, product, and factor markets just like private firms. There are some similarities with the end of the socialist experiment in Russia: “‘The kibbutz was never isolated from society,’ says Shlomo Getz, the director of the Institute for Research of the Kibbutz at Haifa University. ‘There was a change in values in Israel, and a change in the standard of living. Many kibbutzniks now wanted to have the same things as their friends outside the kibbutz.”

The bottom line, from economist and former kibbutznik Omer Moav: “People respond to incentives. We are happy to work hard for our own quality of life, we like our independence. It is all about human nature — and a socialist system like the kibbutz does not fit human nature.” (Via BK Marcus.)

2 comments 9 February 2010

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