Posts filed under ‘Theory of the Firm’
Ken Lay: Not Such a Bad CEO After All?
| Peter Klein |
Jim Brickley combs through the mess of Enron trial materials to examine the behavior and performance of Missouri’s own Ken Lay. His findings may surprise you:
Internal documents released through the Enron litigation allow for a more detailed examination of the activities of top executives than is typically possible. This clinical study of Enron’s Ken Lay highlights the difference between popular opinion on the role and knowledge of CEOs with that suggested by economic theory and evidence. In contrast to popular opinion, the evidence is consistent with the following three hypotheses: 1) Lay performed a role at Enron that is consistent with existing economic theory and evidence, 2) he performed this role with reasonable diligence, and 3) while he was relatively well informed about Enron at a high level, it is unlikely that he would have had detailed information on many of Enron’s transactions — including deals with Fastow’s partnerships. News analysts assert that a positive feature of Lay’s legacy is that CEOs are now spending more time monitoring the details of financial reports and internal controls. This study suggests that the opportunity costs of this change in CEO behavior are higher than these analysts suggest.
On a related note, here is an interview with Gene Fama (via Don Boudreaux) covering principal-agent issues and CEO compensation, as well as efficient-markets theory.
Kitchen Hierarchy
| Peter Klein |
Before Kitchen Confidential made him a celebrity, Anthony Bourdain was a real chef, working upscale New York kitchens at places like the Supper Club and Sullivan’s. Bourdain’s style is not to everyone’s taste, but he knows how to manage a restaurant crew. A chef, after all, is not primarily an artist, but a manager, facing the same set of organizational challenges — delegation, incentives, monitoring — as any administrator.
I mention this because I recently stumbled upon an interview with Bourdain in the July 2002 Harvard Business Review. Despite several attempts by interviewer Gardiner Morse to get Bourdain to endorse creativity, spontaneity, and empowerment in the kitchen, Bourdain remains an unreconstructed devotee of Escoffier’s “brigade system,” a sort of culinary Taylorism in which each member of the cooking staff has a fixed place in the production chain, a very narrow job description, and an obligation to obey his chef de partie (section leader) and the head chef without question. (more…)
Podcast: Munger on Coase on the Firm
| Peter Klein |
The latest podcastin Russ Roberts’s EconTalk series features Duke’s Mike Munger on Coase and the nature of the firm.
Nicolai and I are big proponents of the Coasian framework, though it is important to realize that a lot of work has been done in this area since the 1970s (let alone 1937). See here and here for commentary.
Combining Transaction Cost Economics and the Property Rights Approach
| Peter Klein |
The transaction cost framework associated with Ben Klein and Oliver Williamson and the property-rights approach of Grossman, Hart, and Moore have a complicated relationship, as Bob Gibbons has explained. Clearly, property-rights theory is not simply a formalization of TCE, as is sometimes believed (see Williamson, Whinston, and Whinston again on the differences). One key difference, emphasized by Williamson and by Gibbons, is that the PRT focuses on the alignment of incentives ex ante, assuming efficient bargaining ex post, while TCE emphasizes ex post hazards.
A recent paper by Patrick Schmitz, “Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach” (AER, March 2006) tries to reconcile the two perspectives by creating a GHM-style incomplete-contracting model in which parties can obtain private information about their ex post benefit, resulting in inefficient rent-seeking over the realized gains from trade. Under certain circumstances, the PRT conclusions are reversed — i.e., the party with the most important relationship-specific investment should not necessarily own the other party’s investment, as the PRT implies. Worth a read.
Call for Papers: Honoring the Life and Works of Alfred Chandler
| Peter Klein |
Shawn Carraher and John Humphreys are editing a special issue of the Journal of Management History devoted to the life and work of the late Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1918-2007). Submissions are due 7 April 2008. Details below the fold. (more…)
ASSA 2008 Papers on Organizations
| Peter Klein |
Some interesting papers from the ASSA Meeting in New Orleans, where I’ll be spending the next couple of days. (I don’t have links, so you’ll have to do your own Googling to find the texts.)
ROBERT GIBBONS and REBECCA HENDERSON, Massachusetts Institute of Technology — What Do Managers Do? Suggestive Evidence and Potential Theories about Building and Managing Relational Contracts
CLAUDE MENARD, ATOM – University of Paris Pantheon-Sorbonne — The Governance of Interfirm Agreements: A Relational Contract Perspective
RICARD GIL, University California-Santa Cruz, and JEAN-MICHEL OUDOT, ATOM – University Paris Pantheon-Sorbonne — Contractual Completeness and Ex-post Efficiency: Trade-Offs between Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Costs in Contract Design
LUIS GARICANO and PAUL HEATON, University of Chicago — Information Technology, Organization, and Productivity in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Departments
DANIEL SPULBER, Northwestern University — Entrepreneurs in the Theory of the Firm (more…)
Ben Hermalin’s Teaching Materials
| Peter Klein |
Many years ago I had the pleasure of taking Ben Hermalin’s class on mechanism design and agency theory. In those days (around 1990) Ben was a baby-faced assistant professor (now a baby-faced chaired professor), just arrived from MIT where, according to rumor, he had single-handedly proofread — and therefore solved — all the exercises in Tirole’s Theory of Industrial Organization. Naturally, this gave him a certain aura among the PhD students. I also recall that, during Ben’s first year at Berkeley, George Akerlof audited his mechanism design course, leading Ben to joke that he would always remember Akerlof as one of his brightest students.
I happened to be on Ben’s website today and discovered that he’s posted a set of lecture notes (see the bottom of this page) from his PhD theory courses. See, in particular, his notes from Economics 201B, the second course in the first-year micro theory sequence. Very useful material for economics PhD students (and their instructors).
Also worth a read is this entry on contract law by Hermalin, Avery Katz, and Richard Craswell (in the new Handbook of Law and Economics, not to be confused with the earlier Encyclopedia of Law and Economics). Check it out.
Ratings Agencies
| Steve Phelan |
One of my hobbies is to perform counterfactual exercises in organization design (yes, sad, I know). Here is my current challenge. Ratings agencies like Moody’s are paid by the issuers of securities rather than the purchasers of the securities. This creates an agency problem because the rater has an incentive to give high ratings to stay in the good graces of the issuer — who will presumably “shop around” to get the best ratings.
Assuming this arrangement is efficient then what are the counterbalancing factors that offset the agency costs? How much would agency costs have to increase to trigger an adjustment in design? Was the the subprime fiasco such a trigger? What would the new design look like?
I know that economists are reluctant to second-guess how the market will work out its problems — but strategists are in the business of being proactive about these things :-)
Bounded Rationality and Economic Organization
| Nicolai Foss |
While many economists and management scholars agree that bounded rationality is important to the understanding of economic organization and there is no shortage of calls for integrating it more with existing theory (e.g., here), how exactly this should be done has been unclear. A problem is that there are so many different conceptions of bounded rationality. Thus, should Ariel Rubinstein´s approach be foundational in attempts to integrate BR with organizational economics? Or the behavioral tradition that stems from Tversky and Kahneman’s research? Or something else?
Moreover, it seems to be notoriously more difficult to work with cognitive assumptions derived from bounded rationality ideas than to doctor utility functions, which may explain why we currently see more research on how alternative specifications of agent motivation (rather than agent cognition) influence economic organization. It is therefore not surprising that to the extent that bounded rationality appears in the organizational economics literature, it is either as a label for “something that makes contracts incomplete” (Williamson, Hart) or as “whatever makes agents commit errors of evaluation” (Sah and Stiglitz) or “whatever makes agents’ information processing speed less than infinite” (team theory). Anything seems to go when it comes to modelling BR, and one is often left wondering what exactly BR is. (more…)
Fundamental Questions About Organizations
| Peter Klein |
Our most popular tag here at O&M seems to be ephemera, but occasionally we write a “big think” post (e.g., this one). Today I’ll offer another. A colleague recently asked me to write down, for a research project we’re sketching out, some “fundamental questions about organizations.” He wanted my off-the-cuff response, not a carefully crafted set of ideas. Here’s what I came up with:
1. Does organizational form matter? How much does it really affect performance, however measured? Organizational form might not be that important because (a) its effects on performance are small relative to the performance effects of technical or allocative efficiency; (b) organizational form is easily changed and always chosen optimally to fit the circumstances; or (c) organizational form is merely a legal distinction without any economic significance. (more…)
Capabilities and Comparative Advantage
| Steve Phelan |
Brad DeLong recently posted an interesting set of questions on his blog about corporate nationality: (more…)
JMS Special Issue on the Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm
| Peter Klein |
In the Spring of 2005 I attended a terrific workshop on “The Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm,” organized by Sharon Alvarez and Jay Barney and held at Ohio State University. Participants included Mark Casson, Dick Langlois, Sid Winter, Ulrich Witt, Ivo Zander, Simon Parker, Todd Zenger, Steve Michael, Bill Schultze, and several others. The papers and discussions explored a variety of approaches for linking the theory of entrepreneurship to the economic and strategic theory of the firm, a subject near and dear to our hearts here at O&M.
The workshop papers have now been published as a special issue of the Journal of Management Studies (volume 44, number 7, November 2007), edited by Sharon and Jay. A special contribution from Brian Loasby, who wasn’t able to attend the workshop, is included. And don’t miss this paper from an unusually structured joint-spousal team.
Agency Theory and Intrinsic Motivation
| Nicolai Foss |
Agency theory represents one of the most influential and controversial bodies of microeconomics. To some, it is an extraordinarily powerful theory that can be applied in all sorts of ways and provides the theoretical foundation for the understanding of reward systems, many contractual provisions, the use of accounting methods, corporate governance, etc. To others (e.g., Bob, Jeff, and Alfie), it is the brainchild of overly cynical economists, responsible for most evil in the World, including bad managerial practices and Enron. (more…)
Poor INSEAD
| Peter Klein |
Business school Insead, founded in 1957 in Fontainebleau, France, opened a campus in Singapore in 2000 and markets itself as “Business School for the World.” “People assume the majority of faculty and students are French,” complains Insead Dean Frank Brown. “That’s not true.”
We’re not French — not that there’s anything wrong with that. This comes from an interesting item about firms with multiple corporate headquarters in yesterday’s WSJ. Lenovo has corporate offices in Beijing, Singapore and Raleigh, N.C. Thomson SA CEO Frank Dangeard says he doesn’t “want people to think we’re based anyplace.” Lenovo’s William Amelio claims the concept of a home country is “outdated.” (Pankaj Ghemawat, call your office!)
There’s a bit of work in multinational strategy about the distribution of subsidiaries across countries and the relationships between subsidiaries and the corporate office. I’m not aware of any studies on multiple corporate offices, however. Any suggestions?
AEI Conference on Private Equity
| Peter Klein |
Those of you in the Washington, DC area may wish to drop by “The History, Impact, and Future of Private Equity: Ownership, Governance, and Firm Performance,” November 27-28 at AEI. The lineup features heavyweights like Michael Jensen, Glenn Hubbard, Josh Lerner, Steve Kaplan, Ken Lehn, Karen Wruck, Annette Poulsen, Mike Wright, and David Ravenscraft, along with a few not-so-heavyweights like me. From the conference announcement:
From humble beginnings twenty-five years ago on Wall Street, the leveraged buyout boom has developed into a veritable industry; today, 30 percent of all corporate merger and acquisition activity in the United States is driven by buyout firms, and the sector commands over $2 trillion in leveraged assets. Along with hedge funds and real assets, private equity is now seen as an important alternative investment class, and fundamental changes in corporate control, governance, modern capital markets, institutional investing, and the funding of entrepreneurial pursuits have all been driven by the growth and evolution of the private equity sector.
My view is that the growth of the PE sector represents an increasingly important manifestation of entrepreneurship — not only because private equity helps fund new ventures, but because the creation of new financial instruments such as high-yield (“junk”) bonds, the establishment and management of diversified buyout funds, the use of private equity to restructure public enterprises, and the like are themselves entrepreneurial acts, given an appropriately broad understanding of entrepreneurship.
The Organizational Implications of Creativity
| Peter Klein |
This paper, forthcoming in Organization Studies, asks how entrepreneurs can structure firms to encourage employee creativity and discovery while discouraging unproductive rent-seeking. The former requires delegation and the latter requires close monitoring and control; managing these trade-offs is a key to successful entrepreneurial performance.
In “The Organizational Implications of Creativity,” Richard Gil and Pablo Spiller examine a similar trade-off: the choice between internal and external procurement of creative activities. The nature of these activities makes them difficult to manage internally, but buying creative content on the market subjects the buyer to the winner’s curse. Here’s the abstract:
We develop a basic framework to understand the organization of highly creative activities. Management faces a fundamental tradeoff in organizing such activities. On the one hand, since creativity cannot be achieved by command and control or by monetary incentives, internal/contractual production of creative products is plagued by hazards arising from their fundamental characteristics: extremely high input, output and market uncertainty, and the inherent informational advantages of creative talent. Procuring highly creative products in the market place, though, exposes the distributor to a fundamental risk: independently produced creative goods are generic distribution-wise. Thus, in procuring creative products in the marketplace, distributors face the unavoidable winner’s curse risk. Since this risk is, to a large extent, independent of the creative nature of the product, the higher the creative content, the higher the relative hazards associated with internal or contractual production. Thus, internal/contractual production of creative goods will tend to be less prevalent the higher the creative content associated with its production. We apply this insight to the evolution of the U.S. film industry in the mid-XXth century. We exploit two simultaneous natural experiments — the diffusion of TV and the Paramount antitrust decision forcing the separation of exhibitors from distributors and prohibiting the use of block-booking. Both events increased the demand for creative content in movies. We develop empirical implications which we test by analyzing in detail the decision by distributors to produce films internally or to procure then in the market place, in the face of an increase in the demand for creative content.
I’m Not Narcissistic, Just Really Important
| Peter Klein |
If you have the kind of sophisticated sense of humor I have, you enjoy Bud Light’s “Real Men of Genius” series. Yesterday I heard the salute to “Mr. Stadium Scoreboard Marriage Proposal Guy”:
You’ve combined the three things you love most in the this world:
Your girlfriend, your team, and lots and lots of attention.
I thought of that when reading Arijit Chatterjee and Donald Hambrick’s recent ASQ paper, “It’s All About Me: Narcissistic CEOs and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance” (working-paper version here).
This study uses unobtrusive measures of the narcissism of chief executive officers (CEOs) — the prominence of the CEO’s photograph in annual reports, the CEO’s prominence in press releases, the CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns in interviews, and compensation relative to the second-highest-paid firm executive — to examine the effect of CEO narcissism on a firm’s strategy and performance. Results of an empirical study of 11 CEOs in the computer hardware and software industries in 1992-2004 show that narcissism in CEOs is positively related to strategic dynamism and grandiosity, as well as the number and size of acquisitions, and it engenders extreme and fluctuating organizational performance. The results suggest that narcissistic CEOs favor bold actions that attract attention, resulting in big wins or big losses, but that, in these industries, their firm’s performance is generally no better or worse than firms with non-narcissistic CEOs.
Remember, there’s no “I” in “team” — but if you look closely, you’ll find a “me.”
Demsetz, Coase, Postrel, and Williamson
| David Hoopes |
A recent post by Nicolai ponders Demsetz’s approach to transaction costs. My understanding (interpretation) of Demsetz’s “The Theory of the Firm Revisited” is quite different from Nicolai’s. Here’s how I remember that paper.
One of Demsetz’s complaints about transaction costs economics is that a number of very different events are bundled together under the term “transaction.” Williamson’s take on transaction costs focuses largely on comparative governance costs. How does making sure a supplier doesn’t cheat you compare to making sure your employees don’t cheat you? Coase’s version of transaction costs is very different. Coase tends to talk about a variety of other frictions that can occur independently of governance costs. These are what Demsetz calls management costs. Demsetz thinks (quite correctly) that referring to these two types of costs using the same term is confusing. In his Nobel speech Coase notes how his beliefs were more consistent with Demsetz’s than with those emphasizing governance.
Steve Postrel and I (in disucssing capabilities in SMJ 1999) separate cooperation costs from coordination costs. I think of this as fitting the Williamson versus Demsetz and Coase types of transaction costs (or management costs as Harold says). Costs dedicated to aligning incentives are different from costs of making sure everyone has the same plan. Steve and I go on to differentiate the costs of sharing specialized knowledge from the costs of coordinating. (Notice how I moved from Coase and Demsetz to myself?!).
Back to Harold. Demsetz believes that you needn’t have oppourtunism to have organizations. Postrel (2003) in an earlier version compared knowledge and governance as theories of the firm. Where Demsetz believes firms economize on managerial costs (or Coasian transaction costs) Postrel believes that without opportunism the firm is unnecessary.
I’m more with Harold (at least in my own mind I’m not sure Harold really wants me tagging along).
Reflections on the McQuinn Entrepreneurship Conference
| Peter Klein |
Last week’s McQuinn Center conference on entrepreneurship in Kansas City was a great success, with some 75 participants from places like Nepal, Norway, the UK, and Peru as well as the US and Canada. Keynoters Cornelia Flora, Pierre Desrochers, Sandy Kemper, and Randy Westgren challenged and inspired the group and the papers and discussions highlighted a variety of innovative entrepreneurship research topics, theories, and methods. Papers and presentations are now available on the conference website.
I had the pleasure of offering introductory and closing remarks, and I’ll share here some reflections about the state of the field and suggestions for moving forward. (more…)
Contract Design Capabilities
| Nicolai Foss |
In his thoughtful appraisal of Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Brian Loasby pointed out that the ability to transact and exchange is itself a capability, that firms may differ in terms of such capabilities, but that organizational economics routinely assume that firms have perfect transacting capabilities. This insight has been curiously neglected in the lenghty debate on the relations between transaction costs and capabilities. Former O&M guest blogger Dick Langlois is one of the few scholars who have embraced the insight, mainly from the capabilities side of the debate and casting it in terms of his notion of “dynamic transaction costs.”
A recent line of research initiated by Nick Argyres and Kyle Mayer addresses the issue more from the organizational economics, mainly TCE, side. Thus, Nick and Kyle’s excellent 2004 Organization Science paper, “Learning to Contract,” makes the empirically grounded point that changes in the structure of the contracts that govern a relationship may (for complex contracts in uncertain environments) reflect joint learning rather than the risks of specific assets. (more…)
Organizations and Markets 
Recent Comments