Posts filed under ‘Business/Economic History’
Skidelsky on Ferguson
| Peter Klein |
Thanks to Humberto Barreto for forwarding Robert Skidelsky’s review of Niall Ferguson’s The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World from the New York Review of Books. Here’s Ferguson talking about the book on NPR. There are plenty of reviews by journalists as well. I haven’t read the book but this review by former O&M guest blogger David Gordon makes me wonder if it’s worth the effort.
Guilds and Innovation
| Peter Klein |
Most economic and management historians see the guild system as partly responsible for the stagnation of the medieval European economy. A new book, Guilds, Innovation and the European Economy, 1400-1800 (S. R. Epstein and Maarten Prak, eds., Cambridge, 2008) offers a revisionist view, challenging the stereotype of guilds as “moribund rent-seekers whose habitual reaction to technical innovation was resistance and rejection.” The reality is more complex, says reviewer Christine MacLeod:
What emerges from this exceptionally coherent volume is not only the complexity of this institution, whose history spans more than half a millennium and a myriad of particular trades and local circumstances, but also the persistent tensions to which it was subjected, both internally from individualistic and capitalist challenges to its collective ethos and externally from the exigencies of nation states. Moreover, it adds another spur to the demanding search for innovation in the workshop and on the construction site, rather than in the too easily accessed and counted records of the patent office.
In Praise of the US Auto Industry
| Peter Klein |
The proposed bailout of GM, Ford, and Chrysler overlooks an important fact. The US has one of the most vibrant, dynamic, and efficient automobile industries in the world. It produces several million cars, trucks, and SUVs per year, employing (in 2006) 402,800 Americans at an average salary of $63,358. That’s vehicle assembly alone; the rest of the supply chain employs even more people and generates more income. It’s an industry to be proud of. Its products are among the best in the world. Their names are Toyota, Honda, Nissan, BMW, Mercedes, Hyundai, Mazda, Mitsubishi, and Subaru.
Oh, yes, there’s also a legacy industry, based in Detroit, but it’s rapidly, and thankfully, going the way of the horse-and-buggy business.
I pulled these numbers from Matthew Slaughter’s fine piece in yesterday’s WSJ, “An Auto Bailout Would Be Terrible for Free Trade,” which points out that the US is one of the the world’s largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment and that an auto industry bailout would surely reduce the flow of FDI, at the expense of the US economy. “Ironically, proponents of a bailout say saving Detroit is necessary to protect the U.S. manufacturing base. But too many such bailouts could erode the number of manufacturers willing to invest here.” Bailouts may also spur retaliatory actions by governments in US export markets, doing further damage to free trade. In short, what the Big Three and their supporters want is the most crass form of protectionism, a blunt demand that US taxpayers, consumers, and producers fork over the cash, now and in the future, to prop up an inefficient, failing industry.
NB: In 2001 I was part of a delegation of US officials visiting Singapore in advance of negotiations over a possible bilateral free trade agreement. The issue was Singapore’s Government-Linked Enterprises (GLCs), nominally private firms partially owned by the Singaporean government. Did these links constitute a trade barrier, putting US firms doing business in Singapore at a competitive disadvantage? We interviewed US executives based in Singapore and learned that the government did not seem to offer the GLCs special favors in input or output markets (though they did benefit from a lower cost of capital). Anyway, as I read Slaughter’s piece I imagined myself as a Singaporean official visiting the US, interviewing foreign executives in the financial-services and, perhaps, automobile industries, asking if they thought US companies got special government protection. To ask this question is to answer it.
Always Two, There Are: A Master, and an Apprentice
| Peter Klein |
Here are the proceedings of a conference on apprenticeship, the much-maligned, but frequently valuable, practice of learning a trade through experience, rather than formal classroom education.
Paul Ryan notes in his EH.Net review:
Its publication responds to the extensive contemporary interest in apprenticeship — among historians, as part of discussions of the role of guilds, proto-industrialization and social change; and among policy analysts, reflecting the benefits of apprenticeship for school-to-work transitions, notably in Germany. . . .
Most contributors subscribe to a revisionist historical view of apprenticeship, as less monolithic, standardized and guild-regulated, and more determined by economic factors, than in traditional interpretations, notably the ganze Haus perspective of the German historical school. Both individually and collectively, the papers document the heterogeneity of apprenticeship. Thus contract durations and completion rates are shown to have varied considerably, even within particular occupations in particular towns in particular periods, despite clear guild prescriptions.
New NBER Working Papers
| Peter Klein |
Three new NBER papers likely to interest the O&M crowd. (Aggressive Googlers can probably find ungated versions.)
Railroads and the Rise of the Factory: Evidence for the United States, 1850-70 by Jeremy Atack, Michael R. Haines, and Robert A. Margo
Over the course of the nineteenth century manufacturing in the United States shifted from artisan shop to factory production. At the same time United States experienced a transportation revolution, a key component of which was the building of extensive railroad network. Using a newly created data set of manufacturing establishments linked to county level data on rail access from 1850-70, we ask whether the coming of the railroad increased establishment size in manufacturing. Difference-in-difference and instrument variable estimates suggest that the railroad had a positive effect on factory status. In other words, Adam Smith was right – the division of labor in nineteenth century American manufacturing was limited by the extent of the market.
The Limited Partnership in New York, 1822-1853: Partnerships Without Kinship by Eric Hilt and Katharine O’Banion
In 1822, New York became the first common-law state to authorize the formation of limited partnerships, and over the ensuing decades, many other states followed. Most prior research has suggested that these statutes were utilized only rarely, but little is known about their effects. Using newly collected data, this paper analyzes the use of the limited partnership in nineteenth-century New York City. We find that the limited partnership form was adopted by a surprising number of firms, and that limited partnerships had more capital, failed at lower rates, and were less likely to be formed on the basis of kinship ties, compared to ordinary partnerships. The latter differences were not simply due to selection: even though the merchants who invested in limited partnerships were a wealthy and successful elite, their own ordinary partnerships were quite different from their limited partnerships. The results suggest that the limited partnership facilitated investments outside kinship networks, and into the hands of talented young merchants.
Inside the Black of Box of Ability Peer Effects: Evidence from Variation in Low Achievers in the Classroom by Victor Lavy, Daniele Paserman, and Analia Schlosser
In this paper, we estimate the extent of ability peer effects in the classroom and explore the underlying mechanisms through which these peer effects operate. We identify as low ability students those who are enrolled at least one year behind their birth cohort (repeaters). We show that there are marked differences between the academic performance and behavior of repeaters and regular students. The status of repeaters is mostly determined by first grade; therefore, it is unlikely to have been affected by their classroom peers, and our estimates will not suffer from the reflection problem. Using within school variation in the proportion of these low ability students across cohorts of middle and high school students in Israel, we find that the proportion of low achieving peers has a negative effect on the performance of regular students, especially those located at the lower end of the ability distribution. An exploration of the underlying mechanisms of these peer effects shows that, relative to regular students, repeaters report that teachers are better in the individual treatment of students and in the instilment of capacity for individual study. However, a higher proportion of these low achieving students results in a deterioration of teachers’ pedagogical practices, has detrimental effects on the quality of inter-student relationships and the relationships between teachers and students, and increases the level of violence and classroom disruptions.
Blame Basel, Not “Deregulation”
| Peter Klein |
Says Charles Calorimis in the Saturday WSJ. First, as Calorimis points out, there wasn’t any deregulation. (Jacob Weisberg, what part of this can’t you understand?) Indeed, by any reasonable measure, government has grown more under George W. Bush than under any administration since LBJ — after this month, perhaps since FDR. Specifically, Calomiris notes:
Financial deregulation for the past three decades consisted of the removal of deposit interest-rate ceilings, the relaxation of branching powers, and allowing commercial banks to enter underwriting and insurance and other financial activities. Wasn’t the ability for commercial and investment banks to merge (the result of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed part of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act) a major stabilizer to the financial system this past year? Indeed, it allowed Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch to be acquired by J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of America, and allowed Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to convert to bank holding companies to help shore up their positions during the mid-September bear runs on their stocks.
Even more to the point, subprime lending, securitization and dealing in swaps were all activities that banks and other financial institutions have had the ability to engage in all along. There is no connection between any of these and deregulation. On the contrary, it was the ever-growing Basel Committee rules for measuring bank risk and allocating capital to absorb that risk (just try reading the Basel standards if you don’t believe me) that failed miserably. The Basel rules outsourced the measurement of risk to ratings agencies or to the modelers within the banks themselves. Incentives were not properly aligned, as those that measured risk profited from underestimating it and earned large fees for doing so.
That ineffectual, Rube Goldberg apparatus was, of course, the direct result of the politicization of prudential regulation by the Basel Committee, which was itself the direct consequence of pursuing “international coordination” among countries, which produced rules that work politically but not economically.
Update: Here’s Larry White on the phantom deregulation.
Searle Center Symposium on Property Rights and Innovation
| Peter Klein |
It’s next month in Chicago. The high-powered lineup includes Joel Mokyr, Avner Greif, Robert Merges, Lynne Kiesling, Stan Liebowitz, Scott Stern, my old classmates Emerson Tiller and Rich Brooks, and many more. Harold Demsetz gives the keynote. Wish I were going.
Political Origins of the Financial Crisis
| Dick Langlois |
Okay, so maybe I’ll write about the financial crisis after all.
Stan Liebowitz has been pointing for a long time to the political origins of lowered lending standards — pressure on Fannie Mae to increase “affordable housing” — and to the role of those lowered standards in the mortgage bubble. “[I]n an attempt to increase homeownership, particularly by minorities and the less affluent, an attack on underwriting standards was undertaken by virtually every branch of the government since the early 1990s. The decline in mortgage underwriting standards was universally praised as an ‘innovation’ in mortgage lending by regulators, academic specialists, GSEs, and housing activists. This weakening of underwriting standards succeeded in increasing home ownership and also the price of housing, helping to lead to a housing price bubble.”
Today the AEI has posted a nice piece by Peter Wallison and Charles Calomiris saying much the same thing. Even more interesting, however, is a long article in Saturday’s New York Times that chronicles the process in great detail.
Capitol Hill bore down on Mr. Mudd as well. The same year he took the top position, regulators sharply increased Fannie’s affordable-housing goals. Democratic lawmakers demanded that the company buy more loans that had been made to low-income and minority homebuyers.
“When homes are doubling in price in every six years and incomes are increasing by a mere one percent per year, Fannie’s mission is of paramount importance,” Senator Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat, lectured Mr. Mudd at a Congressional hearing in 2006. “In fact, Fannie and Freddie can do more, a lot more.” (more…)
GM-Fisher: Yet More
| Peter Klein |
The debate over the acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, like the Energizer bunny, keeps going, and going, and going. . . . The new issue of Industrial and Corporate Change has two more papers, “Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel? The GM–Fisher Body Contract” by Victor Goldberg and “The Enforceability of the GM–Fisher Body Contract: Comment on Goldberg” by Ben Klein. Here are the abstracts:
Goldberg: In the analysis of vertical integration by contract versus ownership, one event has dominated the discussion — General Motors’ (GM) merger with Fisher Body in 1926. The debates have all been premised on the assumption that the 10-year contract between the parties signed in 1919 was a legally enforceable agreement. However, it was not. Because Fisher’s promise was illusory the contract lacked consideration. This note suggests that GM’s counsel must have known this. It raises a significant question in transactional engineering: what is the function of an agreement that is not legally enforceable?
Klein: Goldberg unconvincingly claims that the General Motors (GM)–Fisher Body contract was in fact legally unenforceable. But even if Goldberg’s contract law conclusion were correct, it is economically irrelevant. It is clear from the actions of Fisher and GM and from the testimonial and other contemporaneous evidence that both transactors considered the contract legally binding and behaved accordingly. Therefore, proper economic analysis of the Fisher–GM case should continue to assume contract enforceability, and the economic determinants of organizational structure illustrated by the case remain fully valid.
Notes from the Economic History Association Meeting
| Dick Langlois |
I am only now (slowly and partially) emerging from a crush of administrative and teaching responsibilities at the beginning of the semester. But I did manage to drive down to New Haven last weekend for some of the Economic History Association meeting. It was an eventful meeting in many respects, including a fire at the hotel Thursday night that sent conference-goers into the street in their pajamas as well as an apparent outbreak of food poisoning from the Saturday night banquet. Happily, I was spared both of those experiences.
For at least two of the three sessions I managed to attend, there emerged a theme: that a lot of interesting work in economic history today is rediscovering and reinventing ideas that Nate Rosenberg, Paul David, and others were discussing in the 1970s and earlier: learning by doing and factor prices, technological and economic complementarities, and general-purpose technologies. (I have been known to talk about the Stanford School in this respect.)
In his keynote address on Saturday — evidently similar to his Clarendon Lectures last year and probably dating back at least to this paper — Daron Acemoglu talked about the issue of skill bias in technological change. In the 1970s, labor economists were arguing that Americans were investing too much in education, since rising wage rates should lead to labor-saving technical change, which would reduce the supply of skilled jobs. Of course, just the opposite happened: skilled jobs grew even faster than skilled workers, creating a skill premium in the U.S. Acemoglu presented a clever general-equilibrium model in which the bias of technological change is endogenous. Under certain assumptions, supply of a factor of production (like skilled labor) can create its own demand. The intuition is that a larger supply of a factor (like skilled labor) can increase the market for complementary innovations to an extent that offsets other effects. (For my own Rosenbergian take on why technical change should be biased toward higher skill levels, see here.) Interestingly, Joel Mokyr discussed Acemoglu’s presentation using a 1975 Paul David paper as a framework. (more…)
What Would Hayek Say?
| Peter Klein |
About the events of the last week? Probably the same thing he said in 1932:
Instead of furthering the inevitable liquidation of the maladjustments brought about by the boom during the last three years, all conceivable means have been used to prevent that readjustment from taking place; and one of these means, which has been repeatedly tried though without success, from the earliest to the most recent stages of depression, has been this deliberate policy of credit expansion. . . . To combat the depression by a forced credit expansion is to attempt to cure the evil by the very means which brought it about; because we are suffering from a misdirection of production, we want to create further misdirection — a procedure that can only lead to a much more severe crisis as soon as the credit expansion comes to an end. . . . It is probably to this experiment, together with the attempts to prevent liquidation once the crisis had come, that we owe the exceptional severity and duration of the depression.We must not forget that, for the last six or eight years, monetary policy all over the world has followed the advice of the stabilizers. It is high time that their influence, which has already done harm enough, should be overthrown.
That’s from the introduction to Monetary Nationalism and International Stability, included in the new collection we mentioned earlier. Thanks to Jeff Tucker for the tip and links to the source material.
An Orthodox Response to Max Weber
| Peter Klein |
“Orthodox” with a capital O, that is. The current issue of the Acton Institute’s flagship journal, the Journal of Markets and Morality, features the first English translation of Sergey Bulgakov’s 1909 essay “The National Economy and the Religious Personality,” described by translator Krassen Stanchev as “the first Orthodox Christian response to Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.” Bulgakov, widely regarded as the greatest 20th-century Orthodox theologian, has been attracting increasing interest in recent decades, in both East and West. Writes Stanchev:
Only in the 1906s did scholars turn their attention to business in the Orthodox medieval world. Professors in theological academies in Communist countries carefully avoided the topic while economic historians, at best, studied the relations between religion and business for closed audiences, but most often they pretended the phenomenon did not exist.
Just a few years after Weber, Bulgakov managed to put together similar theoretical arguments and a set of historical evidence that allowed claiming origins of the capitalist spirit from Orthodox Christianity as well. For those who are familiar with the later Russian “scientific” philosophers’ disregard for facts and documents, it will be a surprise as to how rich Russian historiography in the nineteenth century has been.
The article is currently gated but should be available to non-subscribers later this year. Or you can subscribe now and avoid the wait.
“El Pulpo”
| Peter Klein |
A few years ago I read, and enjoyed, Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer’s Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala. (Kinzer also has a nice book on the CIA’s role in Iran.) So when I saw Peter Chapman’s Bananas!: How The United Fruit Company Shaped the World in a local bookstore — yes, the bright-yellow cover caught my eye — I snapped it up. United Fruit — “El Pulpo” (the Octopus) to its detractors — is a fascinating company, the history of which should be required reading for students of international business. Bananas is a disappointment, unfortunately. I wasn’t expecting a scholarly treatment but, even by journalistic standards, the book is weak, substituting breathy clichés for facts and analysis. And Chapman’s unfamiliarity with even the most basic concepts of economics doesn’t help. (Spend your money on Bananas instead — my favorite Woody Allen movie.)
Today I learned of at least one scholarly treatment of United Fruit, focusing on its Colombian operations: Bananas and Business: The United Fruit Company in Colombia, 1899-2000 by Marcelo Bucheli (New York University Press, 2005). Alan Dye makes some interesting points about knowledge transfer in his review for EH.Net:
One important contribution is the story the book tells of how United Fruit eventually decided to abandon its initial policy of creating barriers to competition and accept fair dealing with rivals to its core business. Although its early history was one of raising barriers to competition and exploiting the weakness of unstable governments to establish its monospony position, he argues that in the long run the presence of this, or another multinational, was necessary for the development of a commercial banana industry in Colombia. United Fruit had pioneered techniques for how to commercialize a fragile and highly perishable product. Regardless of unethical practices when dealing with locals in the producing countries, the importation of the marketing techniques that such pioneers in the industry developed were of substantial value to local industry. (more…)
McNamara on Management
| Peter Klein |
From Abraham Zaleznik in HBS Working Knowledge (via Marshall Jevons):
[Robert S. McNamara] was a brilliant student at the University of California and at Harvard Business School, where he became a member of the HBS faculty. McNamara was a devotee of managerial control, an expertise he applied in his work at the Ford Motor Company and later at the Department of Defense as secretary in President John F. Kennedy’s cabinet.
His mantra was measurement. As secretary of defense, McNamara developed, along with key subordinates, including Robert Anthony of the HBS control faculty, long-range procurement cycles. He even tried to get the U.S. Navy to subscribe to a common aircraft for the three branches of the military. The Navy refused to go along, since this branch was concerned about aircraft operating from carriers.
McNamara urged field commanders in Vietnam to apply measurement to enemy losses, but did not realize until it was too late that the measurements were unreliable to assess enemy losses. The most reliable assessments came from correspondents like Neil Sheehan and David Halberstam. McNamara published a book years after he retired to reassess the Vietnam War and his role in it as secretary of defense. His main theme was the failure to examine critically the assumptions leading to U.S. involvement in this disaster. Editorial writers took no pains to spare McNamara’s feelings.
The moral I took away from his story is to avoid the perils of the fox and its reliance on a single belief, in this case measurement, and the technology of control.
For more on McNamara’s management philosophy and experiences, Deborah Shapley’s 1992 biography Promise and Power is pretty good. I also recommend The Whiz Kids: Ten Founding Fathers of American Business — and the Legacy They Left Us by John Byrne. As these books point out, McNamara was not a pioneer in this area but a follower of Tex Thornton, head of the US Army’s Statistical Control Group in WWII and later CEO of Litton Industries. It was Thornton who brought McNamara and the rest of his “Whiz Kids,” as a group, to Ford in 1945. Harold Geneen, the most famous “management-by-the-numbers” guy, was not part of this group but shared much of Thornton’s philosophy. (See Robert Sobel’s Rise and Fall of the Conglomerate Kings.)
Technology and Organization and Firm Size (Re-Redux)
| Dick Langlois |
I blogged a while back about the recent Dosi et al. paper in Capitalism and Society, which basically claims that, since firm size distributions (as they model them) have not changed much over time, it must be the case that recent technological change has not led to greater vertical specialization in industry. My response to this claim, which should be published soon, points out that firm size in the sense of price theory (as measured by output, employees, etc.) tells us nothing at all about firm size in the sense of Coase (number of transactions or stages of production within the firm’s boundaries). Vertical specialization does not imply small size — it may even mean larger firms. A recent NBER paper by four University of Chicago economists sheds light on this point. There is evidence, notably in a well-known paper by Erik Brynjolfsson and coauthors, that, at least before 1994, investment in ICT technology tended to make firms smaller. But there is another way in which ICT, in the form of the Internet, can make firms bigger. As this NBER paper shows, in reducing search costs in areas like new-car sales and bookstores, the Internet tended to increase the average size of the firm by driving the smaller less-efficient firms out of business and increasing the (price theory) size of the more efficient. Note that such an increase in size is not a resurgence of the Chandlerian multi-unit enterprise. Despite its diversification into many different products, even Amazon is still highly specialized vertically.
Cars for Comrades
| Peter Klein |
A while back we posted a video from an East German Trabant factory that got a lot of hits. A video is worth more than a thousand words on the political economy of socialism, right?
Indeed, the automobile played an important role in the eventual collapse of the communist system, according to Lewis Siegelbaum’s Cars for Comrades: The Life of the Soviet Automobile (Cornell University Press, 2008). As Perry Patterson notes in his review for EH.Net:
As incomes and economic complexity grew over time, the Soviet state found it necessary to produce more and more vehicles of all sorts, and private cars in particular. But policymakers also discovered that the existence of cars generated additional demands for consumer services, and discontent when the economy could not provide them. As Siegelbaum puts the matter, “cars, cars, and more cars seem to have played a particularly large and invidious role in popular disillusionment with Soviet socialism.” Worse perhaps for the Soviet state, private automobiles and the culture that grew up around them also opened up numerous ways for individuals to evade and undermine the official command economy. For example, cars facilitated private conversions, private dealmaking, the generation of “unearned” income from taxi rides, and the unplanned movement of (sometimes stolen) goods.
The quality of Soviet cars was, well, about what you’d expect. The book “provides extensive examples of the mental knots in which the Communist leaders tied themselves, wanting on the one hand to boast about their superiority over the West on all fronts, and being unable and unwilling to match it when it came to cars,” notes the Economist.
My first “serious” research paper, written in Glen Elder’s undergraduate sociology class, dealt with the social and cultural impact of “automobility” in the US, so this subject is near and dear to my heart. (Fortunately, the paper is buried deep in a secret vault and will never see the light of day.)
Homogeneity and Cooperation
| Peter Klein |
Why are Scandinavians so cooperative? Nicolai and Lasse might suggest it’s their superior moral character. La Porta et al. (1997), Putnam et al. (1992), and others point to Protestantism: hierarchical religions like Catholicism and Islam, it is argued, tend to discourage trust and retard the development of social capital. The Protestants, who already have Max Weber in their corner, seem to be piling it on.
Not so fast, says Kevin O’Rourke in a recent paper, “Culture, Conflict, and Cooperation: Irish Dairying Before the Great War” (Economic Journal, October 2007). O’Rourke compares the Danish and Irish dairy industries before 1914 and argues that cultural and ethnic homogeneity, not religion, explains the success of Danish cooperatives. Unlike recent large-sample econometric work on trust, the paper uses deeper, more robust indicators of cooperation. Key findings:
At first sight, the contrast between Protestant Ulster and the Catholic South (as well as between Denmark and Ireland as a whole) seems a striking confirmation of the LLSV hypothesis that culture matters for the ability to cooperate, and that hierarchical religions such as Catholicism undermine both trust and cooperation. However, on closer examination it appears that politics, not culture, was responsible for the lower Irish propensity to cooperate. Suspicion between Catholics and Protestants, and tenants and landlords, spilled over into Nationalist suspicion of the cooperative movement and hindered its spread, despite the efforts of the [Irish Agricultural Organisation Society] to remain apolitical. To this extent, the results are more consistent with the stress on [ethnolinguistic fractionalisation] in Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) than with the cultural perspective of LLSV, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001).
Denmark benefited from several relevant advantages that Ireland did not enjoy during this period. In particular, it was an extremely homogeneous country, ethnically, religiously and linguistically. There was no conflict over who should own the land, since land reform in Denmark had been underway since the late eighteenth century. . . . Nor was there any ethnic conflict, or disputes over where national boundaries should lie (all such controversies became redundant following the loss of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864). The results suggest that this homogeneity of Danish society is what explains the success of cooperation there.
Rothbard on Big Business
| Peter Klein |
We at O&M are sometimes described as “pro-business.” But this is not correct. We strongly support the economic function of commerce, and we think private ownership of capital, the profit-seeking activities of entrepreneurs and managers, and unfettered markets for consumer goods, factors of production, and financial assets are essential to a strong economy. But that doesn’t mean we admire the behavior and character of every capitalist, entrepreneur, and manager. Indeed, plenty are scoundrels. Empirically, the businesspeople who rise to the top in today’s mixed economy, with its peculiar blend of free markets and state controls, are likely to be those who excel in political entrepreneurship, in “working the system” to their advantage.
Murray Rothbard summarizes this view in a private letter written in 1966:
For some time I have come to the conclusion that the grave deficiency in the current output and thinking of our libertarians and “classical liberals” is an enormous blind spot when it comes to big business. There is a tendency to worship Big Business per se. . . and a corollary tendency to fail to realize that while big business would indeed merit praise if they won that bigness on the purely free market, that in the contemporary world of total neo-mercantilism and what is essentially a neo-fascist “corporate state,” bigness is a priori highly suspect, because Big Business most likely got that way through an intricate and decisive network of subsidies, privileges, and direct and indirect grants of monopoly protection.
Rothbard refers his correspondent to Gabriel Kolko, William Appleman Williams, James Weinstein, C. Wright Mills, and other New Left critics of the corporate state for details. For more on Rothbard’s own views see “Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty” (1965) and “Confessions of a Right-Wing Liberal” (1968), as well as related essays by Joseph Stromberg and Roy Childs.
New Center for Economic Documents Digitization
| Peter Klein |
Below is an announcement from the St. Louis Fed about its new digital document library, the Center for Economic Documents Digitization (CEDD). A nice complement to the CORI K-Base, Connie Helfat and Steve Klepper’s FIVE project, and similar resources. Three cheers for the Digital Age!
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis recently introduced the Center for Economic Documents Digitization (CEDD), with a mission to preserve the nation’s economic history through digitization. To date, CEDD has digitized more than 300,000 pages of published material and archival collections from the Federal Reserve System and selected partners — currently, the Brookings Institution, the Government Printing Office and the Missouri Historical Society.
This storehouse of documents includes U.S. government publications, Federal Reserve publications, photographs, manuscripts, and multimedia formats, all available on the St. Louis Fed’s FRASER (Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research) website: http://fraser.stlouisfed.org. (more…)
Technology and Firm Size and Organization (Redux)
| Dick Langlois |
Peter blogged a while ago about an article by Giovanni Dosi, Alfonso Gambardella, Marco Grazzi, and Luigi Orsenigo in the bepress online journal Capitalism and Society. Both this article and the accompanying discussion by Bill Lazonick take aim at my 2003 article “The Vanishing Hand.” I have now crafted a response, which I propose to submit to the journal as a letter. But readers of O&M can read it right away here.
I should also mention that the same issue of Capitalism and Society has an interesting article on the family firm by Princeton historian Harold James, with a wonderful comment by Randall Morck. I met Morck this past November at a conference in Kyoto, and was extremely impressed.
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