Posts filed under ‘Evolutionary Economics’
Legal Entrepreneurship
| Steve Phelan |
I just had lunch with the general counsel of an internet retailer, which is headquartered here in Las Vegas. He was bemoaning the fact that the biggest headache in his job is patent infringments… (more…)
Reflections on LLSV
| Peter Klein |
I meant to blog on the newest LLSV paper (actually LLS, in this case) but never got around to it. LLSV, you’ll recall, inaugurated a stream of empirical research on the financial and economic effects of legal systems (focusing on the differences between common- and civil-law countries). The newest paper clarifies the argument and reflects on ten years of research, discussion, and debate on the role of legal origins.
Fortunately, Daniel Sokol has written some comments on the Conglomerate blog (one of my regular reads, by the way — keep up the good work, guys!). Daniel notes, wisely:
I believe that LLSV makes certain assumptions about history and political economy in legal origins that are not exactly supported by the underlying historical record. A number of scholars have attacked LLSV on these grounds. Nevertheless, I still find myself strangely attracted to LLSV. In many ways, the results are what you would intuitively expect if you were on your own to attempt to rank countries based on investor protection or other similar features. More importantly, a number of the variables that LLSV uses are a bit squishy but we have yet to come up with better cross country measurements. Indeed, as a result of the critiques, LLSV have gotten better as to how they measure shareholder protection. From a policy perspective, the key to change to various bottlenecks requires not merely a top down approach in the change of the legal system but a bottom up approach by the users of these legal systems to overcome various bottlenecks that are regulatory. This makes me believe that over time the common law/civil law distinction will be seen as a rather false one where instead you will find countries lumped into categories based on their ability to respond to local and changing conditions (even the United States, which in recent years may have created increased regulatory bottlenecks such as SOX). This evolutionary approach is what I believe holds the key to understanding how to think about law and institutions.
ASSA 2008 Papers on Organizations
| Peter Klein |
Some interesting papers from the ASSA Meeting in New Orleans, where I’ll be spending the next couple of days. (I don’t have links, so you’ll have to do your own Googling to find the texts.)
ROBERT GIBBONS and REBECCA HENDERSON, Massachusetts Institute of Technology — What Do Managers Do? Suggestive Evidence and Potential Theories about Building and Managing Relational Contracts
CLAUDE MENARD, ATOM – University of Paris Pantheon-Sorbonne — The Governance of Interfirm Agreements: A Relational Contract Perspective
RICARD GIL, University California-Santa Cruz, and JEAN-MICHEL OUDOT, ATOM – University Paris Pantheon-Sorbonne — Contractual Completeness and Ex-post Efficiency: Trade-Offs between Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Costs in Contract Design
LUIS GARICANO and PAUL HEATON, University of Chicago — Information Technology, Organization, and Productivity in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Departments
DANIEL SPULBER, Northwestern University — Entrepreneurs in the Theory of the Firm (more…)
Immigration and the Housing Bubble
| Steve Phelan |
Brad De Long’s analysis of the current financial crisis published in the Taipei Times on 01/01/08 received some attention in the blogosphere yesterday. For a crisis resulting in a sustained fall in asset values, he recommends either 1) nationalizing the debt or 2) inflating the price of nominal assets. As I was reading the article (and another on the fact that an 3 million excess housing units were created in the boom above long term trends) it occurred to me that a third path might be available — increased immigration. (more…)
Open Source and Spontaneous Order
| Peter Klein |
Open-source software is often cited as an example of what Hayek termed spontaneous order, the organic, bottom-up, decentralized form of organization that characterizes the market system. Giampaolo Garzarelli, in an explicitly Hayekian analyis, says open-source projects are defined by “no hierarchy, self-organization, self-regulation, and no ownership structure.” Is this an accurate characterization?
Commercial law, manifest in the medieval law merchant or lex mercatoria, is another important example of spontaneous order in the literature (see Harold Berman and Bruce Benson). Fabrizio Marrella and Christopher Yoo use the law merchant as a benchmark, asking “Is Open Source Software the New Lex Mercatoria?”They think not, arguing that focal firms, individuals, and groups play a more important role in guiding the evolution of open-source projects than is usually recognized. As a result, “[o]pen source has not achieved the type of universality or uniformity of principles envisioned by proponents of the lex mercatoria.” (more…)
Adam Smith: Proto-Austrian?
| Peter Klein |
Austrian economists have mixed views on Adam Smith and classical economics. Mises and Hayek admired Smith as a social theorist and system builder while rejecting much of his technical apparatus, especially the labor theory of value. Menger taught Smithian political economy to his most famous pupil, Crown Prince Rudolf. Rothbard considered Smith grossly overrated. More generally, Austrian economists have tended to distance themselves as much from the classical system as from its neoclassical descendant. (Kirzner’s review of George Reisman’s Capitalism, which tries to synthesize Austrian and Ricardian economics, is worth reading in this regard.)
A new paper by Michael Bradley argues that the distinction between classical and Austrian analysis is overdrawn, at least with regard to competition theory. (more…)
Summer Workshop on Social Norms
| Peter Klein |
It’s hosted by Spain’s Urrutia Elejalde Foundation and takes place in San Sebastián, 14-17 July 2008. (Basque Country, not Spain, if you prefer.) The impressive speaker list includes Jon Elster, Diego Gambetta, Herb Gintis, Russell Hardin, and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, among others. Details here.
Ratings Agencies
| Steve Phelan |
One of my hobbies is to perform counterfactual exercises in organization design (yes, sad, I know). Here is my current challenge. Ratings agencies like Moody’s are paid by the issuers of securities rather than the purchasers of the securities. This creates an agency problem because the rater has an incentive to give high ratings to stay in the good graces of the issuer — who will presumably “shop around” to get the best ratings.
Assuming this arrangement is efficient then what are the counterbalancing factors that offset the agency costs? How much would agency costs have to increase to trigger an adjustment in design? Was the the subprime fiasco such a trigger? What would the new design look like?
I know that economists are reluctant to second-guess how the market will work out its problems — but strategists are in the business of being proactive about these things :-)
Capabilities and Comparative Advantage
| Steve Phelan |
Brad DeLong recently posted an interesting set of questions on his blog about corporate nationality: (more…)
Langlois on McCraw on Schumpeter
| Peter Klein |
Former O&M guest blogger Dick Langlois reviews Thomas McCraw’s Schumpeter biography, Prophet of Innovation, for EH.Net.
McCraw is at his best in conveying Schumpeter the man, providing an engaging and beautifully written portrait of this larger-than-life and often tragic figure. McCraw also works hard at weaving Schumpeter’s economics into the life story and at making the ideas supply their share of the drama. The result deepens our understanding of a fascinating and complex man and of the difficult times in which he lived, even if it does not necessarily sharpen our understanding of his economics or add much that is new to his biography.
See also our previous comments on McCraw and Schumpeter more generally.
More on the Noble Prize (or the Economics Prize in Memory of Nobel)
| David Hoopes |
Since the O&Mers have been so quiet about the N prize I guess I’ll ramble a bit. In a comment on one of Peter’s posts I mentioned Demsetz and Alchian. For some reason I had it in my head that A.A. had already won. That’s what I get for staying at UCLA for so long (Alchian had just quit teaching when I got there).
I don’t know why I thought Alchian had won it. “Production, Information costs and Economic Organization” (with Harold Demsetz), American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777-95 is a pretty amazing paper. And “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process” (with Robert Crawford and Bejamin Klein), Journal of Law and Economics (1978) has been very influential. Though I think people think of Ben Klein for that paper. As noted above, Alchian is very well known for (and thought of because of ) “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory,” Journal of Political Economy 58 (1950): 211-21.
Having said all that, I think srp is correct in that Alchian’s best chance is going in with Nelson and Winter for evolutionary economics or Demsetz and Williamson or Oliver Hart for theory of the firm. It’s hard to imagine that evolutionary economics is that appreciated. I think Sid Winter is grossly underrated. His body of work in economics and strategy is pretty amazing.
As readers of my posts might guess, I am a pretty big fan of Demsetz. I don’t know that Harold is as productive or quantitative as most award givers might like. Stilger and Coase were pretty big fans. But, Hart and Williamson seem more likely award winners.
Over at orgtheory.net they’ve been discussing sociologists and management people who (in some alternate universe) might win. There are not too many Herb Simons out there.
Hagel on Institutional Innovation
| Peter Klein |
Here is John Hagel with a nice post on institutional innovation. Product, process, and management innovation are important, he notes, but institutional innovation — that which “redefines roles and relationships across independent entities to accelerate and amplify learning and reduce risks” — is the key to long-term value creation. Hagel names diversity, relationships, modularity, federated decision-making, reputation mechanisms, feedback loops, and incentive structures as the design principles underlying institutional innovation.
Hagel is clearly right to emphasize institutional innovation as a key driver of long-term firm, industry, and overall economic performance. He names the creation of the joint-stock company as a primary example. We could perhaps add the M-form structure, the franchise arrangement, relational contracting, the loosely organized network, and the venture-funded startup to this list.
And yet, there is a lot we don’t know about institutional innovation. (more…)
What Is a Capability and What Does It Matter?
| David Hoopes |
I am often surprised when I present or submit papers because audience members and reviewers find my construct definitions problematic. Often, people find my definitions are too narrow. Also, sometimes others don’t find the scholars whose work I would like to develop merit the attention I give them. This attention sometimes comes in the form of using their definition. Case in point: Sid Winter and capabilities. In a couple of papers I’m working on my co-authors and I have based our definition of capabilities on one Sid Winter has used in an SMJ paper and a book he edited. Tammy Madsen and I have stuck with Sid’s definition. Steve Postrel and I have taken Sid’s definition and made it more specific to our work. Some readers and listeners have had a hard time with this (and given me a hard time). Now, there’s one “school,” that generally does not like definitions or theoretical constructs to be very narrow. Thus, “can’t X, Y, or Z also be a capability?” “Well, it could be. Just not in this paper.” “Aren’t capabilities just resources?” “Sure. So and So big shot thinks so. We just think of resource and capabilities as being two different things.” Another “school” doesn’t understand why we should care about Sid’s opinion. “Shouldn’t you use Other Big Shot’s definition?” “Well, I don’t really understand her definition. Sid has been doing this capability thing for a while.” “Isn’t it the same as Selznick?” “I don’t think so. Sid doesn’t think so” (see Intro to edited volume with Dosi).
I don’t mind that people prefer other definitions. Yet, I am surprised by how agitated people get. I get agitated by definitions when 1) There aren’t any; 2) I don’t understand what the author/presenter is saying; 3) The definition includes everything and the kitchen sink (presumably because that’s the way life is, “complex”).
So, I stumble along with my narrow definitions and hope not to get yelled at too much.
Economic Darwinism During Recessions
| Peter Klein |
Some version of the survivor principle, or “economic Darwinism,” underlies much economics and strategy research. While the term “survivor principle” was coined by Stigler (1968), the idea is usually attributed to Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953). Alchian argued that even though theories about rational decision makers making “optimal” choices are clearly unrealistic, the predictions of such theories need not be. The quest for profit, combined with competitive selection forces, ensures that the average firm will tend to behave like those described by theories of rational behavior (Alchian, 1950). Friedman (1953: 22), defending the profit-maximization hypothesis, puts it this way:
[U]nless the behavior of businessmen in some way or other approximated behavior consistent with the maximization of returns, it seems unlikely that they would remain in business for long. Let the apparent immediate determinant of business behavior be anything at all — habitual reaction, random choice, or whatnot. Whenever this determinant happens to lead to behavior consistent with rational and informed maximization of returns, the business will prosper and acquire resources with which to expand; whenever it does not, the business will tend to lose resources and can be kept in existence only by the addition of resources from outside. The process of “natural selection” thus helps to validate the [maximization] hypothesis or, rather, given natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis can be based largely on the judgment that it summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival.
The problem with Friedman’s strong version of the survivor principle is that we know little about how such competitive selection processes actually work. (more…)
Brilliant But Neglected II
| Peter Klein |
Some suggestions for Nicolai’s list:
John G .Matsusaka, “Corporate Diversification, Value Maximization, and Organizational Capabilities,” Journal of Business 74 (July 2001): 409-31. Offers a novel and provocative “match-seeking” theory of diversification in which firms do not know their own capabilities but must discover them by experimenting with various combinations of business units. A diversified firm may be valued at a discount relative to more specialized firms because its current lines of business include some not consistent with its capabilities, but such conglomeration is necessary, and value-creating in the long run, if the firm is to discover where it should eventually refocus. 85 hits on Google Scholar. Possibly neglected because it appeared in the Journal of Business near the end of its run.
Robert C. Ellickson, “A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 83-97. A nice example of the emergence of private law, focusing on the rules governing property rights in whales prior to the twentieth century. Without a central authority the whaling community — a small, close-knit group with shared characteristics and frequent interaction — developed a complex set of norms enforced by community sanction and the threat of ostracism. Just 25 Google Scholar hits. (more…)
Is Social Capital Path Dependent?
| Peter Klein |
Recent work by Robert Putnam, Douglass North, Ed Glaeser, and others has highlighted the role of social capital — membership in organizations, participation in civic activities, social trust — plays in economic development. Empirically, social capital has typically been measured with survey data, making historical comparisons difficult. It is important to know, however, how social capital changes over time. If social capital is largely path dependent, then there is little that can be done to improve the stock or productivity of social capital at a particular time.
A new paper by Marta Felis Rota, “Is Social Capital Persistent? Comparative Measurement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” exploits Adelman and Morris’s (1965) database of socio-economic indicators for 23 countries from 1850 to 1914 to construct social capital indicators for the late nineteenth century, which can be compared to similar indicators for the twentieth century. Evidence for path dependence is weak; all countries enjoy long-run increases in social capital but rates of change vary widely. Check it out.
Two Essays on Douglass North
| Peter Klein |
By Arnold Kling, here and here.
I usually recommend to my students North’s 1991 Journal of Economic Perspectives paper, “Institutions,” for an overview of his general approach to institutions and economic change.
Methodological Individualism at the DRUID Conference
| Nicolai Foss |
Today is the second day of the annual conference of the Danish Research Unit for Industrial Economics. In order to stimulate controversy, and entertain conference delegates between less interesting paper sessions, DRUID organizes debates on motions.
I participated along with Sid Winter of the Wharton School, Peter Abell of the London School of Economics, and Thorbjørn Knudsen of Southern Denmark University in today’s “DRUID Debate on Methodological Individualism versus Scientific Progress” (sic!!!!!) which involved the following motion:
Let it be resolved that this conference believes that the lack of methodological individualism applied in strategy research seriously limits scientific progress in the field.
Speaking for the motion were Peter and I, speaking against were Sid and Thorbjorn. A vote was taken before the debate. There were about as many pro as contra votes. After the debate, which had its rather heated moments, another vote was taken. And again there about as many pro as contra votes. Apparently, the debate had — perhaps not surprisingly — not managed to change any beliefs. The debate was streamed, and should be available on the DRUID site within a couple of weeks.
Can Markets Be Designed?
| Peter Klein |
A fundamental distinction between organizations and markets is teleological: organizations are established by specific individuals to achieve specific purposes, while markets emerge, organically, from the bottom up. Carl Menger used the terms “organizations” and “orders” to distinguish these two categories of institutions; Hayek preferred the obscure Greek terms taxis and cosmos. Invoking this distinction does not deny, of course, that there are “organic” elements within firms, or that markets are infused with institutions that are at least partly “designed” (civil law codes, for instance).
What, then, is meant by “market design,” as in designing markets for cadaveric organs, education vouchers, or tradeable emissions permits? Do attempts to do so constitute what Hayek called “constructivist rationalism” or “constructivism,” the belief that we can remake social institutions that have emerged incrementally, over long periods of time, to suit our current whims?
Lynne Kiesling and Mike Giberson have been wrestling with this question over at Knowledge Problem (here and here). How, asks a reader, “does one invoke Hayek in one breath and then speak of ‘designing’ a market in the next while keeping a straight face?” Lynne and Mike offer several responses: (more…)
The Growth of Cities: A Formal Model
| Peter Klein |
Luís Bettencourt, José Lobo, Dirk Helbing, Christian Kühnert, and Geoffrey West’s paper “Growth, Innovation, Scaling, and the Pace of Life in Cities” (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 17, April 24, 2007) is getting a lot of attention, garnering plugs in Scientific American and Nature. They use data on innovation, employment, wages, GDP, consumption, crime, disease, housing, and infrastructure from US, European, and Chinese cities to estimate a “power law scaling function” linking demographic, socioeconomic, and behavioral indicators to city size. Such indicators, 
Findings:
Many diverse properties of cities from patent production and personal income to electrical cable length are shown to be power law functions of population size with scaling exponents,
that fall into distinct universality classes. Quantities reflecting wealth creation and innovation have
(increasing returns), whereas those accounting for infrastructure display
(economies of scale). We predict that the pace of social life in the city increases with population size, in quantitative agreement with data, and we discuss how cities are similar to, and differ from, biological organisms, for which
Finally, we explore possible consequences of these scaling relations by deriving growth equations, which quantify the dramatic difference between growth fueled by innovation versus that driven by economies of scale. This difference suggests that, as population grows, major innovation cycles must be generated at a continually accelerating rate to sustain growth and avoid stagnation or collapse.
For more on cities see these posts on Jane Jacobs and this one on clusters. Here is Ed Glaeser’s influential 1992 paper (with Hedi Kallal, Jose Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer) on growth in cities. Other important Glaeser papers on cities include this one with Jesse Shapiro, this one with Albert Saiz, and this one with Christopher Berry. Here is Glaeser’s review of Richard Florida’s Creative Class and here is Florida’s blog. And here is an interesting special issue of the Review of Austrian Economics on the new urbanism.
Update: Here is Florida’s take on the paper.
Organizations and Markets 
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