The Ethics of Bankruptcy
1 May 2009 at 10:11 am Peter G. Klein Leave a comment
| Peter Klein |
I like this 2003 HBR piece from Joe Bower and Stuart Gilson on bankruptcy. Substitute “Chrysler” and “foreign auto makers” for “WorldCom” and “competing telecom firms” and you’ll get the idea:
WorldCom’s bankruptcy, however, highlights an important, potentially very large social cost of the U.S. bankruptcy system. Competing telecom firms, which have played by the accounting rules and have used more prudent financing, now find themselves — once again — at a competitive disadvantage relative to the company. Unlike WorldCom, these firms had to stay current on their debt and service their lease obligations. They did not get to write down their assets and debt, nor have they been able to reduce taxes by claiming that their profits never existed.
Is this fair? Do the benefits of the system outweigh its costs? The system works well to protect assets and employees, to be sure. But are WorldCom’s assets and employees really the ones that should be protected? What about those of more efficient firms? In capital-intensive industries like petrochemicals, steel, telecoms, and airlines, doesn’t bankruptcy law make it harder for efficient companies to drive inefficient assets out of business? In the majority of bankruptcy cases in these industries, the top managers are gone, but old capacity returns to the market with an improved balance sheet. This can easily prolong a period of industrywide overcapacity as well as unfairly disadvantage competitors.
Their focus is bankruptcy resulting from corporate fraud, but the question applies equally well, in my view, to bankruptcy resulting from managerial incompetence.
BTW, for a primer on bankruptcy, Michelle White’s 1989 Journal of Economic Perspectives paper, “The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision,” is a good place to start.
Entry filed under: - Klein -, Bailout / Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, Law and Economics.









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