Macroscope
10 January 2007 at 4:22 pm spostrel 3 comments
| Steven Postrel |
Peter’s recent post about macroeconomics and macro vs. micro approaches in organization theory stirs up not-so-fond memories. From my first exposure to Samuelson’s version of the Keynesian synthesis, I found the whole thing off-putting. This feeling was a mixture of impatience with the aggregation assumptions and frustration with the seemingly backward causality of the Keynesian worldview, where production is a trivial matter and the only problem is making sure there is enough effective demand. The latter frustration was somewhat alleviated by learning about adaptive and then rational expectations, aggregate supply, sunspot and other coordination theories, and the host of microfoundation arguments that either got rid of the Keynesian assumptions or at least made some of them plausible. The impatience about aggregation never really went away.
I think macroeconomics sticks around because, despite some of its intellectual flaws, it benefits from some key features that tend to make macro theories in any domain more useful:
1) Measurable aggregate variables that we care about (e.g. inflation or savings).
2) Accounting identities for these aggregate variables that hold independent of the microstates of the system (e.g. savings equals investment).
3) Collective phenomena (correlated actions of the parts) that can only be observed at a macro level (e.g., business cycles).
4) Macro-to-micro causation, where it each micro part is affected by all the other parts, not just by one or two others (e.g., cutbacks in output due to reduced demand due to everyone else’s cutbacks in output).
5) Robustness of collective phenomena to many micro details (e.g., economy-wide unemployment level probably unaffected (to first order) by firms’ organization structures or by individual market structures.
Do organizational or strategic phenomena have any of these five features? We have 1) and 2) for business firms; accounting data approximate the economic variables we would like to measure. As far as 3) goes, a firm’s strategy or a strategic shift can only be defined at the level of the whole firm. Constructs like organizational culture are a little bit trickier — it’s begging the question (traditional meaning) to simply assume that culture exists independently of particular individuals’ beliefs, but it does seem that cultures persist in the face of personnel turnover. We might see 4) for some things, such as which equilibrium is picked in a coordination game (e.g. a weakest-link effort game), but not for all phenomena of interest. And 5) holds only on a case-by-case basis. For example, sometimes it seems reasonable to treat a department of an organization as a unitary actor, on the grounds that the details of its internal structure result in coherent department-level behavior as it interacts with other departments. At other times, a more-reductionist approach may be called for, as when we want to know how new human resource policies are likely to affect firm performance.
I’m one of those annoying (to Peter and Teppo) modeling pragmatists when it comes to disputes about reductionism. I feel that I can assess the above factors, as well as additional issues about tractability vs. degree of realism, on a case-by-case basis better than any predetermined methodology. I’d certainly be unhappy with a blanket rule mandating that we always use the most reductionist theory possible.
Entry filed under: Former Guest Bloggers, Methods/Methodology/Theory of Science.
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1.
Joseph Mahoney | 11 January 2007 at 10:48 am
Mark Blaug in THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS writes: “Let us, by all means, commend methodological individualism as a heuristic postulate: in principle, it is highly desirable to define all holistic concepts, macroscopic factors, aggregate variables, or whatever they are called, in terms of individual behavior if and when this is possible. But when it is not possible, let us not lapse into silence on the grounds that we may not defy the principle of methodolgical individualism.” (1980: 51).
Blaug (1980:51) also notes that, pragmatically speaking, a macroeconomic proposition that “works” should not be ruled out because there are no (currently developed) microfoundations of that proposition.
The Blaug/Postrel perspective on methodological pluralism is a well-reasoned position.
2.
Antoinette | 21 August 2007 at 7:14 am
Hi Steven
I might be completely off the limit with my question but I was turning to this blog to find something about what psychological economists would consider to be a good theory. Now I found all sorts of articles on that e.g. by Fudenberg, Camerer, Rabin, Tomer etc. but recurrently stumbled over a word which I did not understand with my management background: tractability. You seemed to have used the word as “parsimony” or “simple”, that is, good models explain a lot with very few variables. If I just take the normal use of the word it would mean “understandable” (e.g. formalized and thus much clearer than normal language). A third meaning I found was “normative, prescriptive”. So my question is: Can anyone explain the meaning of this word in relation to economic theory?
Thx
Antoinette
3.
Steve Phelan | 21 August 2007 at 11:55 am
Antoinette
Tractability refers to the ease with which a mathematical model can be solved.
See http://cole.fon.bg.ac.yu/introduction.htm#4.%20MODEL%20TRACTABILITY