Economic Advisers to Presidential Candidates
17 December 2007 at 10:08 am Peter G. Klein 6 comments
| Peter Klein |
Last week’s Freakonomics column in the NY Times asked “What Does A Presidential Candidate’s Economic Adviser Actually Do?” McCain adviser Douglas Holtz-Eakin gives the best (facetious) response: “The first thing that the economics adviser brings to any campaign staff is a hip coolness and bling.” The serious answers are interesting too.
Several high-profile academic economists are involved with the 2008 campaign: Greg Mankiw and Glenn Hubbard are advising Romney, Micheal Boskin works for Giuliani, and Austan Goolsbee is helping Obama. Maverick Republican Ron Paul hasn’t announced any official economic advisers — “my advisers [are] Mises and Hayek and Sennholz,” he told Business Week — but this list of academic supporters includes some distinguished economists (scroll down to the Ks).
Entry filed under: - Klein -, Classical Liberalism.
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Organizations and Markets 
1.
REW | 18 December 2007 at 4:33 pm
Peter,
How does an academic supporter differ from an athletic supporter?
REW
2.
Peter Klein | 18 December 2007 at 4:39 pm
Hmmm, perhaps there is little difference. . . . But I notice no one on the list is named “Jacques.” (Yes, we are juvenile.)
3.
Gary Peters | 19 December 2007 at 6:48 pm
Are you coming over to the dark side? Does this mean you will actually vote in the upcoming election?
4.
Peter Klein | 19 December 2007 at 10:55 pm
I might actually do it this time. Shocking isn’t it? Of course if I do, it will be purely for consumption, not to affect the outcome.
5.
REW | 19 December 2007 at 11:42 pm
If you intend to maximize consumption value, try my model. Register for the party whose putative nominee you find repulsive. With luck you can vote against that candidate in the primary and then again in the general election. Moreover, you get to be counted as a crossover vote by the pundits in November. If your preferred candidate wins because of voters crossing over, the outcome generates a great deal of utility.
6.
Peter Klein | 20 December 2007 at 9:52 am
I love it! (Can we model a utility function that includes a Schadenfreude paramater?)