Posts filed under 'Management Theory'
What Would Peter Say?
| Peter Klein |
Peter Drucker, that is. The great management guru died in 2005 — and even then, he didn’t blog, unlike some other guys named Peter. If Drucker were alive today, what would he say about the financial crisis, health-care reform, climate change, and the other Big Issues of our day? Rosabeth Moss Kanter asks in the current issue of HBR, and thinks Drucker’s writings have important lessons for today’s problems. E.g.:
- Drucker would not have been surprised that incentives to take excessive risks contributed to the recent global financial meltdown. Back in the mid-1980s, he warned about a public outcry over executive compensation — a main theme on the U.S. government’s agenda following the fall of banks in 2008.
- Years ago, he warned of troubles ahead if GM executives remained stuck in memories of previous successes and failed to ask his famous “what to stop doing” question. GM was an iconic example of failure to see the need for significant innovation; its structure had become ossified, and its top management couldn’t consider a change.
- He focused on how organizations could best achieve their purpose, not on business per se or on profit as the main indicator of success. He championed a robust civil society of voluntary nonprofit organizations as an essential foundation on which business could thrive and people could prosper, because this sector plays a vital role in promoting health, education, and well-being. The role of government is fuzzier in Drucker’s writings, although it is clear that he mistrusted centralization of power and saw bureaucracy as a source of rigidity rather than innovation.
I hadn’t known before that Drucker’s father was friends with Schumpeter, often described as a major influence on Drucker’s thinking. “Regular guests of the Druckers included the economists Schumpeter, Hayek and Mises, with whom Drucker’s father had business relations in his function as director of the K.& K. trade museum,” according to Drucker’s official biography. Unfortunately the young Drucker was more attracted to Othmar Spann, described by Mises as an “anti-economist.”
2 comments 16 November 2009
The MSM Rediscovers the Classics
| Peter Klein |
The rediscovery of Keynes is one of the official storylines of the financial crisis and global recession. The problem is that Keynes was, in my judgment, a charlatan, a clever man obsessed with his own cleverness who never paid serious, thoughtful attention to economics (or any subject). You have to learn a little about Keynes to be well-educated and — because of his vast influence — to understand contemporary macroeconomic thought, but otherwise there is little intrinsic value in his writings.
Happily, the mainstream media is rediscovering other writers too. Last week the WSJ ran a nice piece on Mises, “The Man Who Predicted the Depression,” focusing on Mises’s 1912 Theory of Money and Credit (the book dismissed by Keynes as unoriginal, with Keynes admitting, a few years later, that he understood German well enough to comprehend things he already knew, but not to grasp anything new). “With interest rates at zero, monetary engines humming as never before, and a self-proclaimed Keynesian government, we are back again embracing the brave new era of government-sponsored prosperity and debt,” writes Mark Spitznagel. “And, more than ever, the system is piling uncertainties on top of uncertainties, turning an otherwise resilient economy into a brittle one. . . . How curious it is that the guy who wrote the script depicting our never ending story of government-induced credit expansion, inflation and collapse has remained so persistently forgotten.” Yesterday, Reuters ran Rolfe Winkler’s piece urging readers to study Mises and Hyman Minsky while Investor’s Business Daily featured an item on Schumpeter.
Today, Don Sull’s Financial Times column focuses on Frank Knight, whom Sull calls “an American Socrates.” (OK, it’s a blog, not a column, and Sull is a management professor at LBS, not some hack journalist, but you get the point.) “In these unsettled times,” Sull writes, “it worthwhile revisiting the contribution of Frank Knight, an economist who was among the earliest and most penetrating analysts of what uncertainty and risk meant, and how they influenced a firm’s ability to make a profit.” Knight is one of the greats, a brilliant and idiosyncratic thinker who could be spectacularly right (on profit) and spectacularly wrong (on capital). Sull’s blog entry today is a teaser, with a promised follow-up to deal more specifically with the risk-uncertainty distinction (my take is here). Watch for it!
5 comments 10 November 2009
No Required Ethics Course at Chicago-Booth
| Peter Klein |
Bucking the trend, the Chicago-Booth MBA program will not offer required courses in business ethics (via Cliff). The school “has no set standard for ethical case studies used in the classroom,” according to Executive Director of Faculty Services Lisa Messaglia,”but leaves it up to faculty, instead.”
[T]he business school is disciplined-based, meaning that classes are divided by disciplines such as sociology or psychology, rather than by industries. As a result, she said, professors may use different examples in their lectures, but Chicago Booth “[doesn’t] change required classes based on trends in the economy.”
I’m not keen on the way ethics is taught in most business schools so I’m sympathetic to the Chicago position. Some previous O&M posts on teaching ethics are here, here, here, here, here, and here.
1 comment 10 November 2009
Multitasking
| Peter Klein |
I was flipping channels last night and came across a Jimi Hendrix biopic. Lots of concert footage, with Hendrix doing his usual amazing Hendrix things — singing, crazy guitar riffs, playing with his teeth. Then I noticed something I hadn’t seen before: He’s doing all this while chewing gum. How can he sing without choking or spitting it out? How does he pluck guitar strings with his teeth and not leave a big wad on the pickups? Some people have trouble walking and chewing gum at the same time. How is he doing this?
Naturally, this got me thinking about multitask principal-agent problems. I liked one article that appeared in 2005 but didn’t generate much attention: Besanko, Regibeau, and Rockett’s “A Multi-Task Principal-Agent Approach to Organizational Form” (Journal of Industrial Economics, December 2005). Multitasking has often been applied performance evaluation, specifically the use of objective versus subjective performance measures. (If the agent is assigned multiple tasks, only some of which are measurable, than a quantitative evaluation scheme biases the agent’s effort toward more easily measurable tasks.) Besanko et al. apply this logic to divisionalization, examining the choice between product-line and functional organization:
This paper studies the choice of organizational forms in a multi-task principal-agent model. We compare a functional organization in which the firm is organized into functional departments such as marketing and R&D to a product-based organization in which the firm is organized into product lines. Managers’ compensation can be based on noisy measures of product-line profits. Measures of a functional area’s contribution to total profits are not available, however. This effect favors the product organization. However, if there are significant asymmetries between functional area contributions to organizational success and cross-product externalities within functions, organizing along functional lines may dominate the product organization. The functional organization can also dominate when a function is characterized by strong externalities while the other is not.
An obvious example: university faculty who are tasked with research, teaching, and service. Research is (in principle) easy to measure: publications, citation counts, grants, speaking invitations, etc. Teaching and service outputs are fuzzier. Even well-intentioned administrators tend to reward what they can count, which means refereed journal articles (and, in some fields, grant dollars) end up being the primary performance metric. Need I point out what this does to teaching?
The same issue is explored in Williamson (1975, pp. 155-75), where the ability to reward division managers based on standalone, divisional profit figures is cited as an advantage of the M-form structure.
3 comments 30 October 2009
How Machiavellian Are You?
| Peter Klein |
A test for university presidents, deans, department heads, center directors, etc. (via Anu).
(Yes, of course, there are management and leadership literatures on old Niccolò. Don’t act surprised!)
1 comment 29 October 2009
Sampling on the Dependent Variable: French Peasant Edition
| Peter Klein |
A useful example of the methodological flaw that plagues the “great companies” and “great leaders” literature in management, from Graham Robb’s excellent The Discovery of France (Norton, 2007):
[N]early every autobiographical account of ordinary life in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France comes from the early chapters of memoirs written by exceptional men who rose through the ranks of the army or the Church, woo wrote their way to fame or who were plucked from obscurity by a patron, a lover or, eventually, an electorate. Few men and even fewer women had the means or the desire to write a book on “How I failed to overcome my humble origins.” Apart from the countless riches-to-riches tales written by aristocrats, almost all the lives that we know about follow the same untypical upward trend: the farmer’s son Restif de la Bretonne, the cutler’s son Diderot, the watchmaker’s son Rousseau, the Corsican cadet Napoleone Buonaparte.
These spectacular success are more typical of long-term trends than of individual lives. Categorical terms like “peasants,” “artisans,” and “the poor” reduce the majority of the population to smudges in a crowd scene that no degree of magnification could resolve into a group of faces. They suggest a large and luckless contingent that filled in the background of important events and participated in the nation’s historical development by suffering and engaging in a semblance of economic activity.
Likewise, business and entrepreneurial strategies can be understood by studying not only firms that tried them and succeeded, but also those that used the same strategies and failed. Reducing the majority of companies to smudges in an industry-wide or economy-wide crowd scene tells us little about what does and doesn’t work.
2 comments 25 October 2009
Penrose (1959) Golden Anniversary
| Peter Klein |
This year marks the 50th anniversary of Edith Penrose’s Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959), one of the most important and influential books on the firm and firm strategy. To celebrate, Yasemin Kor and Christos Pitelis organized a roundtable at last week’s SMS conference with remarks by Christos, Yasemin, Joe Mahoney, Margie Peteraf, and Maurizio Zollo. The participants have graciously allowed me to post their slides and materials (1, 2, 3, 4). Christos, Penrose’s friend and literary executor, has edited and introduced a new edition of the 1959 book, which you can purchase here. You can read his introduction here. Nice!
Penrose trivia: During the 1950s Murray Rothbard made his living by reviewing literature and grant proposals for the William Volker Fund. When going through Rothbard’s correspondence a few years ago I came across a proposal for a study on firm growth submitted jointly by Penrose and Fritz Machlup, her dissertation supervisor at Johns Hopkins. Apparently at one point, the book was going to be a joint project. (Rothbard thought the ideas in the proposal didn’t fit with Penrose’s earlier warnings about the use of biological analogies in economics. However, as Joe Mahoney has noted, there is no inconsistency between the 1952 article and the 1959 book; Penrose is careful in her work on growth not to treat growth tendencies in firms as automatic, but to model them based on the preferences, beliefs, and actions of the firm’s personnel. In other words, she accepts natural selection in this context but not random mutation.)
BTW, what other important works in our field appeared in 1959, to be celebrated this year? Coase’s article on the Federal Communications Commission is one. The 1970s may have been the golden decade but there were major contributions in the previous decades as well. What are your favorites? Whose anniversary should we be preparing to celebrate?
3 comments 21 October 2009
Williamson’s “Economics of Institutions” Syllabus
| Peter Klein |
I was pretty clueless when I started graduate school. I had good undergraduate training in economics, and had the privilege of attending my first Austrian seminar, where I met Murray Rothbard, Hans Hoppe, Roger Garrison, and David Gordon, before beginning graduate work. But I really didn’t know exactly what I wanted to study. Like most economics PhD students, I wasn’t exactly turned on by the core theory and econometrics classes. Then I took Williamson’s course ECON 224, “Economics of Institutions,” and it was a revelation. The syllabus dazzled me, with readings from Coase, Simon, Hayek, North, Arrow, Chandler, Alchian, Demsetz, Ben Klein, and many other brilliant and thoughtful economists, along with sociologists, political scientists, historians, and others. I decided then that institutions and organizations would be my area, and I’ve never looked back.
Since Monday I’ve been digging through my files trying to find a copy of that syllabus. I found my folder for that course, containing notes, readings, and exams (no, you can’t see my test scores), but for some reason the syllabus has disappeared. I must have taken it out to study, perhaps when designing my own course in institutions and organizations, and it didn’t make its way back into the file. But I did find an older copy, the Fall 1988 edition. That was, I believe, Williamson’s first year at Berkeley, after arriving from Yale (where he didn’t teach PhD courses, his main appointment being in the law school). I took the course in 1989, but the syllabi are very similar. So here it is. Note the range of authors, journals, subject areas. Not at all like the typical economics PhD course!
3 comments 16 October 2009
Hoisted from the Comments: Hoopes on Williamson
| Peter Klein |
Former guest blogger David Hoopes’s comment deserves its own post:
So, we’re leaving the serious discussion to our goody two-shoes organizations twin? Was Will Mitchell a Williamson student? No one has said anything about Teece. Teece’s early JEBO articles did a great job talking about economies of scope and transaction cost influences on strategy.
Unmentioned yet, there has been some contentious discussion about the implications of TC economics on strategy and organization. Many including Connor and Prahalad consider the implications of TC to lead to bad management and bad strategy. However, our very own Steve Postrel wrote a great paper, “Islands of Shared Knowledge” that (esp in an earlier version) does a great job of comparing and contrasting the RBV and TC as theories of the firm.
Harold Demsetz weighed in on this earlier in his, “Theory of the Firm Revisited” (which is one of my favorite all time papers). Harold argues that firms would exist without governance problems. Steve has tried to get Harold to see the light (i’m not sure i do) but to no avail.
Of course, CERTAIN org theorists, whose names i do not mention think that Williamson’s logic, as does all competition-based economic theory, leads to evil and terrible results: unethical business students who become tomorrow’s headlines.
I’m very happy to see Williamson win. His influence on strategy and organization is immense. And, at this point, I don’t see any theory of the competitive firm can reasonably leave him out. I will admit, in terms of competitive heterogeneity and competitive advantage I don’t think governance is anywhere near as important as productive capabilities. BUT, capabilities literature still has a lot of work to do to be specified as exactly as TCE.
David, more serious discussion is on the way. Unfortunately, we O&Mers have higher opportunity costs than the bloggers at our good-twin site, so we can’t get the posts up as quickly as they can. :-)
3 comments 13 October 2009
Management Miscellany
| Peter Klein |
1. We are not big on Jim Collins here at O&M but Toyota president Akio Toyoda is a fan, explaining his company’s woes in terms of Collins’s five stages of business decline. (Is “be headquartered in a country with an overvalued currency” one of the stages?)
2. Karen Ho’s Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street (Duke, 2008) is reviewed by fellow anthropologist Gillian Tett in the FT. The key to understanding the financial crisis, we learn, is Bourdieu (why haven’t I read about this book on orgtheory.net?). “Massive corporate restructurings are not caused so much by abstract financial models as by the local, cultural habitus of investment bankers, the mission-driven narratives of shareholder value and the institutional culture of Wall Street.” Why didn’t I think of that?
3. I’ve been reading Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We, the first of great dystopian novels (in Natasha Randall’s new translation). I had head that Taylorism figures prominently in the novel, but didn’t know Taylor would be mentioned by name. “Yes, that Taylor was, without doubt, the most brilliant of the Ancients. True, he didn’t think everything through, didn’t extend his method throughout life, to each step, around the clock. He wasn’t able to integrate his system from an hour to all twenty-four. But all the same: how they could have written whole libraries about the likes of Kant — and not take notice of Taylor, a prophet, with the ability to see ten centuries ahead?” Of course, as we’ve noted before, there’s more to Taylor than meets the eye.
8 comments 4 October 2009
Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics
| Peter Klein |
Mike Sykuta and I are editing a volume for the Elgar Companion series, The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics. The volume is currently in production with an expected publication date in mid-2010. We’ve created a page here on O&M with more information, including a table of contents and some sample chapter drafts. Enjoy!
2 comments 30 September 2009
Two Quotations on Profits
| Peter Klein |
Henry Hazlitt, from Economics in One Lesson:
In a free economy, in which wages, costs and prices are left to the free play of the competitive market, the prospect of profits decides what articles will be made, and in what quantities — and what articles will not be made at all. If there is no profit in making an article, it is a sign that the labor and capital devoted to its production are misdirected: the value of the resources that must be used up in making the article is greater than the value of the article itself.
One function of profits, in brief, is to guide and channel the factors of production so as to apportion the relative output of thousands of different commodities in accordance with demand. No bureaucrat, no matter how brilliant, can solve this problem arbitrarily. Free prices and free profits will maximize production and relieve shortages quicker than any other system. Arbitrarily fixed prices and arbitrarily limited profits can only prolong shortages and reduce production and employment.
The function of profits, finally, is to put constant and unremitting pressure on the head of every competitive business to introduce further economies and efficiencies, no matter to what stage these may already have been brought.
Barack Obama, from last week’s address on healthcare:
I’ve insisted that like any private insurance company, the public insurance option would have to be self-sufficient and rely on the premiums it collects. But by avoiding some of the overhead that gets eaten up at private companies by profits and excessive administrative costs and executive salaries, it could provide a good deal for consumers, and would also keep pressure on private insurers to keep their policies affordable and treat their customers better. . . .
So, (a) profits and executive salaries are part of (avoidable) overhead, and (b) government agencies have lower administrative costs than private firms. Who knew? (Thanks to Gary for the quote.)
4 comments 15 September 2009
Corporate Diversification Humor
| Peter Klein |
As someone who works in the corporate diversification area I enjoyed this Onion piece on Yamaha:
Despite concerns over the recent global recession, Yamaha Corporation president Mitsuru Umemura announced last week that he was content with the current level of production of Jet Skis, alto saxophones, snowmobiles, power generators, scooters, and golf carts. “Initially we thought that the declining global market would result in overproduction of synthesizers, PA systems, DVD players, tone generators, and motocross bikes, but in fact our production quotas were almost perfectly attuned to the market in power amplifiers, heart-rate monitors, signal processors, analog mixers, engine oil, microphones, HiFi systems, and grand pianos,” said Umemura, who stressed that his company prides itself on attention to detail. “At the Yamaha Corporation we’re focused on one thing and one thing alone — quality sound chips, ceiling brackets, editing software, race-kart engines, sport boats, flugelhorns, ATVs, sequencers, outboard motors, conference systems, golf clubs, projectors, MIDI controllers, lamp cartridges, portable recorders, subwoofers, component systems, and motorcycles.”
I remember while doing my dissertation research coming across a mid-1960s cartoon from Fortune or Business Week showing Santa’s elves whispering nervously as Santa meets with a slick-looking conglomerator in the background. One elf to another: “I think we’re becoming a division of Gulf & Western!” Robert Sobel also tells a story (I think in The Rise and Fall of the Conglomerate Kings) about the conglomerate CEO who specializes in acquisition by stock-swap. One day his son announces that he’s sold the family dog for $1,000. “You got cash for that old pooch?” “No, I traded him for two $500 cats.”
And there’s the great line from Fortune about Peter Grace, whose famous acquisition sprees transformed W. R. Grace from a mundane shipping company into “a purveyor of everything from bull semen to grilled cheese sandwiches.”
2 comments 9 September 2009
Books About Work
| Peter Klein |
I blogged earlier about Matthew Crawford, whose book Shop Class as Soulcraft challenges our commonly held beliefs about white- and blue-collar work. In a feature in Saturday’s WSJ Crawford listed his five favorite books about work. It’s an unusual list: Harry Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital, Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, Arlie Russell Hochschild’s The Managed Heart, Richard Sennett’s The Corrosion of Character, and Mike Rose’s The Mind at Work. After Virtue, for example, is well-known as an outstanding work in contemporary moral philosophy, but Crawford sees it in a different light:
Alasdair MacIntyre shows that the manager, that stock character in modern institutional life, is a moral relativist by stipulation — it’s just part of the job. Unlike an entrepreneur, a hired manager must accept the ends of an organization as given — as unavailable for rational scrutiny. His task is to adjust others, and indeed himself, to the realization of those ends, by whatever means are effective. As the business section of any chain bookstore confirms, what is wanted are therapeutic techniques of “self transformation”; the manager becomes a sort of institutional pop psychologist.
What are your favorite books (and articles) about the workplace? Besides Dilbert. I’m partial to Donald Roy’s 1952 classic, “Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop.”
7 comments 7 September 2009
Postrel on Competitive Advantage
| Peter Klein |
Former guest blogger Steve Postrel gave an interesting presentation at last week’s AoM Professional Development Workshop on competitive advantage: “Competitive Advantage: Can’t Live With It, Can’t Live Without It.” Steve sent me the slides and was happy to share them here. Add your questions and comments below.
Steve provides a set of conditions that must be met for competitive advantage to be internally consistent and operationally meaningful, then presents his own (unique) definition, a simple and precise formulation in terms of gains from trade:
Seller 1 has competitive advantage over Seller 2 with respect to a specific transaction if and only if the economic surplus (gains from trade = V – C) from a transaction between 1 and the buyer is greater than the surplus from a transaction between 2 and the buyer. The difference in surplus is the CA.
A series of implications, qualifications, and applications follows. What do you think?
3 comments 21 August 2009
Mintzberg Interview
| Peter Klein |
A short interview with Henry Mintzberg, mostly about his forthcoming book Managing, in today’s WSJ (not sure if it is gated). Best line:
I talk about what I call “the inevitably flawed manager.” We’re all flawed, but basically, effective managers are people whose flaws are not fatal under the circumstances. Maybe the best managers are simply ordinary, healthy people who aren’t too screwed up.
Add comment 17 August 2009
Short Piece on Probability Theory
| Peter Klein |
“Risk, Uncertainty, and Economic Organization” is my contribution to the Hoppe Festschrift. I got the topic idea from some blogger guy. My chapter focuses, as the title suggests, on Knightian uncertainty. Hoppe places Knight, along with Ludwig von Mises, squarely in the frequentist camp (typically associated with Ludwig’s brother Richard). I tend to agree with Hoppe although, as I discuss in the paper, there are many interpretations of Knight, and some commentators argue that subjective (Bayesian) probability theory renders untenable the Knightian distinction between insurable risk and true uncertainty (see, for example, Dick’s 1982 paper).
Ultimately, however, I don’t think the approach to the firm promoted on this blog depends on a particular interpretation of Knight. The central claim is that judgment represents a kind of decision-making that cannot be traded on the market, and that therefore requires the entrepreneur exercising such judgment to establish a firm (more specifically, to take ownership of capital resources). To put it differently, ownership of assets implies a kind of ultimate responsibility that the owner cannot delegate. I think one can be agnostic about exactly why judgment isn’t tradable — it could be a form of asymmetric information, rather than ontological differences between types of knowledge — and still buy the basic Knight-Mises-Foss-Klein approach to the firm.
10 comments 6 August 2009
HR Graphic of the Week
| Peter Klein |
From Wired’s “New Rules for Highly Evolved Humans” feature: “Use a Plausible Excuse When You Call In Sick.”
1 comment 4 August 2009
Special Issue of HRM on “HRM and Knowledge Processes”
| Nicolai Foss |
With Scott Snell (Darden Graduate School of Business) and my SMG colleague Dana Minbaeva, I have edited this just-published special issue of Human Resource Management on the intersection of knowledge management and HRM. One of this highlights of the special issue is an excellent paper by Teppo Felin, Todd Zenger, and Joshua Tomsik that takes issue with some influential ideas on how “knowledge” prompts the emergence of “communal” forms of organizing.
Add comment 31 July 2009
Organizations, Markets, and Health Care Reform
| Russ Coff |
Amidst the fierce debate about the U.S. health care system is a raving lack of clarity. At the core, is whether organizations and markets fail to produce an optimal solution. Even the most neoclassical of economists these days acknowledge that market externalities exist and that these should be the focus of government intervention. Unfortunately, I don’t feel that the debate has been rigorous or well-informed in defining the market failure or why a government run system would be superior.
Liberal Economist Paul Krugman explains why markets fail summarizing Kenneth Arrow’s arguments (here). Basically, the third-party payee system and the information asymmetries render comparison shopping ineffective (and hence competition fails to yield an optimal solution).
Indeed, there is a good bit of inefficiency in the current U.S. system. A recent NY Times article notes that health care costs the average U.S. household $6,500 more each year than other comparable wealthy nations. Unfortunately, looking at many of the important outcomes, it appears that consumers are not getting much for their money on many dimensions (e.g., chronic disease outcomes). So it should be possible to lower costs and improve outcomes. Of course, this ignores the question of whether costs are higher to subsidize R&D that ultimately spills over into other countries.
Unfortunately, the article continues to point out how the reform efforts seem to ignore this low-hanging fruit. (more…)
7 comments 30 July 2009
Federal Reserve “Independence”
| Peter Klein |
I was invited to sign the Open Letter in support of Fed independence but, like Jerry O’Driscoll, Bob Higgs, and Larry White, I don’t support the cause. Follow the links above for detailed arguments. For my part:
1. The Open Letter focuses exclusively on monetary policy, as if the Fed’s Congressional critics like Ron Paul just want to know how the Federal Funds Rate is set. But the Fed conducts not only monetary policy, but fiscal policy as well, especially during the last 18 months. If the Fed can buy and hold any assets it likes, if it works hand-in-hand with the White House and the Treasury to coordinate trillion-dollar bailouts, isn’t it reasonable to have some oversight? (And don’t forget bank supervision. Even the Fed’s defenders recognize a need to separate its monetary-policy and bank-supervision roles. But as long as the Fed continues as a bank regulator, shouldn’t someone should be watching the watchmen?)
2. The Open Letter itself is poorly crafted, full of unsubstantiated assertions and misleading statements. There’s no argument there, as Higgs emphasizes. Actually, neither the time-series or cross-sectional evidence suggests any correlation between central-bank independence (whatever that means) and economic performance.
3. More generally, the Fed is a central planning agency, and it performs about as well as every central planning agency in history. Have we learned nothing from the huge literature on comparative economic systems? “Independence,” in this context, simply means the absence of external constraint. There are no performance incentives and no monitoring or governance. There is no feedback or selection mechanism. There is no outside evaluation (outside the blogosphere). Why on earth would we expect an organization operating in that environment to improve social welfare? Is this institution run by men, or gods?
2 comments 22 July 2009
Bounded Rationality or Skilled Performance?
| Nicolai Foss |
In my 2003 contribution to the Festschrift for Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (here), I argued that Nelson and Winter’s main oeuvre, their 1982 book, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, is much more about tacit knowledge than about bounded rationality. The notion of routines is intended to capture the firm-specific and tacit character of productive knowledge rather than heuristics, satistificing search, and the like (these may not be opposed, though).
I am reading Great Minds in Management at the moment (highly recommended!). In his chapter, “Developing Evolutionary Theory for Economics and Management,” Sidney Winter seems to agree:
Skill provides a compelling model of effective behavior that is different, and deeply different, from what we are told either by theories of rational decision or by behavioral theories featuring ‘bounded rationality.’ As far as I can see, the latter theories do not lead one to expect that the word ‘awesome’ will ever be needed to describe human behavior” (p. 533).
Indeed, as my frequent co-author, Teppo Felin, argues, bounded rationality is almost always about people’s foolishness (notably the heuristics and biases literature), rather than about how and why people actually cope, sometimes quite successfully, with most of the decision situations they confront. It is about decision failure, rather than decision success (possibly premised on the implicit assumption that the standard model of rational decision is the only existing model of decision success). The problem with Winter’s alternative, namely that of behavior as skilled performance, is that it seems unclear what are the available models. Skilled performance seems as arbitrary as bounded rationality.
11 comments 15 July 2009
Does Economics Training Hinder Managers’ Ability?
| Benito Arruñada |
In a new paper with Xosé H. Vázquez we explore the consequences of using different behavioral assumptions in training managers on their future performance. We argue that training with an emphasis on the standard assumptions used in economics (rationality and self-interest) leads future managers to rely excessively on rational and explicit safeguarding, crowding out instinctive contractual heuristics and signaling a “bad” type to potential partners. In contrast, the behavioral assumptions used in management theories, because of their diverse, implicit, and even contradictory nature, do not conflict with the innate set of cooperative tools and may provide a good training ground for such tools.
We present tentative confirmatory evidence by examining how the weight given to behavioral assumptions in the core courses of the top 100 business schools influences the average salaries of their MBA graduates. Controlling for the average quality of their students and some other school characteristics, we find that average salaries are significantly higher at those schools whose core MBA courses contain a higher proportion of management courses as opposed to courses based on economics or technical disciplines. (more…)
4 comments 8 July 2009
McNamara
| Peter Klein |
I haven’t read all the obituaries of Robert S. McNamara, who died early this morning, but the ones I’ve seen focus almost exclusively on his tenure as US Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War. Few mention how he got to be Secretary — an HBS professorship, WWII experience in procurement as a member of Tex Thornton’s “Whiz Kids,” a stint at Ford Motor Company after the war, and the presidency of Ford just before taking the job as Defense Secretary. The Times notes, in passing, that “Mr. McNamara had risen by his mastery of systems analysis, the business of making sense of large organizations — taking on a big problem, sorting it out, studying every facet, finding simplicity in the complexity.” Um, OK, I guess that’s one way to describe it. In any case, none of the obituaries I’ve seen so far discusses this in any detail, or seems to realize that McNamara’s approach to managing large organizations is controversial among researchers and practitioners.
Here’s a brief comment I made last year on McNamara’s management style.
4 comments 6 July 2009
Inspirational Weekend Reading
| Nicolai Foss |
I am reading Ben Goldacre’s Bad Science in which Dr. Goldacre explodes the ridiculous claims of medical quacks of all stripes (e.g., homeopathy, the idiocies of the media re the interpretation of research results, hostility towards “mainstream medicine,” etc.). The book is much needed and very, very entertaining.
And it makes me think that management research needs its Goldacre. A few quick ideas:
- Perhaps we need something akin to the Cochrane Collaboration. We can all agree that “evidence-based management” is a good idea. Indeed, it is such a good idea that there should be no need for writing books or blogs about it. We should all embrace and internalize the idea. However, in practice, there is probably much too little effort devoted to meta-analysis and other synthetic efforts in management research.
- There are quacks in management. Some of them write books. Some consult. Shrugging the shoulder is the typical reaction on the part of management academics. Should we treat them more harshly? Should management quacks be identified and fought?
- Perhaps the majority of research articles in management end with a variation over “There is a need for more research.” Articles in medicine used to end similarly. However, as Goldacre notes (p. 57), “… it is a little known fact that this very phrase has been banned from the British Medical Journal for many years, on the grounds that it adds nothing: you may say what research is missing, on whom, how, measuring what, and why you want to do it, but the hand-waving, superficially open-minded call for ‘more research’ is meaningless and unhelpful.” Amen!
4 comments 4 July 2009
Slides from Foss-Klein PhD Course
| Peter Klein |
Slides from the PhD course, “The Theory of the Firm and Its Applications in Management Research I,” are now available on the course webpage (scroll down to the bottom).
PS: Did you notice the course title ends with “I,” implying there will be a II and maybe a III? Gotta love that precommitment device. It’s as if Stallone had named his first film “Rocky I.”
3 comments 26 June 2009
Management Journal Impact Factors 2008
| Nicolai Foss |
The new ISI impact factors for 2008 have just been released. There are lots of surprises this time. The biggest one is arguably that Organization Science is now out of the top 10 range, a long drop from its #4 status in 2006 (this sucks when you got two recent papers, one forthcoming and one R&R, at this journal :-( ). The second surprise, at least to me, is that the Journal of Management has made it to #5. One possible explanation is its rather influential yearly review issues. Another surprise is that Organization Studies, which was among the top 10 in 2006, has now moved down a lot to close to #30. The Journal of Management Studies, while not among the top 10 this year, has not been harmed as badly, dropping to #14. ASQ, once the undisputed top-management journal, is now #9. Less surprising is Academy of Management Review’s #1 position (it is usually among the top 3), and that the Strategic Management Journal is #4.
The rank order down to LRP at # 36 is: AMR – AMJ – MIS Q – SMJ – JoM – ORM – JIBS – AMLE – ASQ – OBHD – RP – JPIM – Org. Sci. – JMS – RoB – JoM – JOperationsM – IMA – JMIS – Man Sci -DS – IRS – LQ – Omega – R&D Man – GOM – JIT – Techno. – Org. Stud. – Brit. JoM – Adv. Strat Man. - HBR – Int Small Bus. J – Int. J. Oper. Prod. M. – Int. J. Man. Rev. – Int. J of Forec. – LRP
A new feature of the list is the inclusion of a five-year impact factor which, given the rather turbulent movements from year to year, makes a lot of sense (and which produces a rather different rank order from the above!).
7 comments 20 June 2009
The MBA Oath
| Peter Klein |
As a manager, my purpose is to serve the greater good by bringing people and resources together to create value that no single individual can create alone. Therefore I will seek a course that enhances the value my enterprise can create for society over the long term. I recognize my decisions can have far-reaching consequences that affect the well-being of individuals inside and outside my enterprise, today and in the future. As I reconcile the interests of different constituencies, I will face choices that are not easy for me and others.
Therefore I promise:
- I will act with utmost integrity and pursue my work in an ethical manner.
- I will safeguard the interests of my shareholders, co-workers, customers and the society in which we operate.
- I will manage my enterprise in good faith, guarding against decisions and behavior that advance my own narrow ambitions but harm the enterprise and the societies it serves.
- I will understand and uphold, both in letter and in spirit, the laws and contracts governing my own conduct and that of my enterprise.
- I will take responsibility for my actions, and I will represent the performance and risks of my enterprise accurately and honestly.
- I will develop both myself and other managers under my supervision so that the profession continues to grow and contribute to the well-being of society.
- I will strive to create sustainable economic, social, and environmental prosperity worldwide.
- I will be accountable to my peers and they will be accountable to me for living by this oath.
This oath I make freely, and upon my honor.
This comes from a group of second-year Harvard MBAs and was featured in last Friday’s New York Times (HT: MGK). Here’s their blog. I eagerly await the analysis of the O&M commentariat.
8 comments 5 June 2009
Seat-of-the-Pants Sports Management
| Peter Klein |
The WSJ recently ran a sort of anti-Moneyball piece on the NBA’s Denver Nuggets that belongs in our “by the numbers” series. Love the title: “Textbook Management? Hardly. — Assembled Largely by Instinct, the Denver Nuggets Keep Winning; Mastering a ‘Curious Business.’” Here’s the central passage:
[The Nuggets] don’t describe their success as the inevitable result of a carefully designed strategy. Rather, in an era when sports executives like to play themselves off as masters of mathematical analysis and risk management — and in a year when most NBA teams chose fiscal prudence over expensive superstars — the Nuggets are an anomaly. They owe their success to a bizarre combination of luck, good health, opportunism and a management strategy that is more six-shooter than Six Sigma.
The story caught my eye partly because it profiles Nuggest owner Stan Kroenke, a real estate developer who lives here in Columbia, Missouri and whose son Josh was Mizzou’s starting shooting guard from 2000 to 2003. (Stan’s wife also happens to be Ann Walton Kroenke, one of Sam Walton’s two nieces; it’s nice to have connections!)
3 comments 4 June 2009
The Hawthorne Effect Revisited
| Peter Klein |
The ever-resourceful Steve Levitt, working with John List, uncovers the original data from the Hawthorne experiments — data long thought to have been lost or destroyed — and finds there actually wasn’t much of a Hawthorne effect:
Our analysis of the newly found data reveals little evidence to support the existence of a Hawthorne effect as commonly described; i.e., there is no systematic evidence that productivity jumped whenever changes in lighting occurred. On the other hand, we do uncover some weak evidence consistent with more subtle manifestations of Hawthorne effects in the data. In particular, output tends to be higher when experimental manipulations are ongoing relative to when there is no experimentation. Also consistent with a Hawthorne effect is that productivity is more responsive to experimenter manipulations of light than naturally-occurring fluctuations. . . . We conclude that the evidence for a Hawthorne effect in the studies that gave the phenomenon its name is far more subtle than has been previously acknowledged.
The short paper, “Was there Really a Hawthorne Effect at the Hawthorne Plant? An Analysis of the Original Illumination Experiments,” is available from NBER. I couldn’t find an ungated copy but the search led me to a large secondary literature, much of it by organizational and industrial psychologists, also questioning the original findings, though apparently without use of the primary data.
7 comments 2 June 2009
