A Classroom Experiment in Organizational Economics
22 February 2007 at 3:04 pm Peter G. Klein Leave a comment
| Peter Klein |
I don’t do classroom experiments, but some of my colleagues find them effective. Here’s an experiment that might appeal to the O&M readership:
We present a simple classroom principal-agent experiment that can effectively be used as a teaching device to introduce important concepts of organizational economics and contracting. In a first part, students take the role of a principal and design a contract that consists of a fixed payment and an incentive component. In the second part, students take the role of agents and decide on an effort level. The experiment can be used to introduce students to the concepts of efficiency, incentive compatibility, outside options and participation constraints, the Coase theorem, and fairness and reciprocity in contracting.
See Simon Gaechter and Manfred Königstein’s paper “Design a Contract! A Simple Principal-Agent Problem as a Classroom Experiment,” available on SSRN.
Entry filed under: - Klein -, Management Theory, Teaching.









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