Posts filed under ‘Innovation’
A Note on Systems Integration
| Dick Langlois |
First let me apologize for being out of circulation for so long. I’ve been inundated with teaching and committee work this semester, but I hope to get back in the swing of things as the year winds down.
The New York Times had an interesting article the other day on a company called Super Micro Computer, a public family-run company in San Jose that puts together leading-edge servers and other hardware for clients that include eBay and Yahoo. The company sells high performance and speed, both the speed of the computer and the speed of the company in designing and delivering its products.
Whereas rivals long ago sent key design work to Asia to take advantage of cheaper, plentiful labor, Super Micro still relies on hundreds of expensive engineers working at its San Jose headquarters. These workers are charged with grabbing the latest and greatest components from suppliers and coming up with new designs months ahead of lumbering heavyweights like Hewlett-Packard and Dell.
Clayton Christensen and his coauthors have argued that a premium on high performance calls for vertical integration and systemic integration in order to fine tune and customize systems, whereas a premium on cost reduction leads to modularity, standardization, and vertical disintegration. The Super Micro case seems to question this conclusion. On the one hand, the company emphasizes design and produces customized units. On the other hand, however, the company is really just a systems integrator — not a vertically integrated company — whose advantage lies in discovering and making use of the innovation of others. In Carliss Baldwin’s phrase, the company “leverages modularity” along the performance margin in much the same way that Dell does (or at least once did) along the cost margin. My conjecture is that, the more inherently modular (whatever that means) the product is, the more systemic integration can be squeezed into a single independent stage of production (systems integration) and the less necessary is genuine vertical integration — even when performance is what matters.
Creative Capitalism
| Peter Klein |
The book is coming out in a few weeks, and the blog is back in business. I didn’t follow all the previous discussion but what I read was of high quality and reflected diverse, and interesting, perspectives.
Bill Shughart’s Review of Prophet of Innovation
| Peter Klein |
It’s in the December 2008 issue of Managerial and Decision Economics. Excerpt:
Many readers, as I did, will close Prophet of Innovation with a feeling of dissatisfaction. On the plus side, McCraw’s life of Joseph Alois Schumpeter is not as dauntingly long as it seems: Nearly 30% of the volume is devoted to notes and other end matter, and so the text runs to a more digestible 506 pages. Generous line spacing and a respectable number of archival photographs speed the pace of reading.
On the minus side, Prophet of Innovation pales in comparison with the recent and far more penetrating biographies of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. by Ron Chernow, of J. P. Morgan by Jean Strouse, and of Andrew Mellon by David Cannadine. In the end, one doesn’t know Joseph Schumpeter quite as fully as one now knows those titans of industry. And we certainly don’t know him as well as we know Robert Skidelsky’s John Maynard Keynes, who was born the same year (1863). Something is missing from Prophet of Innovation, perhaps because McCraw chose not to be “concerned with Schumpeter’s economic thinking, narrowly construed” (p. xi). That choice, in my judgment, fatally compromises any attempt to tell the story of a man who lived and breathed economics over a distinguished, remarkably productive academic career that spanned four decades, taking him from the classrooms of the University of Vienna, where he (and Ludwig von Mises) studied under Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, to Harvard Square.
Historical Origins of “Open Science”
| Peter Klein |
An interesting piece on science and patronage by Paul David, with a comment by Ken Arrow:
The Historical Origins of “Open Science”: An Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scientific Revolution
Paul A. David, Stanford University & The University of Oxford
This essay examines the economics of patronage in the production of knowledge and its influence upon the historical formation of key elements in the ethos and organizational structure of publicly funded “open science.” The emergence during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries of the idea and practice of “open science” was a distinctive and vital organizational aspect of the Scientific Revolution. It represented a break from the previously dominant ethos of secrecy in the pursuit of Nature’s Secrets, to a new set of norms, incentives, and organizational structures that reinforced scientific researchers’ commitments to rapid disclosure of new knowledge. The rise of “cooperative rivalries” in the revelation of new knowledge, is seen as a functional response to heightened asymmetric information problems posed for the Renaissance system of court-patronage of the arts and sciences; pre-existing informational asymmetries had been exacerbated by the claims of mathematicians and the increasing practical reliance upon new mathematical techniques in a variety of “contexts of application.” Reputational competition among Europe’s noble patrons motivated much of their efforts to attract to their courts the most prestigious natural philosophers, was no less crucial in the workings of that system than was the concern among their would-be clients to raise their peer-based reputational status. In late Renaissance Europe, the feudal legacy of fragmented political authority had resulted in relations between noble patrons and their savant-clients that resembled the situation modern economists describe as “common agency contracting in substitutes” — competition among incompletely informed principals for the dedicated services of multiple agents. These conditions tended to result in contract terms (especially with regard to autonomy and financial support) that left agent client members of the nascent scientific communities better positioned to retain larger information rents on their specialized knowledge. This encouraged entry into their emerging disciplines, and enabled them collectively to develop a stronger degree of professional autonomy for their programs of inquiry within the increasingly specialized and formal scientific academies (such the Académie royale des Sciences and the Royal Society) that had attracted the patronage of rival absolutist States of Western Europe during the latter part of the seventeenth century. The institutionalization of “open science” that took place within those settings is shown to have continuities with the use by scientists of the earlier humanist academies, and with the logic of regal patronage, rather than being driven by the material requirements of new observational and experimental techniques.
See also this and this on science funding. And of course Hayek’s Counter-Revolution of Science (free full text!) should be consulted.
Beware of Geeks Bearing Formulas
| Peter Klein |
The entrepreneur, writes Mises in one of my favorite passages, “is a speculator, a man eager to utilize his opinion about the future structure of the market for business operations promising profits.” The entrepreneur relies on his “specific anticipative understanding of the conditions of the uncertain future,” an understanding that “defies any rules and systematization.”
This passage was in my mind today as I read the WSJ front-pager about the computer models used by AIG to analyze asset risk. Poor Gary Gorton, who designed many of AIG’s models, is put on public display. AIG’s catastrophic failure is likely to fuel skepticism about the use of such models for risk analysis, though Gorton maintains the problem was the application of the models, not their basic design. (His Yale colleague Ian Ayres will likely agree.) Longtime skeptic Warren Buffet has the best line: “Beware of geeks . . . bearing formulas.”
Today’s paper also includes an item on Harry Markowitz, including this:
As with all new information tools at our disposal, applying portfolio theory to investing entails its share of trial and error. Mr. Markowitz admits some people might object to asking him how to repair the credit crisis. “You, Harry Markowitz, brought math into the investment process,” he imagines some people thinking. “It is fancy math that brought on this crisis. What makes you think now that you can solve it?”
He draws a line between his portfolio theory and its later misapplication. “Not all financial engineering is always bad,” he says, “but the layers of financially engineered products of recent years, combined with high levels of leverage, have proved to be too much of a good thing.”
Update (Nov. 5): See this related piece from the Times.
Who Invented the Internet?
| Peter Klein |
OK, we now know it wasn’t Al Gore. (And John McCain didn’t didn’t invent the BlackBerry either.) But who did invent the internet? Physicists have long maintained that they did. Michael Nielsen (via Josh Gans) disagrees:
It’s true that the principal inventor of the web, Tim Berners-Lee, was a programmer working at CERN, the huge European particle accelerator. In 1988 he sketched out a way of hooking up hypertext ideas, developed by people like Ted Nelson and Bill Atkinson, to the internet, developed by people like Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn. He talked the idea up at CERN for a year, with no response. In 1989 he wrote up and circulated a formal proposal around CERN. Again, no response for a year. Finally, he coded up a prototype in his spare time. In this, he actually was helped by his manager, who said it was okay if he used one of CERN’s workstations to build the prototype. It was launched to the world about one year later.
Berners-Lee didn’t succeed because CERN was doing fundamental research. He succeeded in spite of it.
Nielsen goes on to make a more general claim about large organizations tending to stifle innovation, but that is a more complicated and difficult issue. Yesterday in my entrepreneurship class we discussed Zoltan Acs and David Audretsch’s 1990 book Innovation and Small Firms, which paints a more nuanced picture (e.g., the relationship between firm size, scope, complexity, etc. and innovation varies widely by industry, market structure, time, manufacturing technology, and the like).
Here is my take on the history of the internet, and here is an academic paper on internal capital markets and innovation.
Searle Center Symposium on Property Rights and Innovation
| Peter Klein |
It’s next month in Chicago. The high-powered lineup includes Joel Mokyr, Avner Greif, Robert Merges, Lynne Kiesling, Stan Liebowitz, Scott Stern, my old classmates Emerson Tiller and Rich Brooks, and many more. Harold Demsetz gives the keynote. Wish I were going.
Government Funding and the Economic Organization of Scienctific Research
| Peter Klein |
A prominent climate scientist, Richard Lindzen of MIT, argues that the politicization of climate science over the last decade is but a symptom of a larger, more general problem caused by government science funding: namely an emphasis on demonstrable results that satisfy the public and have “practical” implications, rather than the pursuit of scientific truth (via Sean Corrigan).
For a variety of inter-related cultural, organizational, and political reasons, progress in climate science and the actual solution of scientific problems in this field have moved at a much slower rate than would normally be possible. Not all these factors are unique to climate science, but the heavy influence of politics has served to amplify the role of the other factors. By cultural factors, I primarily refer to the change in the scientific paradigm from a dialectic opposition between theory and observation to an emphasis on simulation and observational programs. The latter serves to almost eliminate the dialectical focus of the former. Whereas the former had the potential for convergence, the latter is much less effective. The institutional factor has many components. One is the inordinate growth of administration in universities and the consequent increase in importance of grant overhead. This leads to an emphasis on large programs that never end. Another is the hierarchical nature of formal scientific organizations whereby a small executive council can speak on behalf of thousands of scientists as well as govern the distribution of ‘carrots and sticks’ whereby reputations are made and broken. The above factors are all amplified by the need for government funding. When an issue becomes a vital part of a political agenda, as is the case with climate, then the politically desired position becomes a goal rather than a consequence of scientific research. This paper will deal with the origin of the cultural changes and with specific examples of the operation and interaction of these factors. In particular, we will show how political bodies act to control scientific institutions, how scientists adjust both data and even theory to accommodate politically correct positions, and how opposition to these positions is disposed of.
The paper is well worth reading by social scientists and organization theorists. Business-school faculty will recognize the parallels with the call for “relevance” in management education (see the links in Teppo’s recent post). And there are important connections to the arts and humanities; recent scholarship, for example, challenges the notion that public funding produces better art (painting, music, literature, drama) than patronage or commercial funding (Cantor, Cowen, Scherer). Some readers may respond, with Pilate, “What is truth?” Somebody has to pay the bills, in other words, and that party will want something in return. (more…)
29 September 2008 at 10:17 am Peter G. Klein Leave a comment
Notes from the Economic History Association Meeting
| Dick Langlois |
I am only now (slowly and partially) emerging from a crush of administrative and teaching responsibilities at the beginning of the semester. But I did manage to drive down to New Haven last weekend for some of the Economic History Association meeting. It was an eventful meeting in many respects, including a fire at the hotel Thursday night that sent conference-goers into the street in their pajamas as well as an apparent outbreak of food poisoning from the Saturday night banquet. Happily, I was spared both of those experiences.
For at least two of the three sessions I managed to attend, there emerged a theme: that a lot of interesting work in economic history today is rediscovering and reinventing ideas that Nate Rosenberg, Paul David, and others were discussing in the 1970s and earlier: learning by doing and factor prices, technological and economic complementarities, and general-purpose technologies. (I have been known to talk about the Stanford School in this respect.)
In his keynote address on Saturday — evidently similar to his Clarendon Lectures last year and probably dating back at least to this paper — Daron Acemoglu talked about the issue of skill bias in technological change. In the 1970s, labor economists were arguing that Americans were investing too much in education, since rising wage rates should lead to labor-saving technical change, which would reduce the supply of skilled jobs. Of course, just the opposite happened: skilled jobs grew even faster than skilled workers, creating a skill premium in the U.S. Acemoglu presented a clever general-equilibrium model in which the bias of technological change is endogenous. Under certain assumptions, supply of a factor of production (like skilled labor) can create its own demand. The intuition is that a larger supply of a factor (like skilled labor) can increase the market for complementary innovations to an extent that offsets other effects. (For my own Rosenbergian take on why technical change should be biased toward higher skill levels, see here.) Interestingly, Joel Mokyr discussed Acemoglu’s presentation using a 1975 Paul David paper as a framework. (more…)
Innovation Story of the Day
| Peter Klein |
OMG. Somebody has created this.
It reminds me of the 2-bladed, then 3-bladed, and now 5-bladed razor, the latter of which was famously spoofed by the Onion (caution: bad language), only to have Gillette actually bring it out the next year. (Both Saturday Night Live, in 1975, and Mad Magazine, in 1979, had the idea first.)
How Well Does the Market Handle Network Effects?
| Peter Klein |
Quite well, according to Dan Spulber’s paper “Consumer Coordination in the Small and in the Large: Implications for Antitrust in Markets with Network Effects,” out recently in the Journal of Competition Law and Economics (June 2008). Dan distinguishes between network effects in small- and large-numbers bargaining situations; Coasean bargaining can solve the problem in the former while Hayekian “spontaneous order” can emerge in the latter. The paper also contains a useful, up-to-date summary of the network effects literature. Highly recommended!
Rival Teams and Non-Rival Knowledge
| Dick Langlois |
A recent issue of the Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, an all-electronic Bepress journal, carried a piece provocatively titled “Quantifying NFL Coaching: A Proof of New Growth Theory” by Kevin P. Braig. The paper is a rambling mix of sports anecdotes and goofy math. My favorite of the latter is:
| lim f(x) = 1 first down
x→10 |
But the piece is amusing reading and does make some interesting points.
The title is more than a bit fatuous, of course. What the author has in mind is that one can increase output not only by increasing the inputs but by learning to reorganize the way those inputs are combined. This was the growth theory of Smith and Marshall, of Rosenberg and Mokyr. The only contribution of the New Growth Theory has been to cram a diminished and mechanized version of these ideas into the formalism of the production function — and, of course, to receive credit in the popular mind for the very notion that growth is about the search for new “recipes.” Braig is on firmer ground when he associates himself with Carliss Baldwin‘s notion of designs.
What has this got to do with sports? Consider baseball, which is probably the most modular of major (American) sports. In baseball, the only real way to be more successful is to improve the quality of the players, what Braig likes to call their human capital. This is because the way players interact is relatively hard-wired and invariant among teams. Small adjustments are possible — shifts, bunting strategy — but no one ever redefines how to turn a double play. The so-called moneyball approach has been to find better statistical measures of the effectiveness of player human capital — not to reorganize how the players interact. (In testimony to the almost mystical numerology of this article, Braig finds wonder in the fact that average on-base percentage has remained nearly constant over the live-ball era at about 0.331, exactly the ratio one gets by recognizing that “the hitters’ needs (4 bases) exceed their resources (2 outs) by a 2-to-1 margin.” But this presumes that human capital in batting should somehow exactly keep pace with human capital in pitching — even though there is arguably more room for innovation in pitching. I think a closer examination would find that baseball rulemakers have tweaked subtle rules like the size of the strike zone or the height of the mound to keep the ratio constant.) (more…)
Niche Business School Programs
| Peter Klein |
I’m surprised that the niche strategy isn’t used more in academia. Most economics departments at research universities strive to be the “MIT of [fill-in-the-blank].” Business schools tend to value the same set of academic journals, teach from the same set of cases, and hire faculty from the same set of top schools. Not only is this strategy unlikely to work for the typical mid-tier university, it has the undesirable social consequence of creating a bland conformism in which every department in Field X looks pretty much like every other department in Field X. The virtues of experimentation and learning are lost. Herd behavior is the order of the day.
Business Week recently ran an interesting piece about several undergraduate business programs that are trying the niche strategy. The University of Louisville runs a successful equine management program. Belmont University in Nashville offers a specialized music business degree. The University of Houston trains students for the energy industry. And Florida State University has a Professional Golf Management program.
What are your experiences with niche programs, where the niche is defined by applied focus (as in the above examples), by research method or approach, by a particular theoretical focus, or otherwise?
Mike Jensen Explains SSRN
| Peter Klein |
Mike Jensen, the distinguished financial economist and co-founder of SSRN, is interviewed here by Growthology’s Tim Kane. Everyone knows that electronic distribution of working papers has been extremely important for academic research in business and the social sciences. By the time most papers are published, they’ve already been read by many, if not most, of the target readers, from working-paper circulation, conference presentations, informal discussions, and the like. Jensen points out that electronic distribution has also had an important democratization effect. The elites always had access to cutting-edge research in advance of publication through informal networks, NBER workshops, and the like. “In my own field, I was part of a very small group doing cutting-edge work in the early days of modern finance, and I noticed that elites in all fields were 2-3 years ahead of other scholars just because they knew about research that took so much time to get distributed widely. The Internet allowed everyone to see the frontier.”
Note also Jensen’s comments about behavioral finance:
In the 1970s, I began to receive [as editor of the Journal of Financial Economics] quite a few papers challenging the efficient market hypothesis. The referees rejected them and I rejected them. Any one of these articles standing alone could be rejected, but I began to feel that as a package they cannot be ignored. The authors were onto something, even if we didn’t see it. Sometime around 1975, over the objection of my referees — many of them close friends — we published a special issue with a collection of those papers. That was controversial but proved to have great value. Subsequent to that, behavioral financial economics evolved.
In creating SSRN, I envisioned an alternative distribution vehicle.
Jensen has also been an important friend of and advisor to CORI, delivering the annual CORI Distinguished Lecture in 2005.
Against Government-Subsidized VC
| Peter Klein |
Government-subsidized venture capital underperforms private venture capital, according to a new analysis of Canadian data. Firms backed by subsidized VC are less profitable, less innovative, and less attractive to later-stage investors than firms backed by private VC. Poor governance and a negative signalling effect, and not adverse selection, appear to be the drivers. This is from a new NBER paper by James Brander, Edward Egan, and Thomas Hellman, “Government Sponsored Versus Private Venture Capital: Canadian Evidence.” Abstract:
This paper investigates the relative performance of enterprises backed by government-sponsored venture capitalists and private venture capitalists. While previous studies focus mainly on investor returns, this paper focuses on a broader set of public policy objectives, including value-creation, innovation, and competition. A number of novel data-collection methods, including web-crawlers, are used to assemble a near-comprehensive data set of Canadian venture-capital backed enterprises. The results indicate that enterprises financed by government-sponsored venture capitalists underperform on a variety of criteria, including value-creation, as measured by the likelihood and size of IPOs and M&As, and innovation, as measured by patents. It is important to understand whether such underperformance arises from a selection effect in which private venture capitalists have a higher quality threshold for investment than subsidized venture capitalists, or whether it arises from a treatment effect in which subsidized venture capitalists crowd out private investment and, in addition, provide less effective mentoring and other value-added skills. We find suggestive evidence that crowding out and less effective treatment are problems associated with government-backed venture capital. While the data does not allow for a definitive welfare analysis, the results cast some doubt on the desirability of certain government interventions in the venture capital market.
Me on Benkler
| Peter Klein |
Here is my review of Yochai Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (Yale University Press, 2006). It will appear in the Fall 2008 issue of The Independent Review. Benkler has written a fine book, though I have some reservations, as explained in the review.
Apple, Microsoft, and Product Design
| Peter Klein |
I’m not an Apple guy. I have no doubt the Mac is a fine product but, come on, I’m not some froofy artist type! (Teppo, take note.) And I know how to use a right mouse button. I do like the iPhone, and would definitely consider buying one if it weren’t tethered to AT&T. At present, however, the only Jobs et al. product I’ve owned is an Apple II back in high school. (With 48K and dual floppies, it sizzled!)
This week I’m teaching the Apple 2006 HBS case in my undergraduate strategy course. As the case materials emphasize, Apple’s product design and packaging capabilities are an important source of its competitive advantage. The Zen thing is certainly a refreshing change from the industry norm. In preparing the case I was reminded of a funny item that circulated a couple of years ago, What if Microsoft Designed the iPod Package? You don’t have to be one of the bad Kleins to enjoy it.
Private Equity and Innovation
| Peter Klein |
LBOs do not reduce patent activity, and the quality of patents may actually increase following a “going-private” transaction, according to a new paper by Morten Sorensen, Per Strömberg, and Josh Lerner.
A long-standing controversy is whether LBOs relieve managers from short-term pressures of dispersed shareholders, or whether LBO funds themselves are driven by short-term profit motives and sacrifice long-term growth to boost short-term performance. We investigate 495 transactions with a focus on one form of long-term activities, namely investments in innovation as measured by patenting activity. We find no evidence that LBOs decrease these activities. Relying on standard measures of patent quality, we find that patents applied for by firms in private equity transactions are more cited (a proxy for economic importance), show no significant shifts in the fundamental nature of the research, and are more concentrated in the most important and prominent areas of companies’ innovative portfolios.
I very much like this kind of work even though I’m a patent skeptic (1, 2, 3, 4).
Organizations and Markets 
Recent Comments