No Country for Old Probability Theorists
| Peter Klein |
I finally got around to seeing No Country for Old Men, which I enjoyed despite unrealistically high expectations (movies too suffer from the winner’s curse). Javier Bardem’s Anton Chigurh surely belongs with Darth Vader, Hannibal Lecter, Dr. Christian Szell, Nurse Ratched, and Max Cady on the list of all-time great movie villains. The movie is in one sense a meditation on the role of chance in human affairs, so naturally I started thinking about risk, uncertainty, choice, delegation, and other issues near and dear to our organizational hearts.
Chigurh, the cold-blooded killer, likes to flip a coin before deciding whether to kill someone, forcing the victim to call the toss. This reminded me that risk and Knightian uncertainty aren’t mutually exclusive determinants of economic outcomes. Entrepreneurs choose to invest in risky projects, but project selection itself reflects the bearing of Knightian uncertainty. Richard von Mises gives the example of champagne bottles that burst while in storage with predictable frequencies. The champagne producer can quantify the risks associated with bottling and storage. But the choice of producing one variety or another, hiring one type of laborer or another, and even being in the champagne business at all, involves another kind of uncertainty, one that cannot be described with mathematical precision. The decision to enter the champagne business involves Knightian uncertainty, but once that decision has been made, some of the variation in outcome can be characterized as probabilistic risk. Think of it in terms of mixed strategies; the specific move is random, but the decision to play a mixed strategy is not. Likewise, Chigurh can hardly claim that his victims’ deaths are random. A coin flip determines their fate, but he chooses to flip the coin — and that choice cannot be explained by a known probability distribution. (more…)
Does Performance Cause Organizational Form?
| Peter Klein |
There is a large literature on the performance effects of organizational form. Obviously, for the strategist, getting organizational form right is important only if it leads to superior performance. Of course, the empirical literature recognizes that organizational form, governance, strategy, and other key decision variables are at least partly endogenous. Still, the causal arrows are usually thought to run from strategy to performance.
Ben Hermalin was at Missouri this week to present his paper, “Firm Value and Corporate Governance: Does the Former Determine the Latter?”, which argues that good governance can be the result, not the cause, of good performance. He constructs a model in which the benefits of getting governance right are, on the margin, increasing in the value of the firm’s investment opportunities. Better-performing firms have better opportunities and hence more to gain from designing governance structures that align managers’ incentives with owners. The model is based on an agency framework and applies specifically to managerial governance, but the general problem would seem to apply to a variety of organizational problems and contexts. (more…)
Private Equity and Innovation
| Peter Klein |
LBOs do not reduce patent activity, and the quality of patents may actually increase following a “going-private” transaction, according to a new paper by Morten Sorensen, Per Strömberg, and Josh Lerner.
A long-standing controversy is whether LBOs relieve managers from short-term pressures of dispersed shareholders, or whether LBO funds themselves are driven by short-term profit motives and sacrifice long-term growth to boost short-term performance. We investigate 495 transactions with a focus on one form of long-term activities, namely investments in innovation as measured by patenting activity. We find no evidence that LBOs decrease these activities. Relying on standard measures of patent quality, we find that patents applied for by firms in private equity transactions are more cited (a proxy for economic importance), show no significant shifts in the fundamental nature of the research, and are more concentrated in the most important and prominent areas of companies’ innovative portfolios.
I very much like this kind of work even though I’m a patent skeptic (1, 2, 3, 4).
Numbers Don’t Lie — Or Do They?
| Peter Klein |
Quantitative analysis leads to superior decision making, says Ian Ayres in Supercrunchers. Enthusiasts for expert systems are skeptical of “intuitive” reasoning. And most contemporary social scientists can’t conceive of a world without econometrics, sociometrics, psychometrics, and fill-in-the-blank-ometrics. Even management scholars are getting into the act. Of course, quantitative analysis is only as good as the assumptions that go into it. And economists such as Knight and Mises maintain that some kinds of human decision-making defy quantification and systematization and are fundamentally qualitative, or verstehende (explaining why some entrepreneurs earn profits while others make losses).
Wharton’s Gavin Cassar studies nascent entrepreneurs (defined here as firm founders) and finds, surprisingly, that those who use common accounting practices such as budgeting, sales forecasting, and financial planning are more likely to overestimate future performance than those who rely on qualitative, intuitive projections. “[T]hose individuals who adopt an inside view to forecasting, through the use of plans and financial projections, will exhibit greater ex-ante bias in their expectations. Consistent with inside view adoption causing over-optimism in expectations, I find that the preparation of projected financial statements results in more overly-optimistic venture sale forecasts.” In other words, quantitative analysis may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, cognitive bias. Worth a read (and see this summary in Knowledge@Wharton).
A New Explanation for Scholarly Productivity
| Peter Klein |
I always suspected it: scholarly productivity is inversely related to — beer. That’s the finding of a new study of Czech ornithologists, as summarized in yesterday’s N.Y. Times (thanks to Brian McCann for the heads-up). The more beer a scientist drinks, the less likely he is to publish or to have his work cited. Apparently this is a cross-sectional result, without fixed effects or instrumental variables, so there is little information on causality. Perhaps unsuccessful Czech scientists tend to drown their sorrows at the local pub (no doubt drinking their copycat Budvar). Personally, I am more likely to grab a brew to celebrate the occasional citation, so I’d expect the correlation (under reverse causality) to run the other way. And what about these rats?
Economics and the Rule of Law
| Peter Klein |
This week’s Economist features a summary of recent economic controversies about the rule of law (thanks to Fabio Chaddad for the pointer). There is near-universal consensus among specialists in economic history and economic growth that the legal rules — and institutions more generally — “matter,” though the precise mechanisms are in dispute, and aspects of the institutional environment such as the quality of legal rules are difficult to measure consistently across societies and over time. We’ve touched on the closely related “legal origins” debate before. As with that controversy, the arguments in this one have become more subtle and complex in the last decade. As the Economist notes:
[A]s an economic concept the rule of law has had a turbulent history. It emerged almost abruptly during the 1990s from the dual collapses of Asian currencies and former Soviet economies. For a short time, it seemed to provide the answer to problems of development from Azerbaijan to Zimbabwe, until some well-directed criticism dimmed its star. Since then it has re-established itself as a central concept in understanding how countries grow rich — but not as the panacea it once looked like.
The Economist piece focuses on the distinction between “thick” and “thin” understandings of the rule of law. (more…)
Fed Intervention Policy
| Steve Phelan |
Greg Mankiw reports that Myron Scholes has a novel idea to fix the credit crisis – rather than simply guaranteeing to underwrite asset losses (as they have with the JP Morgan/Bear Stearns ) Scholes proposes that the Fed takes senior equity and debt positions in a distressed bank thereby improving the capital adequacy ratio, and thus preventing a credit freeze which would damage the real economy. I like it – what do YOU think?
Debt Bites Back
| Steve Phelan |
A nice cartoon presentation of the debt crisis by the Wasington Post that you might want to use in your classes.
Two questions:
1) Is the story essentially correct or is it overly damning?
2) What are the organizational implications of this story – for institution and policy building?
We can only assume that all sorts of “corrective” measures will be planned and taken in the immediate future. I believe we should be getting involved in the debate by honing our theoretical position. We are watching economic history in the making.
Hayekian Knowledge Arguments: An Epistemic Fallacy?
| Nicolai Foss |
A small handful of papers have become highly influential in economics as well as in management and organization research. One such paper is Friedrich Hayek’s 1945 essay, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” a paper that emerged in the context of the debate on the viability and efficiency of planned resource allocation on the societal level (i.e., socialism) that raged among academic economists in (particularly) the inter-war period. Hayek famously argued that planning confronts inherent knowledge-based constraints, and these constraints are certainly binding at a scale of activity that makes comprehensive overall management/planning of economy-wide resource allocation deeply inefficient. Many modern management thinkers have echoed this argument, arguing that “traditional” authority relations are increasingly challenged by the (increasingly) dispersed nature of knowledge.
However, at least when applied to authority in firms the Hayekian knowledge argument arguably misconstrues the nature of managerial authority, because it is based on an epistemic fallacy. (more…)
Jay Barney to Become Honorary Doctor at CBS
| Nicolai Foss |
At a ceremony on April 4., a honorary doctorate will be bestowed upon Professor Jay B Barney by the Copenhagen Business School. Jay will be in excellent company; earlier honorary doctors at CBS include Oliver Williamson and James March. (more…)
Big Think in Management Research
| Peter Klein |
Greg Clark’s A Farewell to Alms has received a lot of attention in the econo-blogosphere. I haven’t read the book and don’t have much to say about it but you can read as much as you like from Cowen, McCloskey, DeLong, Caplan, Kling, and others. One of the most interesting reviews, to me, is this one by Robert Margo of Boston University. Margo admires the book but dislikes this genre, what he calls “Big Think.”
“Big Think” refers to the genre of economic history that asks The Big Question. Why England and not China? Do institutions “matter” or is it something else, or many things? Why is the United States rich and Bolivia poor?
Reviewers should be upfront about their ex ante biases. Here is one of mine: I do not care for Big Think. The Big Question per se is not the problem — in economics, there is nothing more important. For me, the problem with Big Think is that it is inherently Too Big. One cannot hope to answer The Big Question by tackling it head on. One must break The Big Question into a great many very tiny precisely posed questions, and get the answers to them right. In economic history we are still _very_ far from completing this task even for a country whose economic history is as well-worn as the United States. Big Think is a Big Distraction from our true purpose in life. (more…)
Reviewing Your Friends
| Nicolai Foss |
Sometime ago I received a request from the Academy of Management Review to review a paper that I immediately recognized, having read it in an earlier version. I informed the editor that I couldn’t do the review because I knew the identity of the authors. About a month later I met one of the authors. I told her that I had been asked to review one of her papers, but had declined, to which she replied: “You should have done the review! We would’ve liked to have that paper in the AMR.” I confess to being somewhat baffled by all the implicit assumptions in this reply (i.e., the paper was actually of good quality, I would have recommended it, etc.), but also by its flagrant disrespect for the principle or ideal of anonymity in reviewing. (more…)
Biblical Wisdom for Academics
| Peter Klein |
The gang at St. Maximos’ Hut has been running a series on the Proverbs and Psalms, highlighting verses that apply to faculty life. To wit:
On faculty recruiting: “He that walketh with wise men shall be wise: but a companion of fools shall be destroyed.” (Prov. 20:13)
On peer review: “Boast not thyself of to morrow; for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth. Let another man praise thee, and not thine own mouth; a stranger, and not thine own lips.” (Prov. 27:1-2)
On people who teach 8:00am classes: “He that blesseth his friend with a loud voice, rising early in the morning, it shall be counted a curse to him.” (Prov 27:14)
And perhaps you’ve seen this one before — a prayer before faculty meetings:
Keep me as the apple of your eye;
hide me in the shadow of your wings
from the wicked who assail me,
from my mortal enemies who surround me.
They close up their callous hearts,
and their mouths speak with arrogance.
They have tracked me down, they now surround me,
with eyes alert, to throw me to the ground.
They are like a lion hungry for prey,
like a great lion crouching in cover.
Rise up, O LORD, confront them, bring them down;
rescue me from the wicked by your sword. (Ps. 17:8-13)
The list also includes economic topics such as capital, financial planning, market institutions, information, etc.
Upcoming Events: A Busy June
| Peter Klein |
June is an exciting month for O&Mers looking for research conferences. First up is ACAC 2008, 12-14 June in Atlanta. ACAC, which has received high marks on this blog, is an annual workshop organized by Rich Makadok emphasizing the “big issues” in strategic management. Next is the DRUID 25th Anniversary Conference, 17-20 June in Copenhagen, with the theme of “Entrepreneurship and Innovation.” The distinguished participant list includes Rajshree Agarwal, Carliss Baldwin, Bo Carlsson, Kathy Eisenhardt, Maryann Feldman, Bronwyn Hall, Steve Klepper, Anita McGahan, Joanne Oxley, Olav Sorenson, Scott Stern, Sid Winter, and some Foss guy. Immediately afterward is ISNIE’s 12th annual meeting, 20-21 June, in Toronto. I am on the program committee, working with president-elect Scott Masten, and we got a bunch of great submissions this year. Barry Weingast and Robert Ellickson are keynoters. The preliminary program should be up on the ISNIE website soon.
Also, for graduate students in economics, history, philosophy, political science, business administration, and related disciplines there’s the Rothbard Graduate Seminar, 13-18 June in Auburn, Alabama. The RGS is an intensive workshop and research seminar on Austrian economics that uses Murray Rothbard’s Man, Economy, and State as its core text. I am one of the discussion leaders.
If I could teleport I’d attend all four!
Asset Specificity and International Trade
| Peter Klein |
The May 2007 issue of the Quarterly Journal of Economics featured a nice piece by Nathan Nunn, “Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade.” The paper constructs an aggregate, country-level measure of asset specificity and relates it to characteristics of a country’s contract-law regime and its patterns of international trade. When asset specificity is high, firms tend to rely on contracts or vertical integration, rather than spot markets, so countries with good legal protection for contracts are more likely to specialize in the production of goods requiring specific investments.
Is a country’s ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of comparative advantage? To answer this question, I construct a variable that measures, for each good, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that require relationship-specific investments. Combining this measure with data on trade flows and judicial quality, I find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important. According to my estimates contract enforcement explains more of the pattern of trade than physical capital and skilled labor combined.
One can quibble about the data and variables, such as the proxy for asset specificity (the absence of organized exchange or a publicly listed price for an input) and use of national input-output tables to construct measures of vertical integration, but overall this strikes me as an impressive piece of work, a clever combination of transaction cost economics and international trade theory. Check it out.
Big Brother Is Watching You
| Peter Klein |
Yahoo has changed the look of its home page, including the placement and format of RSS feeds. David Gerard sends along this scary image of what greeted him when he logged onto his computer this morning.
Steven Cheung Has a Blog
| Peter Klein |
Unfortunately it’s in Chinese. Perhaps one of our Chinese-speaking readers could summarize its contents?
Here is an English-language blog dedicated to Cheung’s ideas. Here is his wikipedia entry, which includes some information on the Late Unpleasantness. And of course the economic analysis of property rights, to which Cheung is a major contributor, is a popular topic on this blog.
New NSF Solicitation
| Steve Phelan |
This call might be of interest to organizational economists:
From Jack M at the NSF:
NSF issued a new solicitation on Virtual Organizations as Sociotechnical Systems yesterday. Proposals are due 2 June.
Further information and a link to the solicitation itself can be found at:
http://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=503256&org=NSF&sel_org=NSF&from=fundThis is a wonderful opportunity for US-based social scientists working on topics pertinent to virtual organizations, broadly construed. A synopsis and list of some potential topics is provided below. (more…)
Pre-Internet Blogging
| Peter Klein |
From the great Wiley Miller. The number of listeners seems about right.
More on Property Rights and Strategic Management
| Nicolai Foss |
The economics of property rights in the tradition of Ronald Coase, Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Steven Cheung, Winston Bush, Eirik Furubotn, Yoram Barzel, John Umbeck, Dean Lueck and Doug Allen is a very minor voice in the conversation of strategic management scholars. Although the EPR is basically generalized micro-economics (mostly done verbally), it does employ terminology and develops insights that lie outside the domain of economics knowledge of most strategy scholars. (more…)
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