Posts filed under 'Myths and Realities'
Does Macroeconomic Theory Influence Macroeconomic Policy?
| Peter Klein |
Not really, according to John Wood’s History of Macroeconomic Policy in the United States (Routledge, 2008). As David Wheelock notes in his EH.Net review:
Wood argues that U.S. fiscal and monetary policy have been remarkably consistent over the decades and largely uninfluenced by macroeconomic theory. Economists have rationalized more than influenced policy, Wood contends, and the direction of influence between economic theory and practice is primarily from the latter to the former.
This is of course the classic explanation for the spread of Keynesianism after 1936: rather than proposing a new approach to macroeconomic policy, the General Theory simply rationalized the massive deficit-spending and easy-money policies already in place (and long desired by disreputable economists such as Foster and Catchings).
1 comment 30 June 2009
Does Capitalism Suffer Cycles of Statism?
| Benito Arruñada |
Does the current expansion of the State reverse a previous reduction, to be reduced once again in the future? Or, alternatively, is there a sort of ratchet effect, with a trend towards greater statism disguised by cycles along such increasing trend?
I am inclined to think that cycling has not taken place around a stationary average but around an increasing tendency (see the figures). But perhaps a better way of facing these questions would be to disaggregate in different dimensions. For instance, in several papers with Veneta Andonova we argue that freedom 
of contract has been in decline for more than a century in Western Law, both in civil- and common-law countries. Something similar could probably be said about trade, but in the opposite direction. However, in both freedom of contract and trade, it might be the case that exchange opportunities have expanded mainly as a result of technological change (e.g., cheaper transportation and communications), whatever the legal constraints. In terms of research, how could these trends be measured?
These thoughts were triggered by a timely and extremely suggestive paper by Witold J. Henisz presented at the Workshop on “Manufacturing Markets” organized last week in Villa Finaly, Florence, by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant. My next few blogs will address other aspects of Henisz’s views on the broader challenges facing capitalism.
2 comments 18 June 2009
The Hawthorne Effect Revisited
| Peter Klein |
The ever-resourceful Steve Levitt, working with John List, uncovers the original data from the Hawthorne experiments — data long thought to have been lost or destroyed — and finds there actually wasn’t much of a Hawthorne effect:
Our analysis of the newly found data reveals little evidence to support the existence of a Hawthorne effect as commonly described; i.e., there is no systematic evidence that productivity jumped whenever changes in lighting occurred. On the other hand, we do uncover some weak evidence consistent with more subtle manifestations of Hawthorne effects in the data. In particular, output tends to be higher when experimental manipulations are ongoing relative to when there is no experimentation. Also consistent with a Hawthorne effect is that productivity is more responsive to experimenter manipulations of light than naturally-occurring fluctuations. . . . We conclude that the evidence for a Hawthorne effect in the studies that gave the phenomenon its name is far more subtle than has been previously acknowledged.
The short paper, “Was there Really a Hawthorne Effect at the Hawthorne Plant? An Analysis of the Original Illumination Experiments,” is available from NBER. I couldn’t find an ungated copy but the search led me to a large secondary literature, much of it by organizational and industrial psychologists, also questioning the original findings, though apparently without use of the primary data.
7 comments 2 June 2009
Sociology that We Like
| Nicolai Foss |
Contrary to the conviction perhaps held by the boys over at orgtheory.net, O&M bloggers are not at all hostile to sociology. In fact, we are highly sympathetic to what is sometimes called “analytical sociological theory,” that is, James Coleman, Raymond Boudon, Jon Elster, Peter Abell, Diego Gambetta, Siegwart Lindenberg, Karl-Dieter Opp, and so on. Here is a nice summary of AST, which — we are told — embraces realism and objectivity, is anti-relativist, appreciates formalization and the use of models, is reductionist, eschews bullshit, etc. (Also check out the nice and entirely well taken acerbic treatment of Foucault on p. 7). Now we only need to know: How exactly does AST differ from microeconomics?
5 comments 29 May 2009
PAL Team on Microfinance
| Peter Klein |
As a microfinance skeptic I was particularly interested in the new paper from the J-PAL team of Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan, “The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation.” Despite the pedestrian abstract, the findings are pretty significant:
To date there have been no randomized trials examining the impact of microcredit. Using such a design, 52 of 104 slums in Hyderabad, India were randomly selected for opening of an MFI branch while the remainder were not. We show that the intervention increased total MFI borrowing, and study the effects on new business starts, investment, and consumption. Households with an existing business at the time of the program invest in durable goods, and their profi ts increase. Households with high propensity to become business owners see a decrease in nondurable consumption, consistent with the need to pay a fixed cost to enter entrepreneurship. Households with low propensity to become business owners see nondurable spending increase. We find no impact on measures of health, education, or women’s decision-making.
Ryan Hahn puts it this way: The verdict is in on microfinance. . . . And it’s not pretty.” He means that microfinance does appear to have a positive marginal effect on business formation and expansion, but the effect is modest and does not (at least within a 15-18-month timeframe) have any discernible effect on well-being.
Add comment 27 May 2009
More “New Economy” Hyperbole
| Peter Klein|
Wired’s Chris Anderson drinks the New Economy Kool-Aid. It’s the same old argument — information technology reduces transaction costs, leading to a radical disaggregation of industry and society — still supported by little more than a few colorful anecdotes, not any kind of systematic analysis. The new twist is the financial crisis, described by Anderson as “not just the trough of a cycle but the end of an era.”
What we have discovered over the past nine months are growing diseconomies of scale. Bigger firms are harder to run on cash flow alone, so they need more debt (oops!). Bigger companies have to place bigger bets but have less and less control over distribution and competition in an increasingly diverse marketplace. . . . The result is that the next new economy, the one rising from the ashes of this latest meltdown, will favor the small.
Nonsense. The major banks, the Chrysler corporation, and whoever is next to fail have not become nimbler and smaller, but larger; they have become part of the Federal government. Fannie and Freddie have swollen and taken on additional responsibilities. The financial crisis, as argued repeatedly on these pages, was spawned by a credit bubble brought about by loose monetary policy and massive government subsidization of the home mortgage market. It has nothing to do with firms being too large or somehow failing to take advantage of the Next Big Thing in social networking or cloud computing. I mean, seriously, is there anything here that couldn’t have been written ten years ago?
To all the usual reasons why small companies have an advantage, from nimbleness to risk-taking, add these new ones: The rise of cloud computing means that young firms no longer have to buy their own IT equipment, which helps them avoid having to raise money or take on debt. Likewise, the webification of the supply chain in many industries, from electronics to apparel, means that even the tiniest companies can now order globally, just like the giants. In the same way a musician with just a laptop and some gumption can accomplish most of what a record label does, an ambitious engineer can invent and produce a gadget with little more than that same laptop.
Bah. Humbug.
5 comments 25 May 2009
Deregulation and the Financial Crisis
| Peter Klein |
Niall Ferguson joins Charles Calomiris, Jerry O’Driscoll, Arnold Kling, and many others in questioning the supposed link between “deregulation” and the financial crisis. As Ferguson emphasizes, the timing is all wrong; there is no time-series correlation between specific patterns of regulation and deregulation and particular financial or economic outcomes. The relaxation of Glass-Steagall restrictions on universal banking is an oft-cited example, but, as these writers point out, no one has offered any specific mechanism by which universal banking contributed to the problem (indeed, the opposite is likely to be true). The “laissez-faire caused the crisis” meme may be pithy, but is there any systematic theoretical or empirical evidence for it?
Ferguson has the best line (suggested by Luke): “It is indeed impressive how rapidly the economists who failed to predict this crisis . . . have been able to produce such a satisfying story about its origins.”
3 comments 22 May 2009
Elfenbein and Zenger on Social Capital
| Peter Klein |
Congratulations to Dan Elfenbein and Todd Zenger for winning the ACAC Best Paper Award for “The Economics of Social Capital in De-Socialized Exchange.” Their paper addresses one of my pet peeves, the expansive use of “capital” to describe any ill-defined substance that accumulates and has value. Hence knowledge, experience, and skills become “human capital” or “knowledge capital”; relationships become “social capital”; brand names become “reputation capital”; and so on. I fear this terminology obfuscates more than it clarifies.
I don’t mind using these terms in a loose, colloquial sense: By going to school I’m investing in human capital or diversifying my stock of human capital; if this gets me a high-paying job I’m earning a good return on my human capital; as I get old I forget new things, so my human capital is depreciating rapidly; and so on.
But we shouldn’t take these metaphors too literally. In economic theory capital refers either to financial capital or to a stock of heterogeneous alienable assets, goods that can be exchanged in markets and analyzed using price theory. Their rental prices are determined by marginal revenue products and their purchase prices are given by the present discounted value of these future rents. Knowledge is not, strictly speaking, capital, because it is not traded in markets does not have a rental or purchase price. What markets trade and price is labor services, and it is impossible to decompose the payments to labor (wages) into separate “effort” and “rental return on human capital” components. Some labor services command a higher market price than others because they have a higher marginal revenue product. Some of this wage premium may be due to intelligence or experience, some due to complementarities with other human or nonhuman assets, some due to hard work, and so on. But these are all determinants of the MRP, and hence the wage, not different kinds of factor returns. (more…)
2 comments 22 May 2009
Bad to Awful?
| Peter Klein |
Via John Hagel, here’s a Business Week preview of Jim Collins’s new book, How the Mighty Fall, and How Some Companies Never Give In, a profile of once-successful firms that go under. Will the new book avoid the core methodological fallacy that doomed Collins earlier work? Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear so:
At our research lab [sic], we’d already been discussing the possibility of a project on corporate decline, in part because some of the great companies we’d profiled in the books Good to Great and Built to Last had subsequently lost their positions of prominence. On one level this fact didn’t cause much angst; just because a company falls doesn’t invalidate what we can learn by studying that company when it was at its historical best.
True, but without some mechanism for distinguishing treatment and control, such an investigation can never be anything more than a collection of interesting vignettes. Collins and his team seem unable to grasp the fundamental scientific principle of cause and effect. Just because a particular behavior corresponds to a particular outcome (be it success or failure), there is no way to now if that behavior contributed to the outcome, without studying individuals or organizations that exhibited the same behavior but experienced a different outcome.
I eagerly await Phil Rosenzweig’s next book: The Horns-and-Pitchfork Effect.
3 comments 16 May 2009
Confidence
| Peter Klein |
Craig Pirrong is concerned about the stress tests:
[Bernanke] emphasized that they were a “confidence-building exercise.” That seems like assuming the conclusion. I would like a fact-finding exercise, with a clear statement of the findings, good or bad. Stating that the objective is to build confidence suggests a pre-ordained result — Kabuki Theater. It’s like saying that something is needed to build “self-esteem.” Success builds self-esteem, not the other way around. Similarly, success builds confidence; confidence-building does not ensure success.
This reminds me of something I read the other day from Isabel Paterson, quoted by Stephen Cox:
[I am] tired of being told that “credit depends on confidence.” Fudge. Credit depends on real assets, sound money and a clean record. . . . When any one asks us to have confidence we are glad to inform him that the request of itself would shatter any remaining confidence in our mind.
1 comment 12 May 2009
Skepticism and Greed
| Dick Langlois |
One of my University colleagues, who works in instructional technology, sent a few of us a post from a mailing list-blog at Stanford called Tomorrow’s Professor. The site has a lot of interesting stuff on teaching and the academy, which O&M readers may find interesting. But this particular post, reprinted from a blog at the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, prompted me to send in a response. Here is what I said. (Take a look at the original post, but I think you can get the idea from my comment.)
I certainly endorse what I take to be the central idea of post 944 — that students of business and economics would benefit from a liberal education.
Having said that, however, let me also note that I think the post gets things exactly — and perhaps dangerously — backwards in many ways. It is a constant trope in the popular press that the idea of “free markets” is some kind of dogma among economists (and perhaps society more broadly). In fact, economists believe that markets exist only within institutional structures, and economics — even so-called free-market economics — is actually about getting the institutions right, not about letting people do whatever they want.
In my view, moreover, economists are the real skeptics in the academy. Despite his (marketing) claim to being a “rogue” economist, Steve Levitt of Freakonomics fame is actually a better model of what most economists do than is Ben Bernanke or Alan Greenspan. Unlike most other academics, economists are rewarded for taking skeptical and iconoclastic positions, at least when they can back those positions up with hard data and clear analysis.
By contrast, few people outside of economics departments or business schools have any understanding whatever about how and when — or even whether — individual action can lead to beneficial unintended consequences. Economics is actually counter-intuitive in many ways. Humans evolved in small bands of hunter-gatherers, and as a result our intuitions about how a large open society operates are often wrong or backwards.
For all these reasons, it seems to me odd to suggest that economists (and students of economics) are dogmatic and would be made more skeptical and thoughtful about the economy by studying other liberal fields. In my experience, it’s rather the opposite. (Which is not to say, of course, that students won’t benefit in many ways from studying other fields.)
The post itself is a case in point. It starts out in the right direction with a marvelous story from Keynes about the nature of the money supply. But then it goes on to talk about “greed” as the central issue, ending with a quote from Roosevelt that “heedless self-interest” is bad economics. In fact, however, it is pointing to “greed” that is unexamined dogma. Why exactly has the level of greed changed over time? Is that really an explanation of anything? In stark contrast, many professional economists (including such serious scholars of the crisis as John Taylor and Karl Case) would point out that the most fundamental cause of the crisis was the expansive monetary policy of the Fed, which pumped money into the system and caused an asset bubble. Our hunter-gatherer ancestors endowed us with intuitions about greedy individuals; but they didn’t leave us intuitions about how a fiat money system works in a huge economy of non-face-to-face exchange. That we have to learn in an economics course.
3 comments 8 May 2009
My “No New Economy” Slides
| Peter Klein |
Here, for the curious, are my slides from this morning’s talk at the Law and Economics of Innovation conference, titled “Does the New Economy Need a New Economics?” (Short answer: no.) This will eventually morph into a paper so comments are most welcome (and thanks to those who have already helped). I’m looking forward to Susan Athey’s keynote later today.
9 comments 7 May 2009
Cheer Up With the Depression Bundle
| Peter Klein |
Sorry, couldn’t resist the headline. But check it out: Murray Rothbard’s America’s Great Depression, Bob Murphy’s Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal, Dave Beito’s Taxpayers in Revolt, and John T. Flynn’s Roosevelt Myth, all for $49! That’s quite an uplifting deal.
More great news: Contra Keynes and Cambridge, vol. 9 of Hayek’s Collected Works, is now out in paperback from Liberty Fund, and just $14.50.
4 comments 1 May 2009
“New Economy” Bleg
| Peter Klein |
The heady dot-com days of the late 1990s brought breathy pronouncements from journalists and some academics that the “new economy” had changed all the old rules. Intellectual capital, not physical capital, is the source of value, so plant and equipment is irrelevant. Information goods are produced at zero marginal cost so firms should give away, rather than sell, their products. Profits don’t matter, only installed base counts. Managerial hierarchy is obsolete; cost curves are flat; supply-and-demand analysis is passé; even opportunity costs don’t matter anymore. The dot-com crash and subsequent shakeout brought many people back to their senses, but even today we continue to hear hyperbolic claims about the newness of the new economy.
I’d like to include some of these wildly exaggerated claims in my talk next week at the GMU/Microsoft forum. Can readers supply some quotes I can use (the more outrageous the better)? Like this:
[W]hen it comes to technology, even the most bearish analysts agree the microchip and Internet are changing almost everything in the economy.
– Greg Ip, WSJ, 18 January 2000
One curious aspect of the Network Economy would astound a citizen living in 1897: The very best gets cheaper each year. This rule of thumb is so ingrained in our contemporary lifestyle that we bank on it without marveling at it. But marvel we should, because this paradox is a major engine of the new economy. . . . Through most of the industrial age, consumers experienced slight improvements in quality for slight increases in price. But the arrival of the microprocessor flipped the price equation. In the information age, consumers quickly came to count on drastically superior quality for less price over time. The price and quality curves diverge so dramatically that it sometimes seems as if the better something is, the cheaper it will cost.
– Kevin Kelly, New Rules for the New Economy, 1998
Once a marketing gimmick, free has emerged as a full-fledged economy. . . . The rise of “freeconomics” is being driven by the underlying technologies that power the Web. Just as Moore’s law dictates that a unit of processing power halves in price every 18 months, the price of bandwidth and storage is dropping even faster. Which is to say, the trend lines that determine the cost of doing business online all point the same way: to zero.
– Chris Anderson, Wired, February 2008
Why have [stock] exchanges at all? Certainly not to help investors. Exchanges are at last being exposed as anachronisms, sustained by inertia and by the desire of incumbents, with help from regulators, to keep raking in monopoly rents. But the curtain is coming down.
– James Glassman, WSJ, 8 May 2000
I’m sure there are much more colorful statements (i.e., straw men for me to knock down) out there. Any suggestions?
5 comments 29 April 2009
Economists More Ethical; US Researchers Not
| Mike Sykuta |
Thanks to Josh Wright over at TOTM, I found Ben Edelman and Ian Larkin’s recent HBS Working Paper on “Demographics, Career Concerns or Social Comparison: Who Games SSRN Download Counts?” Their abstract reads:
We use a unique database of every SSRN paper download over the course of seven years, along with detailed resume data on a random sample of SSRN authors, to examine the role of demographic factors, career concerns, and social comparisons on the commission of a particular type of gaming: the selfdownloading of an author’s own SSRN working paper solely to inflate the paper’s reported download count. We find significant evidence that authors are more likely to inflate their papers’ download counts when a higher count greatly improves the visibility of a paper on the SSRN network. We also find limited evidence of gaming due to demographic factors and career concerns, and strong evidence of gaming driven by social comparisons with various peer groups. These results indicate the importance of including psychological factors in the study of deceptive behavior.
Their results suggest that papers published in the Economics Research Network of SSRN are significantly less likely to have “fraudulent” downloads (as measured in their paper) while papers in the Finance, Legal, and Accounting Networks are significantly more likely to have fraudulent downloads. Aren’t these the places in which ethics are being more broadly taught? Business and Law?
Among their other interesting results, papers by non-US authors are less likely to have fraudulent downloads. Perhaps surprisingly, one’s status on the tenure track seems not to be important, but one’s peer comparisons do. Sadly, there is no attempt to directly measure the O&M effect.
Add comment 20 April 2009
Down with Strunk and White
| Peter Klein |
Geoffrey Pullum does’t think much of the ubiquitous grammar guide, celebrating its 50th anniversary this week. The Elements of Style “does not deserve the enormous esteem in which it is held by American college graduates. Its advice ranges from limp platitudes to inconsistent nonsense. Its enormous influence has not improved American students’ grasp of English grammar; it has significantly degraded it.” (Thanks to Gary Peters for this link to a free version, available for just a few days.)
19 comments 13 April 2009
Keynesian Economics in a Nutshell
| Peter Klein |
An earlier post on Keynesian economics in four paragraphs has proven extremely popular. Here’s Keynesian economics in just one-and-a-half paragraphs, courtesy of Mario Rizzo:
Clearly, DeLong is a rigid aggregate demand theorist. He talks about output and employment as if it were some homogeneous thing. In his mind, macroeconomics is just about spending to increase the production of stuff. Yes, there is lip service to the idea that the stuff should have economic value. But that is easy when you assume that the only alternative is value-less idleness. . . .
The sectoral problems generated, not only by exogenous shocks but by the low interest rate policy of the Fed, are of critical importance. The aggregate demanders are blind to this.
Here at O&M we take the opposite perspective, namely that heterogeneity matters. Actually, as Mario has pointed out in a series of posts (1, 2, 3), Keynes himself was much better than his latter-day followers. Keynes may have been wrong — deeply, deeply wrong, in my view — but he was no fool. As for today’s Keynesians. . . .
Update (14 April): See also Mario’s fine essay in the April Freeman, “A Microeconomist’s Protest.”
Add comment 10 April 2009
Sutton Alert
| Peter Klein |
I haven’t made way through all of Bob Sutton’s contribution to the HBR symposium, “How to Fix Business Schools,” but I read the summary on Sutton’s blog, and Bob manages to work two whoppers into the opening paragraph. First, he calls Oliver Williamson “a major proponent of Agency Theory.” (Bob, for the differences between agency theory and transaction cost economics, try Williamson’s 1988 Journal of Finance paper. Or any introductory textbook.) OK, a nit-pick. But consider this: “Many economists teach and believe that humans are selfish and greedy.” Apparently Bob has read Williamson’s description of opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile.” Rather than think about what this means, or consider the context in which Williamson uses the term, Bob turns to his dictionary, which tells him that guile means “treacherous cunning, skillfull deceit.” Ergo, economics teaches cunning and deceit!
In the HBR piece itself, Bob manages to make the obligatory link between Alan Greenspan and Ayn Rand, though calling Greenspan a follower of Rand is a bit like saying the Black Panthers were inspired by Gandhi. (As Greenspan repeatedly reminded us, he believed in Rand’s ideas “at the high philosophical level,” i.e., not at all, where actual policies were concerned.) The opening of the HBR piece is informative, however, in suggesting how Sutton may have came to his views about economics and economists:
In my experience, most economists at top business schools are clueless about the nitty-gritty of management, which can’t be captured in elegant mathematical models. They treat any teaching remotely related to what leaders actually do on their jobs as a low status activity; at faculty meetings, I’ve seen economists and their followers dismiss and ridicule professors who teach “soft” skills. Those who speak in simple language and use words instead of numbers are often screened out, expelled or sentenced to spend their days at the bottom of the pecking order. And even faculty who bring rigorous evidence that challenges economic assumptions are badly treated.
I’m sorry that Sutton’s interactions with economists haven’t been more pleasant. But, really, what do his personal experiences have to do with the substance of economic doctrine, or its application to management? You won’t learn anything about these from reading this stuff.
8 comments 6 April 2009
Adam Smith’s Famous Metaphor
| Peter Klein |
The indefatigable Gavin Kennedy explains, for the umpteenth time, that Adam Smith was ambivalent about market capitalism and that the famous metaphor of the “invisible hand” was not meant as a generalized defense of the market. As Gavin points out, Smith’s detailed analysis of the market economy appears in Books I and II of the Wealth of Nations, while the invisible hand metaphor appears only once, in Book IV, where Smith defends British merchants who, despite mercantilist export subsidies, preferred to keep their capital invested at home, to the benefit of the British economy. Notes Gavin:
So inconsequential was [Smith's] use of The Metaphor that neither he, nor anybody else until the late 19th century, commented upon it. . . .
Moreover, it was only in Chicago in the 1930s that The Metaphor was generalised into Smith’s so-called “law” of markets. Paul Samuelson (1948, 1st edition), in his famous textbook, Economics (16 editions), publicised this invention with the inevitable affect on modern economics, as tens of thousands of his readers took it on trust as true.
To be sure, the relevant passage in Smith also includes the famous lines, “By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good,” and the remark that “What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom.” But Smith’s statements need to be understood in context; he is discussing the specific problem of trade monopoly, arguing against trade and industrial policies that subsidize particular markets or industries.
4 comments 31 March 2009
Relative Prices Matter
| Peter Klein |
Hate to keep flogging a dead horse, and perhaps preaching to the choir, but the point can’t be made often enough: relative prices matter. The childish Keynesianism of people like DeLong and Krugman, like Bernanke and Geithner, understands only aggregate concepts like “national output,” “employment,” and “the price level.” A consistent theme of this blog’s rants is that resources are heterogeneous (1, 2) and, consequently, relative prices must be free to adjust to changes in demand, technology, market conditions, and so on. When government policy generates an artificial boom in a particular market, such as housing — drawing resources away from other parts of the economy — the key to recovery is to let resources flow out of that market and back to the sectors of the economy where those resources belong (i.e., to match the pattern of consumer demands). It’s quite simple: home prices should be falling, interest rates should be rising, savings rates should be going up, and debt levels should be going down. The Administration’s policies, like that of the last Administration, are designed to achieve exactly the opposite. Why? Because relative prices don’t matter, the allocation of resources across activities doesn’t matter, all that matters is to keep any sector from shrinking, any prices from falling, any firms from failing, any consumers from reducing their consumption. A child thinks only about what he can see. The unseen doesn’t exist.
Here are some excellent posts on the subject. Craig Pirrong notes that Sherwin Rosen had a colorful way of emphasizing relative price effects. Mario Rizzo (1, 2) points to data on the housing market and the Fed’s continuing attempt to keep resources from flowing out of this bloated sector. And here’s a snippet from Israel Kirzner’s short book on Mises explaining that insolvent financial institutions should be liquidated, not rescued. Good reading for grown-ups.
3 comments 28 March 2009
The Danish Mortgage System to the Rescue?
| Nicolai Foss |
As many O&M readers will remember, George Soros recommended a “Danish fix” for the US mortgage crisis. The American Enterprise Institute is sponsoring a whole-day event today on the related, if more cautious, topic, “Can Elements of the Danish Mortgage System Fix Mortgage Securitization?” Here is the wiki on the Danish mortgage system.
Add comment 26 March 2009
Selection, Meritocracy, and Educational Quality
| Dick Langlois |
We have all heard complaints about the decline in the quality of students over, say, the second half of the twentieth century. The usual interpretation is that this has to do with decline in the quality of schools, especially high schools, or in the curriculum delivered in those schools. I always like to point out to people (that is, to non-economists) that much of the perceived decline is likely a matter of demographic and selection effects. Access to secondary and higher education expanded tremendously after World War II, which changed the underlying distribution of abilities of students finishing high school and attending college. (This is also relevant to discussions of the quality of American college students versus Europeans or others — the fraction of students going on to college is higher in the U. S. than elsewhere, so comparing just the mean is misleading.) Education also became more meritocratic after the War, in that colleges and universities began to screen students by academic ability rather by other characteristics (like income).
I just ran across an interesting new paper by Lutz Hendricks and Todd Schoellman that analyzes these issues in a thorough and illuminating way. Here is the abstract:
Student Abilities During the Expansion of U.S. Education, 1950-2000
Since 1950, U.S. educational attainment has increased substantially. While the median student in 1950 dropped out of high school, the median student today attends some college. In an environment with ability heterogeneity and positive sorting between ability and school tenure, the expansion of education implies a decrease in the average ability of students conditional on school attainment. Using a calibrated model of school choice under ability heterogeneity, we investigate the quantitative impact of rising attainment on ability and measured wages. Our findings suggest that the decline in average ability depressed wages conditional on schooling by 31-58 percentage points. We also find that the entire rise in the college wage premium since 1950 can be attributed to the rising mean ability of college graduates relative to high school graduates.
This has a number of significant implications. As the authors point out, average ability has declined at all levels of schooling. This should color our interpretation of the much-touted fact that real wages haven’t increased much since 1960. At the same time, the wage gap between low and high levels of educational attainment has increased over time — because improved sorting has selected people of higher ability into college and selected people of lower ability out of college.
2 comments 24 March 2009
Why They Heart Keynes
| Peter Klein |
Luigi Zingales rides the Straight Talk Express (via Casey Mulligan):
Keynesianism has conquered the hearts and minds of politicians and ordinary people alike because it provides a theoretical justification for irresponsible behavior. Medical science has established that one or two glasses of wine per day are good for your long-term health, but no doctor would recommend a recovering alcoholic to follow this prescription. Unfortunately, Keynesian economists do exactly this. They tell politicians, who are addicted to spending our money, that government expenditures are good. And they tell consumers, who are affected by severe spending problems, that consuming is good, while saving is bad. In medicine, such behaviour would get you expelled from the medical profession; in economics, it gives you a job in Washington.
Three comments: First, the “hangover” metaphor, while not exactly accurate, is an effective way to communicate the basics of the Mises-Hayek malinvestment theory of the business cycle. Use it! Second, Zingales’s description applies equally well to the 1930s and 1940s, when the Keynesian consensus emerged. It’s important to remember that massive deficit spending to “cure” the Depression began with Hoover and Roosevelt in the early 1930s, long before the General Theory appeared. Keynes’s book did not propose a new direction for economic policy; it provided an allegedly scientific rationale for policies already in place, policies government officials were eager to defend and protect. (The use of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy to increase output had long been derided by serious economists as nonsense, as the domain of “monetary cranks” and other snake-oil salesmen).
Third, the Keynesian delusion afflicts not only policymakers, but professional economists as well. I’ve long suspected that the appeal of Keynes to people like Krugman and DeLong is ultimately based on aesthetic, not scientific, grounds. Deep in their hearts, they just don’t like private property, markets, and individual choice. They don’t think ordinary people are capable of making wise decisions and think they, the elites, should be in charge. They resent the fact that most people don’t want their lives controlled by liberal intellectuals. Technical arguments about the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy, the relationship between aggregate demand and output, the experience of the 1930s, and the like are really beside the point. For Keynesian economists, the belief that markets are naturally unstable in the absence of government planning is a matter of faith.
9 comments 11 March 2009
Global (Daylight) Savings Glut?
| David Gerard |
I almost hate to bring this up given the levels of scorn and derision I was subjected to over this (and that was just from my friends), but a few years ago Paul Fischbeck and I used our traffic safety website to look at the change in risks and fatalities surrounding daylight savings time. There weren’t any obvious changes for drivers and vehicle occupants, but there did appear to be some dramatic changes in pedestrian risks (e.g., deaths per trip). For the “Spring” forward, we observed considerably lower risks during the evening rush offset by elevated morning risks.
Because we observed pedestrian risk numbers spike during the time change and then return to trend, we attributed the effect to people adjusting to the time change. This conjecture is consistent with some published research that looked at this question. Our basic message (we thought) was to “look both ways or you might get run over,” and thought we might get some good Samaritan points along with the people who remind you to change your fire alarm batteries.
Instead, what we found was that the time change is quite the lightning rod for controversy, over energy savings, traffic fatalities, depression, heart attacks, and many other societal ills. As a policy matter, however, we received feedback from across the spectrum. These are some of the tamer selections:
I am a professional working adult, actually a senior, and I as well as hundreds of others, would like to have our clocks left alone. All of us do not enjoy driving to and from work in darkness. The psychological effects are more than depressing as I am sure you are aware. — Muriel
Thank you both for helping our cities to understand that people should come before cars. — Steve
Now do a study about the dangers of children waiting for school buses in the dark. My elementary school age child was leaving the house in the dark at 7am to get her bus until daylight savings time ended this week. — Sylvia
I am not sure what to conclude from all of this. I have no idea what a benefit-cost analysis of the alternatives would look like, but we certainly learned there are more dimensions of the policy issue than we imagined. As a political economy story, the status quo does not appear to be completely locked in. A few years back, the federal government pushed back the return to standard time until after Halloween in order to reduce the risk of vehicular trick-or-treating incidents.
Perhaps in November I will be able to shed some additional light on the issue.
2 comments 9 March 2009
Ah, Democracy!
| Peter Klein |
I learned this week from Doug French that Dissident Books has published a new edition of H. L. Mencken’s classic and extremely politically incorrect Notes on Democracy. Who but Mencken could write that the common man “is not actually happy when free; he is uncomfortable, a bit alarmed, and intolerably lonely. He longs for the warm, reassuring smell of the herd, and is willing to take the herdsman with it.” As for democratically elected politicians, Mencken reminds us how quickly all those sappy paeans to the people’s will evaporate when a “crisis,” real or imagined, is on the horizon. “All the great tribunes of democracy, on such occasions, convert themselves, by a process as simple as taking a deep breath, into despots of an almost fabulous ferocity. Lincoln, Roosevelt and Wilson come instantly to mind.”
This was on my mind when I read (via Kathryn Muratore) about a new study appearing in Science finding that children looking at pictures of political candidates correctly pick the eventual winner 64% of the time. Apparently we are hard-wired to prefer pretty faces, even when supposedly choosing based on policy views, ideology, “the issues,” etc . So much for the rational voter.
1 comment 7 March 2009
Our Collective Delusions
| Dick Langlois |
I just ran across a new NBER working paper by Roland Benabou called “Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets.” Looks like an interesting paper. But why does he pick on this blog? I believe we here at O&M are far more resistant than most to groupthink. And I’m sure you all share this view.
6 comments 5 March 2009
Disaster Socialism
| Peter Klein |
As I noted elsewhere yesterday, the “stimulus” bill making its way through Congress is a fine illustration of the Higgs effect, the tendency of government to expand massively in response to “crises,” real or imagined. Naomi Klein’s “Disaster Capitalism” thesis is exactly backward: “disasters” are inevitably followed by huge increases in the public sector at the expense of the private. Anyway, if you have any doubt that the current legislation has precious little to do with economic stimulus, consider the details of the House’s proposed $825 billion package, which includes:
- $1 billion for Amtrak
- $2 billion for child-care subsidies
- $50 million for the National Endowment for the Arts
- $400 million for global-warming research
- $2.4 billion for carbon-capture demonstration projects
- $650 million for digital TV conversion coupons
- $8 billion for renewable energy funding
- $6 billion for mass transit
- $600 million for the federal government to buy new cars
- $7 billion for modernizing federal buildings and facilities (including $150 million for the Smithsonian)
- $252 billion is for income-transfer payments ($81 billion for Medicaid, $36 billion for expanded unemployment benefits, $20 billion for food stamps, and $83 billion for the earned income credit for people who don’t pay income tax)
- $66 billion for education
Now I should state, for the record, that unlike other critics of this particular stimulus package, I don’t favor government “stimulus” packages of any kind. I’m not a Keynesian, after all.
1 comment 28 January 2009
The Heath Brothers on Incentives
| Peter Klein |
Dan and Chip Heath worry that incentive plans backfire because of focusing illusion — managers place too much weight on a single variable in the incentive contract, ignoring the likely side effects. I don’t disagree that this is possible but Chip and Dan seem to be knocking down a pretty feeble straw man. The drawbacks of single-variable, quantitative incentive schemes are well known in the organizational design literature, spawning oodles of studies of multi-tasking, the use of multiple performance measures, the benefits and costs of subjective evaluation criteria, and the like. (There’s a nice overview in BSZ chapter 16.)
Add comment 26 January 2009
Keynesian Economics in Four Paragraphs
Courtesy of Robert Barro:
[A]ssume that the multiplier was 1.0. In this case, an increase by one unit in government purchases and, thereby, in the aggregate demand for goods would lead to an increase by one unit in real gross domestic product (GDP). Thus, the added public goods are essentially free to society. If the government buys another airplane or bridge, the economy’s total output expands by enough to create the airplane or bridge without requiring a cut in anyone’s consumption or investment.
The explanation for this magic is that idle resources — unemployed labor and capital — are put to work to produce the added goods and services.
If the multiplier is greater than 1.0, as is apparently assumed by Team Obama, the process is even more wonderful. In this case, real GDP rises by more than the increase in government purchases. Thus, in addition to the free airplane or bridge, we also have more goods and services left over to raise private consumption or investment. In this scenario, the added government spending is a good idea even if the bridge goes to nowhere, or if public employees are just filling useless holes. Of course, if this mechanism is genuine, one might ask why the government should stop with only $1 trillion of added purchases.
What’s the flaw? The theory (a simple Keynesian macroeconomic model) implicitly assumes that the government is better than the private market at marshaling idle resources to produce useful stuff. Unemployed labor and capital can be utilized at essentially zero social cost, but the private market is somehow unable to figure any of this out. In other words, there is something wrong with the price system.
Barro thinks a multipler of zero is a more plausible baseline assumption. Of course, if GDP is adjusted for quality, the multipler is most likely negative, as resource allocation is directed by government officials, not consumer demands. In prior work Barro has estimated wartime multiplers of 0.8, but this seems high based on Robert Higgs’s important work [1, 2]. More important, there the Austrian point that resources are heterogeneous, and the additional goods and services financed by government spending will tend to be in the “wrong” place in the economy’s intertemporal structure of production. Keynes rejected the idea of capital heterogeneity, so this problem was lost on him.
3 comments 22 January 2009
Krugman’s Got the Disease
| Peter Klein |
Paul Krugman suffers increasingly from what might be called Stiglitz’s Disease, the inability to read (or cite) anyone but oneself. Some years ago Krugman wrote a rather silly and superficial piece on the Austrian theory of the business cycle, which he called the “hangover theory” of recessions. Krugman’s essay provoked strong reactions from Roger Garrison, John Cochran, David Gordon, and Bob Murphy, all of whom have considerable expertise regarding this particular theory. Naturally, Krugman didn’t read any of these responses because they weren’t written by, well, Paul Krugman. So, a couple of days ago, Krugman again trots out his “hangover” metahpor, oblivious to the fact that his original essay got the Austrian theory completely wrong. Ah, the joys of being a full-time dilettante!
4 comments 31 December 2008
