Posts filed under ‘– Klein –’
Defending the Undefendable
| Peter Klein |
One of the greatest influences on my intellectual development (such as it is) was Walter Block’s Defending the Undefendable: The Pimp, Prostitute, Scab, Slumlord, Libeler, Moneylender and Other Scapegoats in the Rogue’s Gallery of American Society. Yes, you read that right. It’s a brilliant polemic on the benefits of peaceful, voluntary exchange, using the most outrageous and provocative examples to illustrate the gains from trade. And oh, the cartoons! My favorite, appearing in the chapter on saving, shows a half-crazed, miserly sort running his fingers through a large pile of gold coins, shouting to his wife, “Lip up, will ya’, Edith? You knew I wasn’t a Keynesian when you married me!”
First published in 1976, the book has just been reissued by the Mises Institute. Get one today and give yourself the same experience as Hayek:
Looking through Defending the Undefendable made me feel that I was once more exposed to the shock therapy by which, more than fifty years ago, the late Ludwig von Mises converted me to a consistent free market position. . . . Some may find it too strong a medicine, but it will still do them good even if they hate it. A real understanding of economics demands that one disabuses oneself of many dear prejudices and illusions. Popular fallacies in economic frequently express themselves in unfounded prejudices against other occupations, and showing the falsity of these stereotypes you are doing a real services, although you will not make yourself more popular with the majority.
See also Block’s 1994 article, “Libertarianism and Libertinism,” which clarifies some misconceptions about the argument. It appeared in the Journal of Libertarian Studies back when yours truly was assistant editor.
The Sixth Force
| Peter Klein |
Luke has a nice post today about competition and cooperation among providers of complementary products — the “sixth force” that Michael Porter left out of his famous framework. Luke points us to “How Companies Become Platform Leaders”by Annabelle Gawer and Michael Cusumano in the Winter 2008 Sloan Management Review. As Luke notes (continuing this week’s Apple meme):
One of the biggest mistakes a company can make is to pursue a product strategy and fail to recognize the platform value of their product. The best example of this is perhaps Macintosh computer which, due to its early technological lead, could have become the dominant platform for personal computing. Instead they priced high, failed to encourage complementary innovation, and let Microsoft become the dominant platform.
Porter does discuss complements in his newer work (e.g., here) but does not elevate them to the status of the original Fab Five.
New Essays on Insider Trading
| Peter Klein |
Steve Bainbridge reviews the history of insider-trading litigation and characterizes Henry Manne’s classic contribution.
Here are Manne’s own reflections (in 2005) on the influence of his work from the 1960s. The new paper, “Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark,” suggests that the activities of insider traders, in so far as they help move stock prices toward their “true” (full-information) values, provides valuable information to corporate decision-makers facing the Hayekian knowledge problem.
Apple, Microsoft, and Product Design
| Peter Klein |
I’m not an Apple guy. I have no doubt the Mac is a fine product but, come on, I’m not some froofy artist type! (Teppo, take note.) And I know how to use a right mouse button. I do like the iPhone, and would definitely consider buying one if it weren’t tethered to AT&T. At present, however, the only Jobs et al. product I’ve owned is an Apple II back in high school. (With 48K and dual floppies, it sizzled!)
This week I’m teaching the Apple 2006 HBS case in my undergraduate strategy course. As the case materials emphasize, Apple’s product design and packaging capabilities are an important source of its competitive advantage. The Zen thing is certainly a refreshing change from the industry norm. In preparing the case I was reminded of a funny item that circulated a couple of years ago, What if Microsoft Designed the iPod Package? You don’t have to be one of the bad Kleins to enjoy it.
Hubbard on Firm Boundaries
| Peter Klein |
Thomas Hubbard has a nice review article in the May 2008 issue of the Canadian Journal of Economics, “Empirical Research on Firms’ Boundaries.” (Thanks to Fabio Chaddad for the pointer.) It’s a well-worn subject but there is certainly room for new interpretations. And Hubbard himself has been an important contributor to this literature (e.g., here and here). Here’s the abstract:
La recherche empirique sur les déterminants des frontières de l’entreprise a fleuri au cours des derniers 25 ans. Cet article discute des progrès accomplis en mettant l’accent sur les avancées intellectuelles faites par les chercheurs dans la littérature spécialisée durant cette période. On souligne le rôle important des chercheurs empiriques dans l’opérationnalisation des concepts théoriques, et on explique comment les succès dans ce registre ont contribué à faire que ces concepts ont eu un impact sur les décisions de faire-ou-faire-faire dans la vie réelle. On discute aussi des déficiences de cette littérature — en particulier la pauvreté des travaux de recherche sur l’impact de la variation dans les frontières des entreprises sur les rendements économiques — et on suggère comment de telles déficiences pourraient être corrigées.
Ha ha, April Fool’s! OK, here it is in English: (more…)
Newspapers as Coasian Firms
| Peter Klein |
The hunter-gatherer model of journalism is no longer sufficient. Citizens can do their own hunting and gathering on the Internet. What they need is somebody to add value to that information by processing it — digesting it, organizing it, making it usable.
This is why we still need newspapers — or something like them. Ronald Coase, the British economist, once asked why we need business firms. Why can’t all their activities be coordinated by individuals contracting with one another instead of working in a bureaucratic, command-and-control environment? The answer, he said, is transaction costs. If a manager had to negotiate with a free-lancer for every task, the cost in time would be unbearably high.
Searching for information on the Internet involves something like transaction costs because we have so many varied sources to evaluate. We need somebody we trust to organize them for us. That can be the task of the new journalism.
That’s from the retirement speech of UNC journalism professor
Mizzou J-School Centenary
| Peter Klein |
My colleague Steve Weinberg‘s new book on John D. Rockefeller and Ida Tarbell, Taking on the Trust, is reviewed in today’s Wall Street Journal. You can read an exerpt here (may be gated for non-subscribers). Steve has another new book, A Journalism of Humanity: A Candid History of the World’s First Journalism School, about the University of Missouri’s J-School, which is celebrating its centenary this year. As explained in the book the journalism school, like the first programs in business administration at Wharton, Tuck, HBS, and elsewhere, struggled to gain acceptance as a legitimate academic program and to escape the “trade-school” stigma.
While vocational programs in law and medicine have long been accepted as legitimate parts of the Academy, and engineering, agriculture, and architecture have been welcomed since at least the late 19th century (in the US, after the Morrill Act), business and journalism have faced particular difficulties becoming integrated into the academic mainstream. Actually, journalism today is even more of an outsider than business administration; for example, while many B-school faculty hold PhDs in economics, sociology, psychology, or other “traditional” disciplines, many J-school professors do not hold PhDs at all, with most being former industry professionals, more like B-school clinical professors. Those of you interested in the history and current problems of business schools might learn something from the experiences of journalism and other professional schools.
The Make-or-Buy Decision: Corporate Lawyer Edition
| Peter Klein |
What are our Lawyers made of?
What are our Lawyers made of?
Of Causes and fees, demurrers and pleas,
Learned Brother and lots of pother,
Counsel and jury with very wise looks,
Flaw in the indictment and statue books,
Such are our Lawyers made of,
Such are our Lawyers made of.
That’s one answer. It ain’t sugar and spice and everything nice, that’s for sure. Whatever lawyers are made of, should firms make them in-house, or hire ones made by somebody else? Steven Schwarcz addresses this question in a new paper, “To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation” (Journal of Corporation Law, Winter 2008). Schwarcz notes that large firms have been shifting much of their transactional work from outside law firms to in-house lawyers. Analysis of survey data suggests that information costs and scale and scope economies are the most important drivers of this trend. Asset specificity seems to play a less important role, mainly because reputation effects are sufficient to mitigate opportunistic behavior by outside law firms. A very interesting paper on the make-or-buy decision.
Shared Governance: Benefits and Costs
| Peter Klein |
Back in grad school I was regularly hectored by a fellow student about joining the Association of Graduate Student Employees (AGSE), our local collective-bargaining association. Despite his attempt to stigmatize me as a free rider, I never joined. I didn’t think I agreed with the organizations goals, and I was sure I didn’t want to be associated with AGSE’s parent organization, the United Auto Workers (go figure). One year there was even a strike, which I found silly (I scabbed).
This semester I’m getting repeated invitations to join the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). Again, I hesitate. Of course, as an American university professor, I’m happy to see more power, prestige, and perquisites go to American university professors (OK, specifically, to me). But the AAUP has a strange agenda. Its mission includes not only protecting academic freedom and defending the role of the university in public life, but also preserving shared governance. Having spent many years in university settings, I’m convinced that shared governance is grossly inefficient, at least most of the time. There can be benefits, of course, to offset these costs, as is the case with worker-owned cooperatives and other non-standard forms of organization. But one searches the AAUP’s website in vain for any analysis or evidence on shared governance. What are the benefits and costs, relative to other feasible organizational forms? Why should professors defend this peculiar institution? (more…)
Maybe Sociology Is Worth Something After All
| Peter Klein |
This passage from yesterday’s WSJ front-pager on Sheraton’s attempt to upgrade its image should delight Brayden and the Boys:
[Sheraton’s Hoyt] Harper, whose father was a psychologist, says he takes an inclusive approach to negotiating with [franchisees]. Instead of issuing blanket instructions, he has brought in major Sheraton owners, such as Host, early on in the design process to get their input and help tweak the final plan. This means that Starwood must endure a lot of criticism from its hotel owners and that the owners must endure criticism from Starwood. “My sociology major was much more appropriate for this job than my business degree,” he says.
On a more serious note, the article contains interesting general information about the hotel industry and the dominant franchise model. It should have mentioned Francine Lafontaine’s work on franchising, particularly this recent paper (with Renata Kosova and Rozenn Perrigot) on the hotel industry and a chain’s choice to own or franchise particular units.
A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Bullet Points
| Peter Klein |
An alert reader directs me to slide 241 of the slide pack for Dick Langlois’s Economics of Organization course. Click the image below for a look. Dick seems to be raising the point that Williamson’s TCE (as well as other theories of economic organization) pays insufficient attention to the processes by which firms reach their “optimal” organizational structures. TCE holds that firms try to minimize (or should minimize) the sum of production and transaction costs. But do firms actually do this? Do they make mistakes? Do they experiment and learn? Is the selection environment strong enough that inefficient organizational choices are quickly eliminated, or do inefficiencies persist? (The problem is particularly important for empirical literature on organizational form — see pp. 440-42 of this paper.) Or, can we assume, with Dr. Pangloss, that whatever is, is optimal?
To illustrate the point, Dick includes a photo of Williamson giving a seminar, with some additional background art — an etching from Candide — added to the frame. If you’re not paying attention you might think the etching is part of the original. I give Dick points for cleverness, but my anonymous correspondent finds the illustration a bit too subliminal. What do you think?
Intelligence Doping
| Peter Klein |
Posner and Becker weigh in on “intelligence doping,” using drugs to increase cognitive performance (see our earlier remarks here). Both argue, on utilitarian grounds, against regulating Provigil and similar stimulants. I bet they’d go for the new Snickers bar too.
No Country for Old Probability Theorists
| Peter Klein |
I finally got around to seeing No Country for Old Men, which I enjoyed despite unrealistically high expectations (movies too suffer from the winner’s curse). Javier Bardem’s Anton Chigurh surely belongs with Darth Vader, Hannibal Lecter, Dr. Christian Szell, Nurse Ratched, and Max Cady on the list of all-time great movie villains. The movie is in one sense a meditation on the role of chance in human affairs, so naturally I started thinking about risk, uncertainty, choice, delegation, and other issues near and dear to our organizational hearts.
Chigurh, the cold-blooded killer, likes to flip a coin before deciding whether to kill someone, forcing the victim to call the toss. This reminded me that risk and Knightian uncertainty aren’t mutually exclusive determinants of economic outcomes. Entrepreneurs choose to invest in risky projects, but project selection itself reflects the bearing of Knightian uncertainty. Richard von Mises gives the example of champagne bottles that burst while in storage with predictable frequencies. The champagne producer can quantify the risks associated with bottling and storage. But the choice of producing one variety or another, hiring one type of laborer or another, and even being in the champagne business at all, involves another kind of uncertainty, one that cannot be described with mathematical precision. The decision to enter the champagne business involves Knightian uncertainty, but once that decision has been made, some of the variation in outcome can be characterized as probabilistic risk. Think of it in terms of mixed strategies; the specific move is random, but the decision to play a mixed strategy is not. Likewise, Chigurh can hardly claim that his victims’ deaths are random. A coin flip determines their fate, but he chooses to flip the coin — and that choice cannot be explained by a known probability distribution. (more…)
Does Performance Cause Organizational Form?
| Peter Klein |
There is a large literature on the performance effects of organizational form. Obviously, for the strategist, getting organizational form right is important only if it leads to superior performance. Of course, the empirical literature recognizes that organizational form, governance, strategy, and other key decision variables are at least partly endogenous. Still, the causal arrows are usually thought to run from strategy to performance.
Ben Hermalin was at Missouri this week to present his paper, “Firm Value and Corporate Governance: Does the Former Determine the Latter?”, which argues that good governance can be the result, not the cause, of good performance. He constructs a model in which the benefits of getting governance right are, on the margin, increasing in the value of the firm’s investment opportunities. Better-performing firms have better opportunities and hence more to gain from designing governance structures that align managers’ incentives with owners. The model is based on an agency framework and applies specifically to managerial governance, but the general problem would seem to apply to a variety of organizational problems and contexts. (more…)
Private Equity and Innovation
| Peter Klein |
LBOs do not reduce patent activity, and the quality of patents may actually increase following a “going-private” transaction, according to a new paper by Morten Sorensen, Per Strömberg, and Josh Lerner.
A long-standing controversy is whether LBOs relieve managers from short-term pressures of dispersed shareholders, or whether LBO funds themselves are driven by short-term profit motives and sacrifice long-term growth to boost short-term performance. We investigate 495 transactions with a focus on one form of long-term activities, namely investments in innovation as measured by patenting activity. We find no evidence that LBOs decrease these activities. Relying on standard measures of patent quality, we find that patents applied for by firms in private equity transactions are more cited (a proxy for economic importance), show no significant shifts in the fundamental nature of the research, and are more concentrated in the most important and prominent areas of companies’ innovative portfolios.
I very much like this kind of work even though I’m a patent skeptic (1, 2, 3, 4).
Numbers Don’t Lie — Or Do They?
| Peter Klein |
Quantitative analysis leads to superior decision making, says Ian Ayres in Supercrunchers. Enthusiasts for expert systems are skeptical of “intuitive” reasoning. And most contemporary social scientists can’t conceive of a world without econometrics, sociometrics, psychometrics, and fill-in-the-blank-ometrics. Even management scholars are getting into the act. Of course, quantitative analysis is only as good as the assumptions that go into it. And economists such as Knight and Mises maintain that some kinds of human decision-making defy quantification and systematization and are fundamentally qualitative, or verstehende (explaining why some entrepreneurs earn profits while others make losses).
Wharton’s Gavin Cassar studies nascent entrepreneurs (defined here as firm founders) and finds, surprisingly, that those who use common accounting practices such as budgeting, sales forecasting, and financial planning are more likely to overestimate future performance than those who rely on qualitative, intuitive projections. “[T]hose individuals who adopt an inside view to forecasting, through the use of plans and financial projections, will exhibit greater ex-ante bias in their expectations. Consistent with inside view adoption causing over-optimism in expectations, I find that the preparation of projected financial statements results in more overly-optimistic venture sale forecasts.” In other words, quantitative analysis may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, cognitive bias. Worth a read (and see this summary in Knowledge@Wharton).
A New Explanation for Scholarly Productivity
| Peter Klein |
I always suspected it: scholarly productivity is inversely related to — beer. That’s the finding of a new study of Czech ornithologists, as summarized in yesterday’s N.Y. Times (thanks to Brian McCann for the heads-up). The more beer a scientist drinks, the less likely he is to publish or to have his work cited. Apparently this is a cross-sectional result, without fixed effects or instrumental variables, so there is little information on causality. Perhaps unsuccessful Czech scientists tend to drown their sorrows at the local pub (no doubt drinking their copycat Budvar). Personally, I am more likely to grab a brew to celebrate the occasional citation, so I’d expect the correlation (under reverse causality) to run the other way. And what about these rats?
Economics and the Rule of Law
| Peter Klein |
This week’s Economist features a summary of recent economic controversies about the rule of law (thanks to Fabio Chaddad for the pointer). There is near-universal consensus among specialists in economic history and economic growth that the legal rules — and institutions more generally — “matter,” though the precise mechanisms are in dispute, and aspects of the institutional environment such as the quality of legal rules are difficult to measure consistently across societies and over time. We’ve touched on the closely related “legal origins” debate before. As with that controversy, the arguments in this one have become more subtle and complex in the last decade. As the Economist notes:
[A]s an economic concept the rule of law has had a turbulent history. It emerged almost abruptly during the 1990s from the dual collapses of Asian currencies and former Soviet economies. For a short time, it seemed to provide the answer to problems of development from Azerbaijan to Zimbabwe, until some well-directed criticism dimmed its star. Since then it has re-established itself as a central concept in understanding how countries grow rich — but not as the panacea it once looked like.
The Economist piece focuses on the distinction between “thick” and “thin” understandings of the rule of law. (more…)
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