Posts filed under ‘New Institutional Economics’
Varieties of Capitalist Development and Corporate Governance
| Peter Klein |
That is the theme for the 2007 Asia-Pacific Economic and Business History Conference at the University of Sydney. As noted in the call for papers: “While the historical study of market economies has been commonplace, there are many aspects worthy of further analysis including the role of savings, human capital, technology, government, and changing markets. Corporate governance has received wide attention in the wake of recent enterprise collapses, yet historians have only begun to research differences in corporate governance over time and among countries.”
The keynote speaker is Doug Irwin, author of several outstanding books on international trade theory and policy.
Simon on Hierarchy
| Nicolai Foss |
I have always been surprised and somewhat disturbed by the tendency in Herbert A Simon’s work to elevate hierarchy and organization over markets. Of course, Simon was a liberal democrat — but he was also a great scientist.
The most visible expression of this tendency is probably Simon’s heavily cited 1991 paper in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, “Organizations and Markets.” Another manifestation of the tendency is Simon’s even more (in fact, much more) famous 1962 paper, “The Architecture of Complexity,” in which hierarchical structure is seen as the master-principle for understanding “the architecture of complexity.”
In an interesting paper, “Hierarchy and History in Simon’s ‘Architecture of Complexity’,” UCLA professor Philip Agre argues that Simon’s paper arose as a critique of general systems theory and its attempt to elevate self-organization over any hierarchical principles. He furthermore sees Simon’s argument as very strongly reflecting the general tenor of the times, what may be called McNamaraism (tellingly, Chandler’s Strategy and Structure was also published in 1962); thus, “… the patterns that Simon discerned became visible within the larger context of the time.”
Paper on Freedom and Entrepreneurship
| Nicolai Foss |
With Christian Bjørnskov I have written “Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurial Activity: Some Cross-Country Evidence. Here is the abstract:
While much attention has been devoted to analyzing how the institutional framework and entrepreneurship impact growth, how economic policy and institutional design affect entrepreneurship appears to be much less analyzed. We try to explain cross-country differences in the level of entrepreneurship by differences in economic policy and institutional design. Specifically, we use the measures of economic freedom to ask which elements of economic policy making and the institutional framework that are responsible for the supply of entrepreneurship (our data on entrepreneurship are derived from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor). The combination of these two datasets is unique in the literature. We find that the size of government is negatively correlated with entrepreneurial activity but that sound money is positively correlated with entrepreneurial activity. Other measures of economic freedom are not significantly correlated with entrepreneurship.
Drop me a mail if you want a copy.
Coase and the Myth of Fisher Body
| Peter Klein |
I vividly recall, at the inaugural meeting of the International Society for New Institutional Economics in 1997, a discussion about the best empirical strategy for that emerging discipline. Harold Demsetz stood up and said “Please, no more papers about Fisher Body and GM!” The Fisher-GM case had become the canonical example of holdup in transaction cost economics and was considered stale and even trite. Ronald Coase, who was at the podium, replied (I’m paraphrasing from memory) “Sorry, Harold, that is exactly the subject of my next paper!”
The GM-Fisher case was introduced into the transaction cost literature by Klein, Crawford, and Alchian in their 1978 paper “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process.” They cited the case as a classic example of vertical integration designed to mitigate holdup in the presence of asset specificity. As the story is told, Fisher refused to locate its plants near G.M. assembly plants and to change its production technology in the face of an unanticipated increase in the demand for car bodies. This led G.M. to terminate its existing ten-year supply contract with Fisher and to acquire full ownership of Fisher.
The basic facts of the account, and the interpretation of these facts, were challenged in five independently written papers, all appearing in 2000. Three of the papers, by Coase, Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, and Freeland, are in the April 2000 Journal of Law and Economics. A fourth paper by Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel appears in Industiral and Corporate Change and one by Miwa and Ramseyer is in the Michigan Law Review. These papers showed that nearly every detail of the canonical account is wrong. (more…)
What’s in a Name? Property Rights, Legal Rights, and Economic Rights
| Nicolai Foss |
I tend to find the property rights approach associated with such economists as Coase, Demsetz, Alchian, and perhaps particularly Yoram Barzel extremely useful, informative, and insightful. (I also find their approaches more generally useful than the more recent property rights approach associated with Oliver Hart and his colleagues and students; on the differences between the “old” and the “new” property rights approaches, see this paper). It spans multiple level of analysis, and its explanatory reach seems to me to be huge. Most of my papers over the last few years utilize property rights notions in one way or another.
However, I have found that there are some basic difficulties of communicating property rights economics. It is not so much a matter of too many people (still) arguing that the Coase theorem “doesn’t hold” (usually the same types who argue that PD games are “wrong”). (more…)
Organizations and Markets 
Recent Comments