Author Archive
Why Academic Freedom?
| Nicolai Foss |
At least in Europe, academic freedom is under siege. Politicians justify their meddling with the fact that universities are (largely) financed by taxpayers’ money, and they are assisted in their meddling by a growing class of bureaucrats in ministries, the EU and increasingly in universities themselves. All this derives legitimacy from a questionable ideology of Mode II research that broadly asserts that most important scientific advance (now) happens in the intersection of disciplines and as a result of collaborative relations between universities and business (here is the Wiki on Mode II).
Given this, it seems necessary to rethink the defense of academia and academic freedom. There is, of course, Polanyi’s application of Hayek’s unplanned order idea in the context of the “republic of science.” However, that argument lacks concreteness and cutting power against those bureaucrats/politicians who wants to intervene just a tiny bit but doesn’t want centrally planned science.
In a recent paper, “Academic Freedom, Private-sector Focus, and the Process of Innovation,” Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein provide a rationale — derived from property rights economics rather than from considerations of appropriability — for academia. Academia is defined as an organizational form which “represents a precommitment to leave control over the choice of research strategy in the hands of individual scientists” (p. 621) (note that this does not necessarily entail public funding). (more…)
Call for Papers: 4th Int. Workshop on Org. Design
| Nicolai Foss |
The 1960s and 1970s were the heydays of organizational design theory. Since then it has fallen out of favor in organization theory (see this nice paper), mainly surviving in organizational economics. However, solid and important work has been done on organizational design all along by the likes of Lex Donaldsson and Richard Burton (e.g., here). These two gentlemen have, together with George Huber, Dorte Døjbak Håkonsson, and Charles Snow, organized the “4th International Workshop on Organizational Design,” to take place at Aarhus University’s School of Business, 29-31 May 2010. Here is the Call for Papers.
Product and Factor Markets in the RBV
| Nicolai Foss |
It is often argued that firm strategy is fundamentally rooted in various imperfections. Strategic management has long been characterized by an intellectual division of labor in which the resource-based view handled (strategic) factor market imperfections and various positioning approaches took care of product market imperfections. This dichotomy is beginning to break down. Two recent papers, one a theory of science-based piece, the other a theory piece, discuss the product/factor market dichotomy and show why it is problematic.
In “Theoretical Isolation and the Resource-based View: Symmetry Requirements and the Separation Between Product and Factor Markets,” Niklas Hallberg and yours truly argue that the RBV treats factor markets as imperfect and product markets as perfect (an approach that we argue is adopted from mainstream economics and its tendency to work with on-off assumptions). We argue that this asymmetry is problematic, as there is a general case to be made for symmetrical assumptions and as it borders on logical inconsistency to assume — within the same model — that one set of markets is perfect and another set is imperfect. The paper isn’t online, but you can email me at njf.smg@cbs.dk for a copy. (Abstract below).
In “Chicken, Stag, or Rabbit? Strategic Factor Markets and the Moderating Role of Downstream Competition,” my CBS (Center for Strategic Management and Globalization) colleague, Dr. Christian Geisler Asmussen, models various deviations from perfect(ly competitive) product markets and shows how these impacts firms’ factor market behaviors and whether they can derive rents from resources purchased on these markets. I believe this is the first systematic study of its kind in the literature (and there are some seriously counter-intuitive findings in it). Very highly recommended! (more…)
Cooperation and the Team Problem
| Nicolai Foss |
Alchian and Demsetz’s famous 1972 paper on the team problem and how resolving that problem may call for the “classical capitalist firm” is one of my teaching favorites. Students like the stark, stylized reasoning in the paper, and the team problem is a great way to introduce agency theory, among other things, because it so directly links to what is usually the only piece of game theory they know, namely the PD game.
However, I often experience that some students (particularly those who are following an OB or HRM class) are worried about the reasoning in Alchian and Demsetz, and are not convinced by the argument that it is basically counterfactual (provided they understand this point). I usually also explain that experimental evidence from the public goods literature suggests that cooperativeness declines over time (e.g., here) unless cooperation is backed up by various flanking arrangements (a recent Nobel can now be invoked in support of this).
A recent experimental paper, “Not just hot air: normative codes of conduct induce cooperative behavior,” — written by a German team (Thomas Lauer, Bettina Rockenbach, and Peter Walgenbach), and published in the newly founded Review of Managerial Science — suggests that the verbal framing of a work environment with cooperative connotations may go a long way towards inducing cooperativeness in team settings. In their experiments, the authors implement five “treatments” that differ only in terms of the framing, specifically in the extent to which reference is made to a cooperative firm context.
The basic experimental setup is team production with teams of four members that each have to make decisions on whether to invest or not in a team project. Each unit invested generates a benefit of 1.6 units for the team — but those benefits are divided equally among all team members. In this setting, changes in framing dramatically influence outcomes. I recommend the paper as a fascinating example of the emerging intersection of the economics of the firm, OB, and experimental methods.
Top Scholar Presidents and University Performance
| Nicolai Foss |
Last Friday my unit at CBS, the Center for Strategic Management and Globalization, sponsored a seminar with Dr. Amanda Goodall, the author of Socrates in the Boardroom: Why Research Universities Should be Led by Top Scholars. (For an earlier O&M post on Goodall, see here). Not only did the upper CBS echolons show up (the Research Dean and the President — both highly cited scholars, BTW), but we also had a long and lively discussion. A highly undull seminar!
Goodall’s findings are mainly based on UK data. Roughly, they are that university rankings correlate rather closely with how well-cited the presidents of the relevant universities are, and that there is strong evidence of the research standing of presidents driving university performance. It is hard to understand why this finding (or the book in general) was dissed by Tyler as a “radical attack on economic reasoning” (here).
Anyway, Goodall’s findings made me wonder whether the finding of causality from president/vice-chancellor/BSchool dean generalizes to other university bureaucrats, notably department heads (and deans in general, not just BSchool deans). Many of the things that are being said in the book of the top scholar-president (an example, somebody who defines the standard, an expert etc.) are things that can be said of department heads in well-functioning research universities. Perhaps one of the ways in which university presidents/VCs/deans matter to research performance is by picking good department heads. Also,Goodall claims that top scholars will not have positive performance consequences if they assume the presidency of bad or mediocre universities. She doesn’t really present evidence for this claim, although it does sound intuitive that a Nobel Prize winner is not best placed at the helm of University of Crapville. However, it may be interesting to look at less extreme cases. I do think there are cases of highly regarded scientists helping rather mediocre universities to improve.
Ennen and Richter on Complementarity
| Nicolai Foss |
The notion of complementarity unites a number of the key concerns of this blog: It has been central in Austrian capital theory since Menger, it is key both in (sociological) organization theory (e.g., here) and in organizational economics (e.g., here), and it is of considerable relevance to the explanation of (sustained) performance difference (e.g., here). (In organizational economics and strategic management, complementarity is usually given the specific interpretation of “Edgeworth complementarity“). Complementarity has also helped to link some of these areas (e.g., here and here).
In a paper, “The Whole is More Than the Sum of Its Parts, Or Is It? A Review of the Empirical Literature on Complementarities in Organizations,” in the most recent issue of the Journal of Management, Edgar Ennen and Ansgar Richter of the European Business perform what is probably the first stocktaking of the complementarity literature. It is very well done and in many ways an eye-opener. Of particular interest is their separation of the literature in those that take an “interaction approach,” focusing on specific interaction effects among specific (typically few) elements (e.g., of organization structure) and those that take a “systems approach” and consider the performance outcomes of entire sets of multiple elements. (My own work with Keld Laursen on complementarity falls in the latter category). Here is the abstract:
The concept of complementarity denotes the beneficial interplay of the elements of a system where the presence of one element increases the value of others. However, the conceptual work on complementarities to date has not progressed sufficiently to constitute a theory that would offer specific predictions regarding the nature of the elements that form complementary relationships or the conditions for their emergence. To advance our understanding of complementarities, the authors provide a synoptic review of the empirical studies on this concept in leading journals in management, economics, and related disciplines over the period 1988-2008. The authors find that whether a study provides evidence of complementarities in organizations is at least partially driven by its investigative approach. On the basis of the findings, the authors argue that complementarities are most likely to materialize among multiple, heterogeneous factors in complex systems. Therefore, the absence of complementary relationships between a limited set of individual factors may not negate the possibility of complementarities, but rather point to the need for including further systems-specific factors in the analysis. The authors conclude by providing directions for future theoretical and empirical research and outlining managerial implications of the work.
Designing Internal Organization for External Knowledge Sourcing
| Nicolai Foss |
The heading to this post is the title of an upcoming special issue of the European Management Review, edited by my colleague at the Center for Strategic Management and Globalization at CBS, Dr. Larissa Rabbiosi, in collaboration with Dr. Toke Reichstein (also at CBS) and Prof. Massimo Colombo of the Politecnico di Milano. Two previous workshops organized by Larissa and Toke have dealt with similar issues (here and here). The theme of the workshop may be seen as concerning the organizational dimensions of “absorptive capacity,” a somewhat elusive concept. It has the potential of integrating key aspects of organizational economics with key ideas of the capabilities view. Submit a paper!
Robert Sugden
| Nicolai Foss |
I have become a huge fan of Robert Sugden, an economics Professor at the University of East Anglia and one of the most cited UK economists. Readers of this blog may know Sugden’s work from, for example, his excellent 1986 book, The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare, as well as his papers on spontaneous order (e.g., here or here). Much of Sugden’s research lies in the zone of overlap between game theory (mainly experimental game theory and coordination games) and moral and political philosophy, and he is engaged in a constant dialogue with scholars in, or associated with, the classical-liberal tradition, such as Hume, Mill, and Hayek. He is the rare economist who, like Frank Knight, manages to publish in American Economic Review as well as in Ethics.
I am reading through Sugden’s recent publications and recommend the following as being of particular interest to the O&M readership:
- “Can Economics Be Founded on “Indisputable Facts of Experience”? Lionel Robbins and the Pioneers of Neoclassical Economics” — An attack on Robbins’ Essay that may also challenge followers of praxeology.
- “Fraternity: Why the Market Need Not Be a Morally Free Zone“(with Luigino Bruni) — Drawing on the work of a contemporary of Adam Smith, Antonio Genovesi, Sugden and Bruni criticize the idea (reflected in, e.g., Williamson’s distinction between “trust as calculative risk” and “trust proper”) that one can make a distinction between market relationships and genuinely social relationships. Market relationships also have elements of joint intentions for mutual assistance.
- The basis for the latter point can be found in “The Logic of Team Reasoning” which is a case for placing agency at the level of teams, specifically those teams that make use of team reasoning. The basic idea is that when team members reason in this way, they consider which combinations of actions will best promote the team objectives, and choose actions accordingly.
- If the above sounds at variance with classical liberalism (which I don’t think it necessarily is), check out Sugden’s criticism of Thaler and Sunstein (here) or his various critical discussions of the notion of “opportunity” in welfare economics (Sen, Cohen, Roemer) (e.g., here) which are all in the mainstream of classical-liberal thought.
Cultural Economics Conference in Copenhagen
| Nicolai Foss |
My colleague Dr. Trine Bille is the organizer of next year’s “International Conference of the Association of Cultural Economics International” in Copenhagen (CBS). Here is the Call. Submit a paper!
Pomo Periscope XIX: Leiter on Foucault
| Nicolai Foss |
Here is a nice discussion of Foucault by UChicago Law School professor Brian Leiter. It is not a smashing per se, but rather a critical discussion that indicates a central flaw in Foucault’s philosophy. Leiter points to Foucault’s well known discussion of the “pretence” of the “human sciences,” something Foucault seems to explain on the basis of the “influence of economic, political, and moral considerations on their development” (Leiter, p. 16). As Leiter points out, however,
[I]t is now surely a familiar point in post-Kuhnian philosophy of science that the influence of social and historical factors might be compatible with the epistemically special standing of the sciences as long as we can show that epistemically reliable factors are still central to explaining the claims of those sciences. And that possibility is potentially fatal to Foucault‟s critique. For recall that central to Foucault‟s critique is the role that the epistemic pretensions of the sciences play in a structure of practical reasoning which leads agents concerned with their flourishing to become the agents of their own oppression. And the crucial bit of “pretense” is, as we noted earlier, that the human sciences illuminate the truth about how (normal) human beings flourish in virtue of adhering to the epistemic strictures and methodologies of the natural sciences. Recall also that Foucault, unlike Nietzsche, does not contest the practical authority of truth (i.e., the claim of the truth to determine what ought to be done); he rather denies that the claims in question are true or have the epistemic warrant that we would expect true claims to have. So the entire Foucauldian project of liberation turns on the epistemic status of the claims of the human sciences. And on this central point, Foucault has, surprisingly, almost nothing to say beyond raising “suspicion.”
Tracking a Moving Arrow Core
| Nicolai Foss |
As argued by Nelson and Winter in their 1982 book, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, and more explicitly by Winter and Gabriel Szulanski in their 2001 paper, “Replication as Strategy,” many firms leverage their competitive advantages by means of replication. Franchise chains come immediately to mind (the “McDonalds Approach”) but also firms like The Body Shop. In the Winter and Szulanski approach, replication is essentially a two-stage process: In the first stage, the replicator defines a template that approximates the “Arrow Core,” that is, essentially the full and correct specification of the fundamental replicable features of a business model as well as its ideal target applications. Unfortunately, no one can determine in advance the exact contents of the Arrow Core, and knowledge about it must be acquired through experiential learning. Learning about the Arrow Core may lead to one outlet being identified as a concrete “template” for further replication, or the template may be understood more abstractly in terms of a specification of preferred location choices, standard operating procedures, the products that shall be offered, etc., that is, a “formula.” In the second phase, the replicator replicates the template, trying to “copy exactly.” In this phase, the template or formula for replication is “frozen.”
In a recent paper, “Tracking a Moving Arrow Core: Replication-as-Strategy in IKEA,” Anna Jonsson, a Lund University expert on IKEA, and I argue that IKEA has not followed the rigid two-phase replication strategy described (and recommended) in Winter and Szulanski and other contributions to the replication literature, but has adopted and organized an approach that may be characterized as an ambidextrous one: Exploration and exploitation in IKEA are more like simultaneously ongoing processes than sequential ones. We also describe the organizational mechanisms that IKEA has implemented to steer this process, such as internal units that are responsible for intra-firm knowledge sharing, and we discuss how it is supported by organizational principles, such as corporate values that stress the importance of employees questioning proven solutions while continuously engaging in knowledge sharing. In other words, IKEA organization is geared towards the tracking of a constantly changing Arrow Core. Drop me a mail at njf.smg@cbs.dk if you want a copy of the paper.
Terence Hutchison Special Issue
| Nicolai Foss |
It is a sad fact that I spent a considerable part of my early 20s browsing the pages of the major economics journals of the interwar period. I was particularly interested in what was then called the “monetary theory of the trade cycle” and the role of expectations in the business cycle (Myrdal, Lindahl, Hawtrey, Robertson — and of course Hayek and his many followers and conversants, such as Lachman, Kaldor, and various UK Labour Party economists who until the advent of Keynes’ GT were surprisingly bent on Hayekian business cycle theory. (Here is one of the results of that work). My forays led to the “discovery” of Terence Hutchison’s 1937 paper, “Expectation and Rational Conduct,” in Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, a paper that, while over the top in a number of ways, is also an early anticipation of rational expectations and the problems of RE.
Hutchison (1912-2007) is nowadays best known as an economic methodologist, perhaps the first explicit proponent of logical positivism and later Popper’s falsificationism. His 1938 book, The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory, is often taken as a response to Lionel Robbins’ strongly Austrian-influenced Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science(1932/1935). Hutchison later engaged in a debate with Fritz Machlup, and Hayek buffs will know that Hutchison coined the notion of “Hayek I” and “Hayek II” (based on Hayek’s acceptance of Misesian praxeology).
The latest issue of the always-interesting Journal of Economic Methodology features a special issue symposium on Hutchison. Among the highlights is the publication of a hitherto unpublished, semi-autobiographical essay by Hutchison, and the reproduction by Bruce Caldwell of some revealing letters by Hayek and Hutchison (Hayek did not agree with Hutchison’s interpretation of his changes in the 1930s).
Governing Firm-Specific Knowledge Assets
| Nicolai Foss |
In spite of book titles such as Competitive Advantage Through People, a whole subfield dedicated to linking human resources and firm-level performance outcomes (i.e., strategic HRM), and a general recognition that many knowledge-based competitive advantages are ultimately rooted in a web of complementary and firm-specific human capital, surprisingly little serious quantitative research exists that links firm-specific knowledge, employee governance mechanisms, and firm-level performance. In fact, there are few theoretical contributions that accomplish this. Work by Russ Coff as well as Gottschalg and Zollo come to mind (as well as this paper).
In “Firm-Specific Knowledge Resources and Competitive Advantage: The Roles of Economic- and Relationship-based Employee Governance Mechanisms,” in the December issue of the Strategic Management Journal (I received my copy October 28!), Heli Wang, Jinuy He, and former O&M guest blogger Joe Mahoney explore the economic- and relationship-based governance mechanisms that mitigate the latent underinvestment problem of employees making firm-specific human-capital investments. Overall, their results suggest that firms with more firm-specific knowledge resources are more likely to adopt those governance mechanisms that can reduce key employees’ concerns about potential hold-up.
The paper is very neat and clear, and my personal candidate for the best research paper in SMJ in 2009. Here is the abstract:
The resource-based view of the firm emphasizes the role of firm-specific resources, especially firm-specific knowledge resources, in helping a firm to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. However, the deployment of firm-specific knowledge often requires key employees to make specialized human capital investments that are not easily redeployable to other settings. Thus, in the absence of effective safeguards and trust building devices, employees with foresight may be reluctant to make such specialized investments. This study explores both economic- and relationship-based governance mechanisms that might mitigate this underinvestment problem. Effective use of these governance mechanisms enables a firm to obtain greater performance from its efforts to deploy firm-specific knowledge resources. Empirical results further support these key arguments.
Economic Methodology in Erkenntnis
| Nicolai Foss |
Economic methodology, or, meta-theoretical discussion of (and in) economics, has gone significantly beyond with theme that many practicing economists associate with the field, namely the realism-of-assumptions theme prompted by Friedman’s famous 1953 essay, “The Methodology of Positive Economics.” Of course that theme is by no means unimportant, and it has, of course, resurfaced under the impact of the financial crisis.
However, the main themes of the current economic methodology discussion have shifted from the role of assumptions to economic models in their entirety. Two main perspectives are sometimes distinguished, namely the “isolationists” who literally see economic models as simplified redescriptions of the mechanisms and causal factors of the real world, and the “fictionalists” who, as the name indicate, ascribe much less realism to models and think of them as purely mental laboratories that may still, however, allow for certain inferences to the real world.
The January 2009 issue of Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytical Philosophy is a special issue, edited by Till Grüne-Yanoff, dedicated to exploring these two positions, and entitled “Economic Models as Credible Worlds or as Isolating Tools?” Among the heavyweight contributors are Robert Sugden, Uskali Mäki, and Nancy Cartwright. I particularly liked Mäki’s argument that the two positions are in actually very close rather than opposed. Highly recommended for those who want to acquaint themselves with frontier issues in economic methodology.
The Economist Going Austro-Demsetzian?
| Nicolai Foss |
Most observers of industrial organization will readily agree that so-called “predatory pricing” is a rare phenomenon. Nevertheless, it remains one of the most hotly debated topics in industrial organization theory and in practical competition policy, probably because it is a particularly conspicuous example of the “abuse of a dominant position” (to use EU competition policy lingo).
In its most recent issue, The Economist has a nice discussion of predatory pricing, prompted by the recent EU Intel case. The article opens by citing Coase, but in actuality its owes much more to Harold Demsetz (cf. this classic paper) as well as Austrian writers on industrial organization such as Dominick Armentano (cf. this paper). The article is excellent as a basis for discussion in classes on industrial organization.
Idea for Historical Law and Economics Thesis
| Nicolai Foss |
Apropos the always-topical issue of the efficacy of the death penalty, I was recently told by Siegwart Lindenberg that one of Gordon Tullock’s characteristically quirky proposals for reform was to institute the death penalty as the sanction that any crime would meet in the criminal justice system. However, there was a twist, because although any criminal would receive a death penalty, not all criminals would actually be executed. Specifically, all criminals would be strapped to the chair, but there was only a probability that the button would be pressed, the probability depending on the severity of the crime. Because of risk aversion and a tendency to overestimate probabilities (and for the Draconian symbolic value), this scheme would put an effective end to much crime. (I haven’t been able to find a reference for this idea; perhaps it exists only in the oral tradition that surrounds the Tullock figure).
It is easy to dismiss the Tullock scheme as “cruel,” “inhuman,” “far out,” “not practicable,” etc. But perhaps it does have a historical precursor. At its height the criminal law of England (the “Bloody Code”) included more than 220 crimes that were punishable by death, including “being in the company of gypsies for more than one month” (here is the Wiki). Other countries have had similar broad approaches to which crimes were punishable by death, though perhaps few as Draconian as England’s. However, one has to bear in mind that there generally was a pardon system, and that it is quite likely that some of the weirder crimes leading to death sentences were more likely to be pardoned than the really serious ones (e.g., a pardon may have been more likely in the case of the “crime” of being in the company in gypsies than outright murder). Could it be that this pardon system functioned in such a way that the probabilities of actual execution directly reflected the real severity of the crime? It seems likely. The data are definitely there. It is just collecting them and doing the analysis.
Jack of All Trades and Master of . . . Administration?
| Nicolai Foss |
CEOs, leaders, and entrepreneurs are typically seen as generalists (e.g., here). They are confronted with the broadest decision domains and have the responsibility of making sometimes crucial decisions within those domains.
In “Congratulations or Condolences? The Role of Human Capital in the Cultivation of a University Administrator” (here; scroll down), John McDowell, Larry Singell, and Mark Stater argue that this also holds for universities. They develop and test a probit model of the decision between administration (from dept. head all the way to university pres.) and the pure academic career. The model is conditioned by training, career background, and (juicy!) academic performance. The data are drawn from the American Economic Association directories. Among the findings: economists with doctoral degrees from less prestigious universities are more likely to select into admin. Women and foreigners are less likely to become administrators. The experience level also positively influences the probability of getting into admin.
I am not convinced that the authors truly capture the specialized versus general human capital dimension. Some of their measures (e.g., whether the PhD degree was awarded by a top-35 PhD institution or not) are measures of quality rather than of the degree of specialization (in fact, this may be consistent with the view that many “pure” academics hold of admins!). Nevertheless, definitely worth a read and good ammo for harassing your local dean! (more…)
“Unskilled and Unaware of It”
| Nicolai Foss |
In general I enjoy teaching and interacting with students. But some students can be a pain, particularly those who are too intellectually challenged to realize the nature of their predicament. They don’t accept (their low) grades (particularly not the grade of “i” ;-)), and blame the professor/instructor for their own low achievement. Here is why.
The New Issue of JEM
| Nicolai Foss |
No doubt a sure sign of impending senility, I take a huge interest in economic methodology, that is, meta-theory as it applies to economics. I serve on the editorial board of the Journal of Economic Methodology and usually enjoy reading the journal. The latest issue of JEM features at least two papers that should be of direct interest to O&M readers, namely Alain Marciano’s “Buchanan’s catallactic critique of Robbins’ definition of economics” (basically a discussion of Buchanan’s famous 1964 presidential address to the Southern Economic Association), and Oliver Williamson’s “Pragmatic methodology: a sketch with applications to transaction cost economics” (pragmatic methodology meaning “keep it simple,” “get it right,” “make it plausible,” and “engage in predictions and empirical testing”). Ah, and for those who take delight in economic controversy there is a rather thorough smashing by Ken Binmore of a recent Deirdre McCloskey book.
Raising the Bar: The Strategy Research Initiative
| Nicolai Foss |
The Business Policy and Strategy Division is the largest and arguably dominant division of the Academy of Management. Strategy’s leading journal, the Strategic Management Journal, consistently ranks among the top-5 management journals. What is being done in strategy clearly matters to the rest of the Academy.
Strategy has a general reputation for being a relatively rigorous management field (whether this is well deserved or not is another matter), something that is often ascribed to the heavy influence of economics on the development of the field over the last three decades. And yet, strategy also exhibits a plethora of different approaches; there is still no agreement on the nature of the key dependent variables; and the field unabashedly employs key explanatory constructs (e.g., capabilities, dynamic capabilities, absorptive capacity, etc.), the nature, operationalization, and measurement of which are still unclear. It may also be noted that although strategy does rely quite a lot on economic reasoning in comparison to other management fields, the formal way of reasoning of modern economists seldom finds its way into the pages of the leading strategy journals.
Prompted, apparently, by similar observations and frustrations, a group of Young(er) Turks (“mid-career scholars,” to use their own words) has gathered under the banner of the Strategy Research Initiative. (more…)
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