Posts filed under ‘Theory of the Firm’
Organizational Economics versus Strategy
| Peter Klein |
Brayden has a nice post at our good-twin blog on the differences between organization theory and strategy research. Writing from the perspective of an organizational sociologist, Brayden argues that organization theory is a higher-status, “purer” discipline, but that strategy research asks better questions and is providing more insight into organizations than organization theory.
I think much of Brayden’s analysis carries over to economics as well. Organizational economics (referring to people like Tirole, Hart, Gibbons, Holmström, Baker, Zingales, Aghion, Garicano, Bolton, etc.) has a much higher status than the kind of work published in the Strategic Management Journal or the strategy papers in Organization Science, the Academy of Management Review, or Management Science. (If by “strategy” we mean simply game theory, then strategy research would have the same status as organizational economics.) The explanation is simple: economic theory is a high-status discipline while sociology and applied economics, sociology, and psychology are not. A prominent economist who does some work that could be considered strategy once told me, when asked about SMJ, that its authors “ask good questions, but don’t know how to answer them.” He said it with a knowing smile and a slight shake of the head, the way a Southerner might say “bless their hearts.” Still, one would have to admit that some terrific work has come out of the strategy journals in recent years, particularly (ahem) as economics has become a more foundational discipline in that field.
Government and the Corporation
| Peter Klein |
What is the net effect of government intervention on firm size, scope, complexity, and ownership? Roderick Long thinks government intervention makes firms larger and more hierarchical than they would otherwise be, and that a pure market economy would be dominated by small firms like worker-owned cooperatives. I think the net effect of government intervention on firm characteristics is ambiguous, because there are so many interventions affecting different types of firms. Here’s some back-and-forth between Roderick and me: his original essay on Cato Unbound, my comment on Mises.org, his reply, and my rejoinder.
Update: See also Caplan.
Some Interesting Working Papers
| Peter Klein |
- Jennifer Arlen and Eric Talley, “Experimental Law and Economics”
This chapter provides a framework for assessing the contributions of experiments in Law and Economics. We identify criteria for determining the validity of an experiment and find that these criteria depend upon both the purpose of the experiment and the theory of behavior implicated by the experiment. While all experiments must satisfy the standard experimental desiderata of control, falsifiability of theory, internal consistency, external consistency and replicability, the question of whether an experiment also must be “contextually attentive” — in the sense of matching the real world choice being studied — depends on the underlying theory of decision-making being tested or implicated by the experiment.
- Matthew J. Holian, “Optimal Decentralization in Corporations and Federations”
Oates’ Theorem and the M-form Hypothesis are both organizational theories of decentralization, though they deal with different types of organizations. This brief note describes how the two theories complement one another, through both verbal description and mathematical models. The result is a simple but comprehensive account of the delegation problem.
- Abhijit V. Banerjee, Esther Duflo, “The Experimental Approach to Development Economics”
Randomized experiments have become a popular tool in development economics research, and have been the subject of a number of criticisms. This paper reviews the recent literature, and discusses the strengths and limitations of this approach in theory and in practice. We argue that the main virtue of randomized experiments is that, due to the close collaboration between researchers and implementers, they allow the estimation of parameters that it would not otherwise be possible to evaluate. We discuss the concerns that have been raised regarding experiments, and generally conclude that while they are real, they are often not specific to experiments. We conclude by discussing the relationship between theory and experiments.
A Note on Systems Integration
| Dick Langlois |
First let me apologize for being out of circulation for so long. I’ve been inundated with teaching and committee work this semester, but I hope to get back in the swing of things as the year winds down.
The New York Times had an interesting article the other day on a company called Super Micro Computer, a public family-run company in San Jose that puts together leading-edge servers and other hardware for clients that include eBay and Yahoo. The company sells high performance and speed, both the speed of the computer and the speed of the company in designing and delivering its products.
Whereas rivals long ago sent key design work to Asia to take advantage of cheaper, plentiful labor, Super Micro still relies on hundreds of expensive engineers working at its San Jose headquarters. These workers are charged with grabbing the latest and greatest components from suppliers and coming up with new designs months ahead of lumbering heavyweights like Hewlett-Packard and Dell.
Clayton Christensen and his coauthors have argued that a premium on high performance calls for vertical integration and systemic integration in order to fine tune and customize systems, whereas a premium on cost reduction leads to modularity, standardization, and vertical disintegration. The Super Micro case seems to question this conclusion. On the one hand, the company emphasizes design and produces customized units. On the other hand, however, the company is really just a systems integrator — not a vertically integrated company — whose advantage lies in discovering and making use of the innovation of others. In Carliss Baldwin’s phrase, the company “leverages modularity” along the performance margin in much the same way that Dell does (or at least once did) along the cost margin. My conjecture is that, the more inherently modular (whatever that means) the product is, the more systemic integration can be squeezed into a single independent stage of production (systems integration) and the less necessary is genuine vertical integration — even when performance is what matters.
Utrecht Conference on Firm Governance
| Peter Klein |
Utrecht University is sponsoring a conference on “The Governance of the Modern Firm,” 11-13 December 2008, featuring contributions from Paul Davies, Roberta Romano, Bill Lazonick, and many others. (Via Geoff Hodgson.)
New Issue of Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal
| Peter Klein |
Volume 2, number 3 of the Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, a special issue edited by Sharon Alvarez and Jay Barney on “Opportunities, Organizations, and Entrepreneurship,” is now out. It features my paper “Opportunity Discovery, Entrepreneurial Action, and Economic Organization,” Nicolai’s paper with Kirsten Foss, “Understanding Opportunity Discovery and Sustainable Advantage: The Role of Transaction Costs and Property Rights,” and several others of interest. The abstracts from my paper and the Foss & Foss paper are below the fold. (more…)
Interviews with Alchian, Coase, Kirzner, Manne
| Peter Klein |
The Liberty Fund has put online several interviews from its Intellectual Portrait Series. Of particular interest to O&M readers:
- Armen Alchian, interviewed by Dan Benjamin
- Ronald Coase, interviewed by Richard Epstein
- Israel Kirzner, interviewed by Tibor Machan
- Henry Manne, interviewed by Fred McChesney
Update (Nov. 2): Manne link fixed.
Nair, Trendowski, and Judge on Penrose
| Peter Klein |
The October 2008 AMR features an essay by Anil Nair, Joseph Trendowski, and William Judge on Edith Penrose’s seminal Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959), written in the form of a book review. The essay is gated, but you can get a flavor from the conclusion:
Many economists call the unexplained variance in a regression equation the “Penrose effect.” According to Barney, it was left to strategy scholars to propose that the Penrose effect comprises the intangible resources and capabilities that are the source of sustained competitive advantage, and while these phenomena may be difficult to measure directly, the implications of these phenomena for firms’ operations and performance could be tested. After reviewing the passionate and prolific research that has attributed its intellectual roots to Penrose’s book, it is clear to us that her work was successful in rallying scholars who sought an alternative to the standard structure-conduct-performance model within strategy. However, scholars should be careful that Penrose’s theory (and the book) does not become a Rorschach blot on which they impose their own biases.
Here is a paper that links Penrose to Austrian concepts of subjectivism and capital heterogeneity. Penrose was of course a student of Fritz Machlup, himself a student of Mises. Apparently at one point the book was to be a joint project with Machlup; in Murray Rothbard’s papers is a memo Rothbard wrote for the Volker Fund evaluating a 1953 grant proposal by Machlup and Penrose for a “Growth of the Firm” project. (Rothbard’s assessment was unfavorable; he was, however, a fan of Penrose’s earlier paper on “Biological Analogies in the Theory of the Firm,” which he cites favorably in “The Mantle of Science.”)
New NBER Working Papers
| Peter Klein |
Three new NBER papers likely to interest the O&M crowd. (Aggressive Googlers can probably find ungated versions.)
Railroads and the Rise of the Factory: Evidence for the United States, 1850-70 by Jeremy Atack, Michael R. Haines, and Robert A. Margo
Over the course of the nineteenth century manufacturing in the United States shifted from artisan shop to factory production. At the same time United States experienced a transportation revolution, a key component of which was the building of extensive railroad network. Using a newly created data set of manufacturing establishments linked to county level data on rail access from 1850-70, we ask whether the coming of the railroad increased establishment size in manufacturing. Difference-in-difference and instrument variable estimates suggest that the railroad had a positive effect on factory status. In other words, Adam Smith was right – the division of labor in nineteenth century American manufacturing was limited by the extent of the market.
The Limited Partnership in New York, 1822-1853: Partnerships Without Kinship by Eric Hilt and Katharine O’Banion
In 1822, New York became the first common-law state to authorize the formation of limited partnerships, and over the ensuing decades, many other states followed. Most prior research has suggested that these statutes were utilized only rarely, but little is known about their effects. Using newly collected data, this paper analyzes the use of the limited partnership in nineteenth-century New York City. We find that the limited partnership form was adopted by a surprising number of firms, and that limited partnerships had more capital, failed at lower rates, and were less likely to be formed on the basis of kinship ties, compared to ordinary partnerships. The latter differences were not simply due to selection: even though the merchants who invested in limited partnerships were a wealthy and successful elite, their own ordinary partnerships were quite different from their limited partnerships. The results suggest that the limited partnership facilitated investments outside kinship networks, and into the hands of talented young merchants.
Inside the Black of Box of Ability Peer Effects: Evidence from Variation in Low Achievers in the Classroom by Victor Lavy, Daniele Paserman, and Analia Schlosser
In this paper, we estimate the extent of ability peer effects in the classroom and explore the underlying mechanisms through which these peer effects operate. We identify as low ability students those who are enrolled at least one year behind their birth cohort (repeaters). We show that there are marked differences between the academic performance and behavior of repeaters and regular students. The status of repeaters is mostly determined by first grade; therefore, it is unlikely to have been affected by their classroom peers, and our estimates will not suffer from the reflection problem. Using within school variation in the proportion of these low ability students across cohorts of middle and high school students in Israel, we find that the proportion of low achieving peers has a negative effect on the performance of regular students, especially those located at the lower end of the ability distribution. An exploration of the underlying mechanisms of these peer effects shows that, relative to regular students, repeaters report that teachers are better in the individual treatment of students and in the instilment of capacity for individual study. However, a higher proportion of these low achieving students results in a deterioration of teachers’ pedagogical practices, has detrimental effects on the quality of inter-student relationships and the relationships between teachers and students, and increases the level of violence and classroom disruptions.
Judgment, Luck, and Schultz
| Peter Klein |
Lasse raised an interesting point a while back about the Knightian concept of judgment, and how it differs from pure luck. Here’s a passage from T. W. Schultz that asks the same question:
[I]t is not sufficient to treat entrepreneurs solely as economic agents who only collect windfalls and bear losses that are unanticipated. If this is all they do, the much vaunted free enterprise system merely distributes in some unspecified manner the windfalls and losses that come as surprises. If entrepreneurship has some economic value it must perform a useful function which is constrained by scarcity, which implies that there is a supply and a demand for their services.
The key to understanding this passage is to recognize Schultz’s rejection, following Friedman and Savage (1948), of the concept of Knightian uncertainty. If all uncertainty can be parametrized in terms of (subjective) probabilities, then decision-making in the absence of such probabilities must be random. Any valuable kind of decision-making must be modelable, must have a marginal revenue product, and must be determined by supply and demand. For Knight, however, decision-making in the absence of a formal decision rule or model — what Knight calls judgment — isn’t random, it’s simply not modelable. It doesn’t have a supply curve, because it is a residual or controlling factor that is inextricably linked with resource ownership. It is a kind of understanding, or Verstehen, that defies formal explanation but is rare and valuable.
Without the concept of Knightian uncertainty, then, Knight’s concept of entrepreneurial judgment makes little sense.
JOM Special Issue on the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
| Peter Klein |
Jay Barney, Dave Ketchen, and Mike Wright are editing a special issue of the Journal of Management on “Resource-Based Theory: Twenty Years of Accomplishments and Future Challenges.” Proposals should be submitted between 1 March and 1 April 2009 for an issue to appear in 2011, the 20th anniversary of the 1991 special issue of JOM that helped establish the field (particularly with Barney’s paper, “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage,” which has 9,889 cites on Google Scholar as of this posting). The full call for papers is below the fold. (more…)
Call for Papers: Org Economics and Org Capabilities
| Nicolai Foss |
The relation between organizational economics (agency theory, TCE, property rights theory, team theory) and the organizational capabilities view has often been debated on O&M. Perhaps not surprising, as at least three out of the four current O&M bloggers have frequently covered this theme in their research, Dick Langlois writing about the relation between these ideas at least as early as 1984 (here), my first publication on the subject appearing in 1993 (here), and Peter’s first paper on it appearing in 1996 (here). I think we hold different views on the nature of the relation between organizational economics and capabilities ideas. I increasingly think of ideas on transaction costs, property rights etc. as primary to, and more fundamental than, notions of capabilities (e.g., see this paper, forthcoming in Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal). Dick, on the other hand, seems to hold the opposite view.
Such differences are even more pronounced in the strategy and organization fields. Some scholars reject organizational economic altogether (Sid Winter seems close to that position). Others argue that organizational economics and the organizational economics view are complementary in an additive sense: They deal with different, yet complementary issues, so that, for example, the organizational capabilities view tells us which assets/resources we need, organizational economics providing insight in the actual organization of those assets/resources (this seems to be the current mainstream view). Some scholars go further, and argue that there is a real scope for integrating, for example, ideas on localized knowledge and learning from the capabilities view with transaction cost economics (e.g., this paper). In fact, overall there seems to have been some movement from the i initial polarized positions of 10-15 years to today’s more integrative stance.
In order to report advances in research on the relation between organizational economics and the organizational capabilities view, Nick Argyres, Teppo Felin, Todd Zenger and I will edit a special issue of Organization Science on “Organizational Economics and Organizational Capabilities: From Opposition and Complementarity to Real Integration.” Papers which can be both theoretical (or, for the US audience, “conceptual”) and empirical, must be submitted between Oct. 1 and Oct. 30 2009. The Call for Papers is here (scroll down a bit). The Call contains a long list of possible themes for papers, but feel free to mail me at njf.smg@cbs.dk (or any of the other editors) if you are in doubt whether your paper may make a fit with the SI.
GM-Fisher: Yet More
| Peter Klein |
The debate over the acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, like the Energizer bunny, keeps going, and going, and going. . . . The new issue of Industrial and Corporate Change has two more papers, “Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel? The GM–Fisher Body Contract” by Victor Goldberg and “The Enforceability of the GM–Fisher Body Contract: Comment on Goldberg” by Ben Klein. Here are the abstracts:
Goldberg: In the analysis of vertical integration by contract versus ownership, one event has dominated the discussion — General Motors’ (GM) merger with Fisher Body in 1926. The debates have all been premised on the assumption that the 10-year contract between the parties signed in 1919 was a legally enforceable agreement. However, it was not. Because Fisher’s promise was illusory the contract lacked consideration. This note suggests that GM’s counsel must have known this. It raises a significant question in transactional engineering: what is the function of an agreement that is not legally enforceable?
Klein: Goldberg unconvincingly claims that the General Motors (GM)–Fisher Body contract was in fact legally unenforceable. But even if Goldberg’s contract law conclusion were correct, it is economically irrelevant. It is clear from the actions of Fisher and GM and from the testimonial and other contemporaneous evidence that both transactors considered the contract legally binding and behaved accordingly. Therefore, proper economic analysis of the Fisher–GM case should continue to assume contract enforceability, and the economic determinants of organizational structure illustrated by the case remain fully valid.
Organizational Economics and International Trade
| Peter Klein |
New NBER paper from Pol Antràs and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, “Organizations and Trade” (ungated here). Surveys “an emerging literature at the intersection of organizational economics and international trade,” arguing that “a proper modelling of the organizational aspects of production provides valuable insights on the aggregate workings of the world economy.” Indeed, “certain predictions of standard models . . . are affected or even overturned when organizational decisions are brought into the analysis.”
A valuable survey, but the focus is quite narrow; an older and broader literature seeking to apply transaction cost economics to issues in international business, going back to Teece (1977), should also be consulted. (Joanne Oxley’s research page is a good place to start.)
Reading List for My Entrepreneurship Course
| Peter Klein |
This semester I’m teaching a new PhD seminar, “Economics of Entrepreneurship: Theory, Applications, Debate.” Here’s an excerpt from the course description. The reading list is below the fold. Comments and suggestions are welcome.
Entrepreneurship is one of the fastest-growing fields within economics, management, organization theory, finance, and even law. Surprisingly, however, while the entrepreneur is fundamentally an economic agent — the “driving force of the market,” in Mises’s (1949, p. 249) phrase — modern theories of economic organization and strategy maintain an ambivalent relationship with entrepreneurship. It is widely recognized that entrepreneurship is somehow important, but there is little consensus about how the entrepreneurial role should be modeled and incorporated into economics and strategy. Indeed, the most important works in the economic literature on entrepreneurship — Schumpeter’s account of innovation, Knight’s theory of profit, and Kirzner’s analysis of entrepreneurial discovery — are viewed as interesting, but idiosyncratic insights that do not easily generalize to other contexts and problems. . . .
This course presents a wide-ranging overview of the place of entrepreneurship in economic theory, with a special focus on applications to institutions, organizations, strategy, economic development, and related fields. It is intended for PhD students trained in economics, sociology, business administration, or a similar field (subject to instructor permission). Students are expected to be in at least their second year of their PhD program and to be working on a dissertation, or looking for a suitable dissertation topic. This is a research-oriented class in which students take an active role identifying suitable articles and topics for analysis, leading course discussions, and evaluating themselves and their peers. (more…)
Influence of E. A. G. Robinson on Coase
| Peter Klein |
The March 2008 issue of the Journal of the History of Economic Thought features “On Robinson, Coase, and ‘The Nature of the Firm'” by Lowell Jacobsen. Robinson is E. A. G. Robinson, the Cambridge economist and longtime editor of the Economic Journal, now known mainly as the husband of Joan Robinson. Coase was trained by Arnold Plant and has written much about Plant’s influence. Jacobsen argues that Coase was also influenced significantly by Robinson, an influence that has not been widely appreciated. Here’s a bit from the conclusion:
Robinson’s influence on Coase’s writing of ‘‘The Nature of the Firm’’ through his The Structure of Competitive Industry is both obvious and significant. This is understandable, as Robinson and Coase both embraced and looked to extend the Marshallian tradition with these noted works.19 They sought to directly engage the real world of business as they were keenly interested in how firms actually behave, and why. They pursued answers to very fundamental questions: Why do firms exist? and, To what size? In addition, the study of firms and their industries requires a variety of considerations if effective decision-making by the firms’ managers is to be properly understood. In Cairncross’ fine biography of Robinson, he noted the brilliance of Robinson was his ability ‘‘to look at problems from different angles, against an historical background, taking in technology, organisational considerations, political feasibility’’ (Cairncross 1993, p. 164). Much the same could be said about Coase. . . .
[Robinson and Coase] were both interested in applying simple, yet compelling, economic concepts and theory such as scale economies, substitution at the margin and, of course, transaction costs. Further, it was important for them that economic analysis be grounded on realistic assumptions; theory that depended on fabricated assumptions to ensure tractability and even elegance should be largely avoided. Moreover, mathematics should not be the sine qua non of economic theory. Unfortunately, formalism and a priori theorizing emerged in the 1930s (given such influences as Robbins, Pigou, and even Joan Robinson) to dominate, if not define, mainstream economics, including the treatment of the firm. As a result, Coase and Robinson arguably became ‘‘outsiders’’ as Medema (1994), in his equally fine biography, concludes about Coase.
The paper is free, for now at least, on the Cambridge Journals site, so grab it while you can.
Tullock on the Corporation
| Peter Klein |
Gordon Tullock is retiring this year from George Mason Law School. In the coming weeks you’ll probably be reading a lot of Tullock tributes and Tullock anecdotes (for example, about his famous put-downs). I don’t have much to add on the personal side, but I thought I’d share a remark or two about one of my favorite, and little-known, Tullock articles, “The New Theory of Corporations,” in Erich Streissler, ed., Roads to Freedom: Essays in Honor of Friedrich A. von Hayek (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
Tullock offers a number of insights into the corporate form and, in particular, the Berle-Means problem, that are well ahead of their time. As Tullock notes in the essay, he draws heavily here on Henry Manne’s work (and, he tells us, many conversations with Manne about these issues). In 1969 the consensus view was that corporations were almost exclusively controlled by salaried managers, running firms in their own interests and largely ignoring the wishes of shareholders. However, Tullock notes:
The theory of management control of corporations, of course, is subject to one very obvious difficulty. It offers no explanation of how managements are changed, and changes of management are an everyday occurrence as any reader of the Wall Street Journal can appreciate. It is true that presidents of large corporations frequently stay in office rather longer than the president of the United States, but they don’t stay in office as long as congressmen and senators, and we would hardly argue that the long tenure of congressmen and senators indicates that we do not have democracy in the United States. Thus, the current orthodoxy that the management actually runs the corporation cannot explain how the management got there or how the everyday occurrence of a change in management occurs. For some reason, this does not seem to disturb the partisans of the . . . Berle and Means theory. (more…)
Reflections on Cyert and March
| Peter Klein |
The April 2008 issue of JEBO features a symposium on Cyert and March’s 1963 classic, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (an O&M favorite). The book has been highly influential in organization theory, somewhat influential in behavioral economics, but mostly ignored in the contemporary economics literature on the firm (see here). As Mie Augier and March note in their introduction to the special issue:
As long as the primary focus of the theory of the firm was on the aggregate outcomes of interaction among rational actors, the book’s role in economics was limited. As Cyert and March noted, “Ultimately, a new theory of firm decision making behavior might be used as a basis for a theory of markets, but at least in the short run we should distinguish between a theory of microbehavior, on the one hand, and the micro-assumptions appropriate to a theory of aggregate economic behavior on the other. In the present volume we will argue that we have developed the rudiments of a reasonable theory of firm decision making” (1963, 16).
As interest in economics moved slowly toward greater concern with behavioral micro-assumptions, ideas consistent with Cyert and March (1963) became more prominent ([Kay, 1979], [Day and Sunder, 1996] and [Day, 2002]), although with hesitations and qualifications ([Baumol and Stewart, 1971] and [Williamson and Winter, 1991]). Elements of a behavioral view of the firm can now be found in many modern developments in economics, but especially in transaction cost economics ([Williamson, 1996] and [Williamson, 2002]), evolutionary theory ([Nelson and Winter, 1982], [Nelson and Winter, 2002], [Winter, 1986] and [Dosi, 2004]), and organizational economics (Gibbons, 2003). Behavioral ideas have been elaborated not only in theories of the firm but also in collateral areas of economics, such as strategic management (Rumelt et al., 1991), organization theory (Argote and Greve, 2007), and the psychological foundations of economic choice ([Tversky and Kahneman, 1974], [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] and [Camerer et al., 2004]). Ideas of bounded rationality, conflict, learning, and routines are now commonplace, as is the general idea that economic behavior is guided by principles of human behavior. Although those ideas have many ancestors, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm probably contributed some modest amount of DNA.
Of particular interest to the O&M crowd are “Outlines of a Behavioral Theory of the Entrepreneurial Firm” by Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, and Wiltbank; “Realism and Comprehension in Economics: A Footnote to an Exchange Between Oliver E. Williamson and Herbert A. Simon” by Augier and March; and “Unpacking Strategic Alliances: The Structure and Purpose of Alliance versus Supplier Relationships” by Mayer and Teece.
Technology and Organization and Firm Size (Re-Redux)
| Dick Langlois |
I blogged a while back about the recent Dosi et al. paper in Capitalism and Society, which basically claims that, since firm size distributions (as they model them) have not changed much over time, it must be the case that recent technological change has not led to greater vertical specialization in industry. My response to this claim, which should be published soon, points out that firm size in the sense of price theory (as measured by output, employees, etc.) tells us nothing at all about firm size in the sense of Coase (number of transactions or stages of production within the firm’s boundaries). Vertical specialization does not imply small size — it may even mean larger firms. A recent NBER paper by four University of Chicago economists sheds light on this point. There is evidence, notably in a well-known paper by Erik Brynjolfsson and coauthors, that, at least before 1994, investment in ICT technology tended to make firms smaller. But there is another way in which ICT, in the form of the Internet, can make firms bigger. As this NBER paper shows, in reducing search costs in areas like new-car sales and bookstores, the Internet tended to increase the average size of the firm by driving the smaller less-efficient firms out of business and increasing the (price theory) size of the more efficient. Note that such an increase in size is not a resurgence of the Chandlerian multi-unit enterprise. Despite its diversification into many different products, even Amazon is still highly specialized vertically.
A Note to My Undergraduate Students
| Peter Klein |
From a former student:
I was in your Managerial Economics back in Spring 2005. I guess I actually learned something and remembered it. I am going back to school for my MBA and I was able to test out of my basic economics class using the knowledge I gained in your class. Since I actually paid attention to you talking about game theory, I was able to save myself from taking an extra graduate class.
Pay attention now, save $$$ later!
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