Posts filed under ‘Public Policy / Political Economy’
Two Quotations on Profits
| Peter Klein |
Henry Hazlitt, from Economics in One Lesson:
In a free economy, in which wages, costs and prices are left to the free play of the competitive market, the prospect of profits decides what articles will be made, and in what quantities — and what articles will not be made at all. If there is no profit in making an article, it is a sign that the labor and capital devoted to its production are misdirected: the value of the resources that must be used up in making the article is greater than the value of the article itself.
One function of profits, in brief, is to guide and channel the factors of production so as to apportion the relative output of thousands of different commodities in accordance with demand. No bureaucrat, no matter how brilliant, can solve this problem arbitrarily. Free prices and free profits will maximize production and relieve shortages quicker than any other system. Arbitrarily fixed prices and arbitrarily limited profits can only prolong shortages and reduce production and employment.
The function of profits, finally, is to put constant and unremitting pressure on the head of every competitive business to introduce further economies and efficiencies, no matter to what stage these may already have been brought.
Barack Obama, from last week’s address on healthcare:
I’ve insisted that like any private insurance company, the public insurance option would have to be self-sufficient and rely on the premiums it collects. But by avoiding some of the overhead that gets eaten up at private companies by profits and excessive administrative costs and executive salaries, it could provide a good deal for consumers, and would also keep pressure on private insurers to keep their policies affordable and treat their customers better. . . .
So, (a) profits and executive salaries are part of (avoidable) overhead, and (b) government agencies have lower administrative costs than private firms. Who knew? (Thanks to Gary for the quote.)
The Onion or Reality: Ron Kirk Edition
| Peter Klein |
Today’s installment of our series featuring statements so self-evidently absurd you wonder how anyone could have made them with a straight face focuses on US Trade Representative Ron Kirk. Here’s Captain Kirk failing Economics 101:
Following an announcement by the White House, United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk released the following statement today on the U.S. decision to impose remedies under Section 421 of the 1974 Trade Act to stop a harmful surge of imports into the U.S. of Chinese tires for passenger cars and light trucks. Following what the ITC determined was a surge, production of similar products in the U.S. dropped, domestic tire plants closed, and Americans lost their jobs. Today’s steps are designed to level the playing field for American workers in the tire market.
The three-year remedies, consisting of an additional tariff of 35 percent ad valorem in the first year, 30 percent ad valorem in the second, and 25 percent ad valorem in the third year, are being imposed after a finding by the United States International Trade Commission that a harmful surge of imports of Chinese tires disrupted the U.S. market for those products. . . .
“This Administration is doing what is necessary to enforce trade agreements on behalf of American workers and manufacturers. Enforcing trade laws is key to maintaining an open and free trading system.”
Christie Romer, where are you? Larry Summers? Austan Goolsbee? Does any economically literate person have a voice in Obama’s White House?
Mr. Kirk, please go read “Saving the X Industry” 500 times. This may help.
The Pretense of Bernanke’s Knowledge
| Peter Klein |
Chairman Bernanke, in his own words:
July 2005: “[U]nquestionably, housing prices are up quite a bit; I think it’s important to note that fundamentals are also very strong. We’ve got a growing economy, jobs, incomes. We’ve got very low mortgage rates. We’ve got demographics supporting housing growth. We’ve got restricted supply in some places. So it’s certainly understandable that prices would go up some. I don’t know whether prices are exactly where they should be, but I think it’s fair to say that much of what’s happened is supported by the strength of the economy.”
July 2005: “[Recession is] a pretty unlikely possibility. We’ve never had a decline in house prices on a nationwide basis. So what I think is more likely is that house prices will slow, maybe stabilize: might slow consumption spending a bit. I don’t think it’s going to drive the economy too far from its full employment path, though.”
February 2007: “Our assessment is that there’s not much indication at this point that subprime mortgage issues have spread into the broader mortgage market, which still seems to be healthy. And the lending side of that still seems to be healthy.”
July 2007: “The pace of home sales seems likely to remain sluggish for a time, partly as a result of some tightening in lending standards, and the recent increase in mortgage interest rates. Sales should ultimately be supported by growth in income and employment, as well as by mortgage rates that, despite the recent increase, remain fairly low relative to historical norms. . . . Overall, the U.S. economy seems likely to expand at a moderate pace over the second half of 2007, with growth then strengthening a bit in 2008 to a rate close to the economy’s underlying trend.”
July 2009: “Overall, the Federal Reserve has many effective tools to tighten monetary policy when the economic outlook requires us to do so. As my colleagues and I have stated, however, economic conditions are not likely to warrant tighter monetary policy for an extended period. We will calibrate the timing and pace of any future tightening, together with the mix of tools to best foster our dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability.”
The Economist Going Austro-Demsetzian?
| Nicolai Foss |
Most observers of industrial organization will readily agree that so-called “predatory pricing” is a rare phenomenon. Nevertheless, it remains one of the most hotly debated topics in industrial organization theory and in practical competition policy, probably because it is a particularly conspicuous example of the “abuse of a dominant position” (to use EU competition policy lingo).
In its most recent issue, The Economist has a nice discussion of predatory pricing, prompted by the recent EU Intel case. The article opens by citing Coase, but in actuality its owes much more to Harold Demsetz (cf. this classic paper) as well as Austrian writers on industrial organization such as Dominick Armentano (cf. this paper). The article is excellent as a basis for discussion in classes on industrial organization.
A Hopeful Sign
| Peter Klein |
At least one major US bank is advertising the fact that it refused TARP funds. Bernanke and Co. must be unhappy, as they insisted that all large banks take the money to avoid tainting those that actually needed it. Wouldn’t it be great if the largest bailout recipients became tarred as Welfare Bums (just as people call G.M. “Government Motors”)? (HT to Lisa Fairfax.)
The irony in all this is that government intervention in financial markets is usually justified by claims about asymmetric information: consumers can’t distinguish reliable from unreliable banks, insurers can’t tell healthy from unhealthy people, and so on, leading to a rash of adverse-selection problems that market mechanisms cannot solve. Actually the reverse is true: low-quality but politically connected financial institutions rely on government intervention to enforce a pooling equilibrium, preventing the market signaling and screening that would otherwise take place.
Discipline-Based Policy Advice
| Peter Klein |
As noted before, the economist long ago replaced the fortune teller as the most popular kind of policy adviser. The US, for example, has a Council of Economic Advisers but no Council of Anthropological Advisers or Council of Critical Literary Theorist Advisers (thank goodness). Now the sociologists want a piece of the action. And, as Rajshree Agarwal, Jay Barney, Nicolai, and I have argued, management scholars (a partially overlapping set with economists, it should be noted) may also have something to offer in understanding the current economic mess.
Here’s Richard Posner making a pitch for legal scholars: “with a few notable exceptions, such as Lucian Bebchuk, Edward Morrison, and Steven Schwarcz, academic lawyers (and Bebchuk and Morrison have Ph.Ds in economics, as well as law degrees) have not made a contribution to the understanding and resolution of the current economic crisis, even though it bristles with legal questions.” But he isn’t sure that academic legal training is currently very useful. Kenneth Anderson is more optimistic:
I think that legal academics will have much to contribute in the reform of finance in the remaking of institutions and markets with fewer panglossian assumptions about how they will find optimal solutions on their own, and with fewer panglossian assumptions that they will do so as a matter of natural necessity. But I also think, even more strongly, and will raise it in some subsequent posts, that lawyers will bring to the table an understanding of the unquantified risks and uncertainties that are written into financial contracts — derivatives, securitizations, etc. — that financial analysts, economists, many other non-lawyer actors, took for granted as not having any effect.
Who else wants a seat at the table?
Preaching from the Choir
| Dick Langlois |
It’s hard to top Bruce Kogut on the Daily Show. But by sheer coincidence I happened upon a video that offers a quite different perspective on corporate social responsibility.
Obama Administration Needs Sociologists
| Peter Klein |
And fewer economists, according to the sociologists interviewed by Inside Higher Ed:
Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, a professor of sociology at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, described watching the news in December, as the economy was in a free fall and Barack Obama, as president-elect, was naming people to key positions in his administration. From the social sciences, he said, it was “the same old cast of characters,” and that means economists.
Obama’s election had brought “a sense of possibility,” but “as a sociologist I was pissed off,” he said.
“I have economist envy on a good day and worse things on a bad day,” he said.
I have great respect for my sociologically trained brethren and sistren (cistern?) but am not sure what, exactly, they are asking for. One sociologist thinks economists downplay race and gender — “their supply and demand curves don’t deal with these questions” — which is silly, as much of the analysis of subprimes by labor economists focuses exactly on this. I’m not claiming that sociology (or anthropology or history or psychology) has no useful policy implications, of course, only asking for specifics. (more…)
Heterogeneity and Health Care
| Peter Klein |
Further to Russ’s post: One of the most frustrating aspects of the discussion surrounding health-care reform is the tendency of politicians, activists, and even a few economists to talk about “health care” as if it’s a homogeneous blob, or an intangible thing like “love” or “happiness.” Of course, what we produce and consume, what we exchange on markets, is not “health care” but specific, discrete health-care goods and services (procedures, medications, insurance policies, etc.). If you never go to the doctor and consume only one aspirin per year, do you have “health care”? If not, what specific bundle of goods and services constitutes a unit of “health care”?
Once we realize we are really talking about discrete, marginal units of particular goods and services the very notion of “universal access to health care” becomes problematic. What exactly is it that people have a universal right to? It’s analogous to debates about the environment. One can have a sort of philosophical or meta-economic commitment to “the environment,” and its protection (hoo-boy), but this means very little in terms of specific trade-offs at the margin. Is it better to have one more house or airport runway or corn field, or one more patch of meadow or forest? Being an “environmentalist” doesn’t answer that question. You know the old story: everybody values “safety,” but that doesn’t mean you never leave your house or, when you do, drive to work in a Sherman tank. You willingly sacrifice some amount of safety in exchange for units of other scarce and valuable goods (like access to the world outside your house, time spent traveling, money). Each of us evaluates this trade-off differently. Likewise, the marginal valuations of specific health-care goods and services, relative to other consumption and investment goods, cash balances, etc. varies from individual to individual. There’s no such thing as “health care.” As always, heterogeneity matters.
Solution to a Credit Bubble? More Credit
| Peter Klein |
As noted before (1, 2, 3), policymakers (and some economists) seem immune to the argument that the credit bubble may have been caused by, you know, too much credit, and that encouraging people to increase their debt levels even more might not be the optimal policy response.
Bill Shughart, a very good economist, notes some disturbing parallels between the monetary and regulatory policies that led to the housing crisis and the US government’s “cars for clunkers” program. Whatever its effect on improving air quality (marginal) or stimulating aggregate demand (barf), one consequence is that people who would not otherwise have taken out a new car loan will do so, increasing total and average leverage in the economy. Will banks be pressured to extend new-car credit to “subprime” borrowers? Well, if all you care about is total lending, this is a good thing.
Attack of the Public Finance Utility Monsters
| Dick Langlois |
I just saw this amusing abstract from Greg Mankiw. I think it will be far too subtle for most people.
The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution
Should the income tax include a credit for short taxpayers and a surcharge for tall ones? The standard Utilitarian framework for tax analysis answers this question in the affirmative. Moreover, a plausible parameterization using data on height and wages implies a substantial height tax: a tall person earning $50,000 should pay $4,500 more in tax than a short person. One interpretation is that personal attributes correlated with wages should be considered more widely for determining taxes. Alternatively, if policies such as a height tax are rejected, then the standard Utilitarian framework must fail to capture intuitive notions of distributive justice.
Extra credit: how would such a tax affect NBA salaries — like that of UConn’s seven-foot-three Hasheem Thabeet, who was taken number two in the recent draft?
Organizations, Markets, and Health Care Reform
| Russ Coff |
Amidst the fierce debate about the U.S. health care system is a raving lack of clarity. At the core, is whether organizations and markets fail to produce an optimal solution. Even the most neoclassical of economists these days acknowledge that market externalities exist and that these should be the focus of government intervention. Unfortunately, I don’t feel that the debate has been rigorous or well-informed in defining the market failure or why a government run system would be superior.
Liberal Economist Paul Krugman explains why markets fail summarizing Kenneth Arrow’s arguments (here). Basically, the third-party payee system and the information asymmetries render comparison shopping ineffective (and hence competition fails to yield an optimal solution).
Indeed, there is a good bit of inefficiency in the current U.S. system. A recent NY Times article notes that health care costs the average U.S. household $6,500 more each year than other comparable wealthy nations. Unfortunately, looking at many of the important outcomes, it appears that consumers are not getting much for their money on many dimensions (e.g., chronic disease outcomes). So it should be possible to lower costs and improve outcomes. Of course, this ignores the question of whether costs are higher to subsidize R&D that ultimately spills over into other countries.
Unfortunately, the article continues to point out how the reform efforts seem to ignore this low-hanging fruit. (more…)
Goldman Sachs, Best in the Business
| Peter Klein |
The business of political capitalism, that is. Like Enron, Goldman operates primarily in the nebulous world of public-private interaction. It is the US’s most politically powerful financial firm, skilled at navigating the byzantine regulations governing the virtually nationalized US financial sector. Goldman’s eye-popping $3.4 billion second-quarter earnings shouldn’t surprise anyone; as Craig Pirrong notes, these earnings reflect good old-fashioned moral hazard, with Goldman exploiting its too-big-to-fail status by taking on huge amounts of risk:
Goldman knows it is too big to fail. How does it know this? Well, the government bailed out AIG not so much for AIG’s sake, but for the sake of big AIG counterparties — most notably Goldman. Moreover, given the conventional wisdom that the government’s primary error in the financial crisis was its failure to bail out Lehman — a piker compared to Goldman — it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that it won’t repeat that mistake in the future, and let Goldman go down. So Goldman knows it can get bigger, and take more risk. It is the classic heads Goldman wins, tails the sucker taxpayer eats the loss gambit. If nobody steps in to rein in the firm, it will continue to add risk, thereby enhancing the value of the Treasury put hiding in the equity entry on its balance sheet.
Somebody should be stepping in — but nobody is. Why not? Partly, no doubt, it is Goldman’s political heft. It is likely too that important policy makers don’t want to crack down on a major source of risk capital to the markets in the fear that this would impede a recovery. Even though in reality, that risk capital is your money and mine, with the exception that we have no chance of capturing the upside, and are left with a good chunk of the downside. This is a piece with the hair-of-the-dog strategy being pursued by Treasury and the Fed.
Ken Lay as Political Capitalist
| Peter Klein |
This blog has taken a special interest in Ken Lay, not just because of his local connections but also because he typifies the modern CEO of a regulated industry, more lobbyist and PR man than manager. Lay, a long-time energy regulator before becoming Enron CEO, was skilled in the ways of Washington — making his reputation as poster-boy for “unbridled capitalism” all the more ironic.
Here is Rob Bradley, quoting from his book Political Capitalism, on Lay and Enron:
Who was Ken Lay, the architect and chairman of Enron from its formation in the mid-1980s until its bankruptcy? The once-celebrated visionary of the energy industry was not an engineer, as were most leaders in the energy sector. Lay did not possess an accounting or finance background, as did some senior executives. He never clawed his way up the corporate ladder in various operational divisions, much less built a company from scratch. No, Enron’s leader was a Ph.D. economist, interested in the big picture and the ways of political power. His résumé was top-heavy with Washington experience, acquired at three federal jobs, the last two regulating the energy industry. . . .
Government favor propelled Enron’s profit-centers in domestic power plants, natural gas and electricity marketing, wind and solar power, infrastructure in underdeveloped countries, and unconventional natural gas production. Enron was all about complex federal laws and administrative regulations, such as special provisions within the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, and Energy Policy Act of 1992 — or FERC rulings such as Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol (FERC Order No. 436: 1985), Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation Under Part 284 of the Commission’s Regulations (FERC Order No. 636: 1992), and Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities (FERC Order 888: 1996). The arcane was pure gold to Enron.
How Active are Governments in the Morality Business?
| Benito Arruñada |
Brad Taylor doubts in his reaction to my previous post on organizations and markets in morality that:
The moral authority of the Church was anywhere near complete in even the most ardently Catholic societies. The Church claimed a monopoly on morality, and many people went along with it to a greater or lesser degree. This seems pretty close to what government does today. The state doesn’t simply create laws aimed at resolving the inevitable conflicts among people, but attempts to influence public opinion through various types of propaganda – telling people not to smoke or get drunk and dance, for example.
I would not claim that the Church enjoyed a monopoly, only that the production of morality was more organizational — i.e., it took place within organizations (the Church itself was divided in several organizations), was more centralized, and was made by specialized moralist experts (mainly, theologians and priests, but even with some specialization of priests between those who focused on taking care of parishes, preaching, and confessing). In contrast, I am inclined to think that morality is now produced more in the market: it is less centralized and is produced by generalists.
It is true, as Brad says, that governments play an increasing role, especially in many European countries where they (1) control most education, even introducing new mandatory courses on “Good Citizenship”; (2) run their own TV stations, with plenty of scope to manipulate its contents; and (3) are actively running advertising campaigns about everything from global warming to racism or the use of condoms.
However, there are many other powerful sources of morality that are purely market driven: e.g., Hollywood movies and commercial TV series; biologists, pop stars, and former politicians moonlighting as preachers for their favorite causes; reality shows; gossip media; and so on.
Why “Doing Business” Leads to Bad Policy
| Benito Arruñada |
In a post at the PSD blog, David Kaplan sees little difference between the “Doing Business” position and my own. He writes:
Part of Professor Arruñada’s argument is that the Doing Business indicators do not capture all the relevant components of the business environment. The writers of the Doing Business 2009 report agree. . . .
I believe that the debate is not mainly about what Doing Business measures. Really, the debate is about how these measures are used in shaping public policy. Critics of Doing Business are concerned that countries will ignore the above warnings and only reform in areas that are measured in Doing Business.
I doubt that one can separate what DB measures and how it does it from how DB measures are used in the field. My main complaint, however, is different, namely that the DB method has often led to bad policy. (more…)
Capitalism’s Challenges: Cycles of Expropriation
| Benito Arruñada |
Following up my previous entry on cycles of statism, I ask next: How important are cycles of expropriation? Consider, for example, how Bolivia has nationalized foreign oil firms every 34 years. In the most recent round, the nationalizing decree read:
Consider that Bolivia was the first country on the Continent to nationalize ts hydrocarbons, in 1937 with Standard Oil Co, a heroic measure, and done again in 1969 with Gulf Oil, leading the present generation to carry on the third and definitive nationalization. (Supreme Decree 28701, Evo Morales, President, May 2006).
In an experiment with Marco Casari we find similar patterns under more “democratic” circumstances. You may download the paper here.
Rajshree Agarwal on the US Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis
| Peter Klein |
Nice interview with Rajshree Agarwal on the US government’s response to the financial crisis. “Has It Helped?” Rajshree’s answer in brief: No.
Government-Made Cars
| Peter Klein |
Former Romanian car czar Ion Mihai Pacepa’s confession in today’s WSJ, and Jeff Tucker’s commentary, reminds me of our Trabant series from a while back (the video link is still among our most popular). Look forward to a future video of a GM (i.e., government) worker putting the finishing touches on the next Nova.
And Meet the New Bud Fox
| Peter Klein |
Further to my Wall Street post: There’s another scene in which we learn that Bud Fox, the twenty-something broker played by Charlie Sheen, will be made CEO of Blue Star Airlines during its reorganization if Gordon Gekko’s hostile takeover is successful. We’re supposed to laugh at the absurdity of a baby-faced kid with an Ivy League education but no knowledge of airplanes or management running an airline. But when the federal government does it, it’s all good. (HT: Randy.)
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